

# THE ART OF ADAPTATION

A STUDY ON THE EUROPEANIZATION  
OF FINLAND'S FOREIGN AND  
SECURITY POLICY

*Teemu Palosaari*

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*The Art of Adaptation.*

A study on the Europeanization of  
Finland's foreign and security policy

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## 1. Introduction

*"The EU membership strengthens the foundations of Finnish security. (...) As a small country we have to adapt, but we also wish to influence. That is the key question in our security policy currently."*

(Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995 "Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy.")

Let us imagine that a state A joins an international organization. The accession presents a change in the state's foreign policy. Let us then assume that the member states of the international organization in question jointly decide to deepen their cooperation in the area of foreign policy, to the extent that the organization eventually can be considered to have its own foreign and security policy, which each member state is expected to follow. Thus the membership requires continuing change of national foreign policy – the state has to adapt to the common policy decided upon at the international level. In addition to mere adaptation, the member state can also try to influence the common policy – by participating in the common decision-making process. Let us then complicate the picture by assuming that a central feature of the organization is a continuing political process which aims to deeper integration in a number of policy areas, foreign, security and defence policy included. Furthermore, as time goes by the membership influences the interests of the state: once a member, the membership can help the state to fulfil its other interests. On the other hand, the membership can change the state's perception as to what its interests actually should be.

Now we have proceeded from the state's autonomous decision to apply for membership to potential impacts of the membership to the state's national policies, preferences and identities. Theory-wise we have entered a watershed: Political Science theories with a rationalist ontological orientation tend to take national interest as a constant factor, a given thing, that is *exogenous* to the above-explained interaction. On the other hand, theories that build on more constructivist starting points argue that preferences and identities of actors are subject to change as well and should thus be regarded as *endogenous* factors. By taking a step from metatheory towards theoretical level a consequential division between rationalist and sociological forms of institutionalism can be located. Here the divisive factor is the way the institutions under transformation are defined: rationalist institutionalism focuses on political and administrative structures,

”formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government” (Vink & Graziano 2007, 13) whereas sociological institutionalism broadens the scope into the underlying political values and identities by highlighting the organizational cultures, conventions and ways-of-doing-things. Institutions are seen as “collective understandings that constitute the self-images and preferences of actors” (*ibid.*, 13).

To lower the level of abstraction let us now replace the state A with *Finland*, and the organization with the *European Union*. In theoretical terms we can at the same token place our attention on European Studies and integration theory, which offer the tools most typically used for analysing such multifaceted processes between the European and domestic levels. A growing research literature on *Europeanization* focuses on the impact of European integration on the domestic level of the member states – and in many cases non-members as well. As will be pointed out in more detail in the following chapter, Europeanization as an approach is connected to both the “institutionalist turn” and “constructivist turn” in Political Science and International Relations.

The research setting and questions to be asked in this study stem both from the empirical and theoretical starting points. Empirically there are certain distinctive characteristics that make Finland an intriguing case for studying the impact of European integration on national foreign and security policy. A non-aligned Finland and common European security and defence policy does not look at the first glance the most obvious pair. From a Central European perspective Finland might indeed appear a geographically peripheral country with a foreign and security policy that diverges from the European mainstream (that is to say having no NATO membership). Somewhat surprisingly, however, when one looks a bit deeper and scratches the surface of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) process, Finland keeps popping up, and often in connection to issues one would least expect. The connection of Finland (together with Sweden) and the so-called Petersberg tasks is well-known: a Finnish-Swedish joint initiative resulted in the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force tasks in crisis management including peacemaking) being written into the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union. Furthermore, there are a number of cases of Finnish activity, but perhaps on a lower level of political visibility: Finns played a role that cannot be underestimated for instance in the geographically most distant EU/ESDP overseas mission (Aceh Monitoring Mission, Martti Ahtisaari). In Africa, a Finn served as the special representative of the EU regarding the Darfur crisis (Pekka Haavisto). In the institutional side, one can note the first chairman of one of the three new ESDP institutions established after ESDP got its kick-start in St. Malo: EU Military Committee (Gustav Hägglund). One can also point to the debate on the so-called structural cooperation in the context of the European Convention and the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and find Finnish activity concerning the solidarity clause

and mutual defence article. Add to that the *Helsinki* Headline Goal and the promoting of civil crisis management and civilian-military cooperation and Finnish participation in two EU battle groups and one can certainly conclude that there is more than meets the eye. It can be safely argued that Finland's relationship with the EU's foreign and security policy – and particularly the security and defence policy dimension of it – is certainly a complex and many-sided one and thus worth closer studying.

The Finnish national foreign and security policy has changed considerably since the early 1990s. In the official documentation the traditional neutrality policy has been replaced by “full political commitment to European integration” and “military non-alignment”. In this light it has been argued by various scholars that the turn from East to West in Finland's foreign and security policy orientation culminated with Finland's EU application<sup>1</sup>, and that the Finnish foreign and security policy has in fact experienced a drastic change during the EU-membership. The EU membership has, for instance, challenged the Finnish concept of foreign policy by turning many previously central foreign policy issues into “internal” EU affairs, affected the division of foreign and security policy power between the President and the Prime Minister and added the political weight of the Parliament in foreign and security policy. Other impacts of the EU that the scholarly studies typically point to are that the relations with other European states have become closer, the bilateral relationship with Russia has turned into a multilateral one, and global policies are now made in the reference group that consists of EU-member states.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, however, there is a tendency in the Finnish official discourse to value and underline continuity, coherence, autonomy and logic of Finnish foreign and security policy. A typical feature in Finnish foreign and security policy has been that even substantial changes may be camouflaged by an emphasis on continuity and logic rather than change. This may well have its roots in the Cold War era: for a neutral country it was necessary to show that the policy has not changed as a result of external pressure, as a neutral country cannot by definition follow someone else's policies (Ojanen et al. 2000, 141; Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003, 130-131; Ojanen 2002, 154). According to some scholars the national foreign and security decision-making elite has promoted and highlighted the continuity aspect purposefully in order to construct the Finnish state identity as being something in which European and Western features have always been

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<sup>1</sup> The first Government Report on Finnish security policy after the EU accession contains two particularly noteworthy passages in this respect. Firstly, it is noted that “The EU membership has become part of the Finland's international identity” (Government Report 1/1995, 6). Secondly, the Report states that “Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure” (*ibid.*, 40). Further analysis on the Report is presented in chapter 4 of this study.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Tiilikainen 2006, 2007, Ojanen 2002, Ojanen et al. 2000, Browning 2002, Tiilikainen & Raunio 2003, Forsberg 2000b, Forsberg 2001, Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 2001.

present, even if in an embryonic state during the Cold War (Browning 2002, Browning 2008, Moisio 2003). This has in turn made it possible to argue that adapting to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) presents no significant break from the traditional line of Finnish foreign and security policy. The construction of continuity actually presents a positive challenge that inspires the research in this study at hand: to unveil change where it is argued not to take place. Consequently, the theoretical framework and methodological solutions are in this study tailored so that they support this task.

What also makes the Finnish case attractive is that security policy has traditionally played a crucial role in Finland. In the domestic cultural understandings it has been strongly linked to the survival of the country. Moreover, security policy has been perceived as sphere where national consensus should reign, particularly since Finland is a small state. According to Ojanen the centrality of security policy is a main factor shaping Finland's position on ESDP, and even the EU has often been seen from a security policy standpoint (Ojanen 2007, 34). The research on Finnish foreign and security policy and EU-membership generally talks of "Westernization", "communalization" or moving from Moscow to Brussels, from neutrality to full political commitment, implying that the EU has indeed influenced Finnish policies. In two major comparative studies, the term Europeanization has been used (Rieker 2006, Jokela 2010). However, a deeper and more detailed analysis of the transformation process has not yet taken place. Especially the national level political processes related to the change remain largely uncovered – for instance, how the EU has found its way into the national political argumentation on security policy, and how the role given to the EU's security policy arrangements has changed during the membership. This study focuses particularly on the changes concerning the key Finnish foreign and security policy concepts (such as non-alignment, peacekeeping and small stateness). Participation in the EU's foreign, security and defence policies has resulted in the reconstruction of these concepts, and new, and in many ways more "European", meanings have been attached to them. Additionally, the study at hand will serve as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland's reactions and contributions to the different stages of CFSP and ESDP development during the first 13 years of EU-membership. It looks at how the alleged key questions of Finnish security policy – "adaptation and wish to influence"<sup>3</sup> – have been realised.

To sum up, from the empirical view point the value of the Finnish case for the study of European integration's impact stems firstly from the considerable change that has taken place in national foreign and security policy. Secondly, compared to the vast majority of

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<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

the other cases, the Finnish starting points for the Europeanization process are quite exceptional. Issues such as the tradition of neutrality policy, the turn of attention from East to West, military non-alignment and non-NATO-membership draw Finland apart from the European mainstream. The vigorous national debate on security policy and the EU's security policy significance – and the contrasting views in the debate – also increase the attractiveness of the Finnish case. For instance, questions concerning the defence dimension of CFSP have typically carried a totally different weight in the Finnish debate than in most of the other countries.<sup>4</sup> Contradicting views can also be found in the domestic academic debate. Furthermore, a small state aspect can be added to the list: the question of small states' vulnerability to the European integration's impact as well the question of their ability to influence the European policies are topics that European Studies touch upon regularly (Hanf & Soedendorph, Antola 2002, Wallace 1999, Kelstrup 1993). Additionally, the studies on Finnish foreign and security policy Europeanization are very limited in number, but yet certain interesting contradictions between the conclusions drawn in the studies can be located.

In addition to the topical debates referred to above the research question of this study stem from the research literature on Europeanization. Typical research topics in Europeanization studies include the EU's impact on member states in various policy sectors as well as decision-making and administrative structures. In addition to national adaptation, the so-called bottom-up direction of Europeanization, that is to say national projection, has been taken into consideration and studied. This means analysing the impact of member states on the EU policies. Other actors than states have also been the topic of Europeanization studies: European integration has provided different domestic interests groups with new political arenas and a chance to challenge or bypass the state level by communicating directly with the European level. All in all, Europeanization has become an established research tradition in European Studies and the foreign and security policies of many EU member states have been studied with the conceptual tools of Europeanization theory. In this study Europeanization theory is complemented with Constructivist International Relations (IR) theory's views on state identity. From a constructivist IR perspective European integration forms an interactive context that is favourable for state identity change. The study builds on the understanding of foreign and security policy as a practice that reproduces identity, and therefore the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy may eventually result in a more Europeanized state identity. A more detailed discussion on the formulation of the research questions, as well as on the applicability and limitations of the selected approach and on its metatheoretical background is presented in chapter 2. It also

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<sup>4</sup> Debated questions include, for instance, does a mutual defence article or solidarity clause make the EU a military alliance. See chapter 6.2.1.

includes a critique and reconstruction of those variants of Europeanization that are typically used for studying foreign and security policy.

Although a main motivator in the background of this study is the fact that the number of previous studies on the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy has been limited, this is not to say that the topic has not been touched upon: a number of studies have dealt with Finland and CFSP (see chapter 3.2) but the framework of Europeanization has been utilized only rarely. Juha Jokela links his analysis explicitly to the Europeanization literature (Jokela 2010). He compares the Europeanization of British and Finnish foreign policies from a post-structural discourse analytical perspective. In addition to that, Norwegian researcher Pernille Rieker has studied the Europeanization of Nordic countries “security identities” and the Finnish case among these. In both these studies Finland is placed in a comparative research setting, which unavoidably decreases the depth of analysis concerning a single case. However, for the purposes of this study the works of Jokela and Rieker are highly useful in that they look at the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy from the perspective of identity.

In addition to filling in the evident lack of Europeanization research on Finnish foreign and security policy, a central purpose of this study is to challenge and question some of the research results and consequent conclusions drawn in the previous studies. Therefore selected items of the previous research literature on Finland are in the following chapters linked to the three different conceptualizations of Europeanization (Wong 2005) and the metatheoretical orientations behind them. Analysis of the primary empirical material is thus complemented with the critical reading and assessment of the previous studies – which hence can be seen to serve as secondary material for the study at hand. In addition to the critical commenting the study argues that the previous studies give an incomplete picture of the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy; it is question of a more profound process of change than the previous studies indicate. Finnish foreign and security policy has undergone significant change during the EU membership and the key conceptions of national foreign and security policy have increasingly been challenged and replaced by new ones. Consequently, as the central elements defining the Finnish state identity have changed, “Finland” is not what it used to be. This study looks at how this happened, and to what extent Europeanization can explain it.

### *Structure of the study*

Chapter 2 contains a theoretical discussion on Europeanization, foreign policy and state identity. It is discussed how the impact of European integration on Finnish foreign and security policy can be conceptualized and studied. Additionally, based on the critical assessment of the theoretical aspects of Europeanization the study will also propose certain ways in which the Europeanization approach in studying national foreign and security policy can be further developed. Europeanization is first described as an analytical approach in European Studies from a broader perspective. After that the different definitions and variants of Europeanization as well as its relationship with integration theories are discussed. Finally, the scope is narrowed into the Europeanization of foreign and security policy: how that particular policy area has usually been studied in Europeanization research and what sort of theoretical tools have been developed for that purpose. The relationship of Europeanization with constructivism and the different institutionalisms is then discussed. In the final part of the theoretical chapter the constructivist IR theories on state identity reproduction are linked to the theoretization on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy. At the same time the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the selected theoretical framework are explained. The purpose is to enrich the selected Europeanization approach with theoretical views on state identity reconstruction and the role of international interaction in the change of state identity.

Chapter 3 prepares the ground for the empirical analysis and looks at both ends of the Europeanization process, that is to say CFSP and Finland and prepares the ground for the empirical analysis. On the basis of previous research it is presented how CFSP constitutes a misfit pressure resulting to Europeanization. It is also explained how the adaptational pressure caused by CFSP has gradually increased during the Finnish EU membership era because of the deepening of European integration in security and defence. Chapter 3 also discussed Finland's proneness to Europeanization: there are certain characteristics in the state identity and cultural understandings related to foreign and security policy of Finland that function as facilitating factors in the Europeanization process and increase the potential vulnerability of Finland to adaptational pressures caused by the CFSP. A categorization of the key foreign and security policy concepts as vehicles of state identity production is presented in Chapter 3.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain the empirical part of the study. The empirical analysis will proceed chronologically and is divided in three phases (1994-1996, 1997-2002; 2003-2007). As will become evident in the empirical chapters, the division is based on the finding that the character of the Europeanization process differs significantly in each



phase. The final chapter 7 aggregates the main findings of the previous chapters and discusses their implications on the Finnish state identity. Chapter 7 links the empirical findings to the constructivist IR identity theory's basic assumptions and draws conclusions on the European integration's impact on Finnish state identity reproduction in which foreign and security policy plays an essential role.

## **2. Theoretical discussion on Europeanization, foreign policy, and state identity.**

### **2.1 Introduction**

As this study deals with the impact of European integration on Finnish foreign and security policy, the central question of the theoretical chapter is how this impact can be conceptualised and studied. The answer presented – that is to say the theoretical framework of the study – builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory.

The study begins with the following broader question: “What is the impact of EU membership on Finnish foreign and security policy?” As was explained in the previous chapter this question stems both from an empirical and theoretical background. Eventually, when the theoretical framework based on the Europeanization literature is applied to the Finnish case, an answer can be given to the following question, too: “To what extent can “Europeanization” explain the change of the Finnish foreign and security policy after the Cold War?” This latter formulation of the research question enables the critical assessment of the Europeanization approach, its pros and cons. Thus the theoretical contribution of this study will concern the ability of the Europeanization approach to come to grips with a process of change taking place in the national foreign and security policy of a member state of the European union.<sup>5</sup> Based on the critical assessment of the theoretical aspects of Europeanization the study will also propose certain ways in which the Europeanization approach in studying national foreign and security policy can be further developed. Additionally, a full-length study on Finland can also be seen as a reply to the need for more studies conducted “to test the longitudinal impact of EU on national foreign policies” presented in the Europeanization literature (Wong 2007, 331).

The following theoretical discussion looks first at Europeanization as an analytical approach in European Studies from a broader perspective and discusses the different definitions and variants of Europeanization as well as its relationship with integration theories. After that the scope is narrowed into the Europeanization of foreign and security policy: how that particular policy area has been usually studied in Europeanization research and what sort of theoretical tools have been developed for that

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<sup>5</sup> Europeanization as a conceptual approach has been also used to study European non-EU-members, as for instance Rieker’s study on Norway (Rieker 2004) proves.

purpose. The main topic here is the three-dimensional conceptualization of Europeanization of foreign policy by Reuben Wong which he calls “an operational theory of Europeanization” (Wong 2005, 135; Wong 2006, 7; Wong 2007). Particularly I focus on the sociological institutionalism-oriented variants of Europeanization typically used for studying foreign and security policy.

Moving on to a more metatheoretical level, the chapter then arrives at the crossroads of European Studies, International Relations and Political Science and investigates the relationship of Europeanization with constructivism and the different institutionalisms. In the final part of the theoretical chapter the constructivist IR theories on state identity reproduction are linked to the theoretization on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy. At the same time the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the selected theoretical framework are explained. The purpose is to enrich the selected Europeanization approach with theoretical views on state identity reconstruction and the role of international interaction in the change of state identity. A related theoretical argument in the study is that so far much of the Europeanization literature on foreign and security policy has endorsed a too simplified and unproblematic view on the (causal) connection between individual level identity change and national level foreign and security policy change. Consequently, the IR theoretisation on state identity is here used as a way to move the attention from the identity reconstruction at the individual level (which is seen here more as a playground for disciplines like social psychology or anthropology; see below) into the level of state identity reconstruction that can be approached by analyzing the national foreign and security policy.

### *The key theoretical assumptions and their connections*

The theoretical chapter deals first with the issue of Europeanization, and the theoretical discussion on state identity construction is presented after that in chapter 2.4. However, I start with a brief overview on the connections of state identity and Europeanization from the perspective of the general research design of the study.

The first major theoretical assumption that this study builds on is that there is a significant connection between state identity and national foreign and security policy. The key concepts of national foreign and security policy serve as the *vehicles of identity production*<sup>6</sup>, which reflect juxtapositions between ‘selves’ and ‘others’ through which national and state identities are produced. The basic statements and concepts of identity theory (such as other/self, enemy/friend, threat pictures, identity reproduction, see e.g.

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<sup>6</sup> Wæver argues that since identity is a relational concept, that it is produced through juxtapositions between selves and others it is possible to identify “specific concepts which historically have come to take on particular importance as ‘vehicles’ of identity production” (Wæver 2002, 24).

Neumann 1996) can be applied to the analysis of national foreign and security policy. Consequently, foreign and security policy tells us how the state in question places itself – identifies – in the international system. Here the study connects to a theoretical tradition in IR which sees state identity as contained and reproduced through foreign policy. Foreign policy is thus seen as a practice that defines and manifests the difference between self and other by making certain objects ‘foreign’ (Campbell 1992, Wallace 1991, Aggestam 2004; see chapter 2.4 below for further discussion on this). In the context of European Studies these vehicles of identity production can help us to understand how particular national and state identities are constructed, re-articulated and modified in the face of the evolving European integration (Wæver 2002, 21).

The definition of state identity adopted in this study follows the so-called middle ground constructivist IR theory’s position on identity and identity change. Main points of that approach can be summed up as follows: 1) identity is a social fact, and not constant and exogenously given, but rather constructed and reconstructed in mutually constitutive social action; 2) interaction at the systemic level has the potential to change state identities and interests (e.g. Christiansen et al. 2001, Buzan et al. 1998, Adler 1997, Checkel 1998, Wendt 1994, 1999). A more detailed discussion on social construction of state identity and on European integration as a context for identity reconstruction is provided in chapter 2.4.2. The connection of constructivist IR theory and Europeanization will also be explained there more thoroughly. At this point it suffices to note that IR theories are useful in understanding how state identity can change in interaction, whereas Europeanization literature can shed light on how European integration can impact a given policy area, in this case national foreign and security policy. State identity and foreign and security policy, then, are linked together through the assumption that the key concepts of national foreign and security policy function as the vehicles of identity production which determine the state identity. (The manner in which these vehicles of identity production are to be located in the Finnish case is explained in 3.)

The second major theoretical assumption of the study thus concerns the role of European integration in the change of the key national foreign and security policy concepts. The literature on Europeanization argues that EU-membership has an impact on national foreign policies – although in different ways in different member states (that is to say there is “national variation”). This Europeanization takes place not chiefly by complying to EU-decisions but primarily by ”softer” means such as learning, socialisation (leading to shared understandings, norms, ways of doing things), i.e. mechanisms related to identity reconstruction. Consequently, Europeanization studies on foreign and security policy tend to rest on a constructivist scientific world view and sociological institutionalism. Chapter 2.2 below will take a closer look on the different ways to

define and study Europeanization. That is followed by a closer analysis of those variants of Europeanization that are specially tailored for and typically used in analysing the change of foreign and security policy.

## 2.2 Europeanization as an approach

“Although there is considerable conceptual contestation with regard to the question what it actually is, the bulk of the literature speaks of Europeanization when something in the domestic system is affected by something European” (Vink 2002, 1).

“[T]he main idea of Europeanization [is] retracing the effects of the European integration process at the national level” (Major 2005, 177).

It is possible to locate three theoretical debates of broader significance in the background of Europeanization research. Firstly, Europeanization is linked to a development trend in European Studies which has shifted the focus of studies from the EU-level onto the domestic level. There is “an emerging literature analysing the impact of European integration and Europeanization on domestic political and social processes of the member states and beyond” (Börzel & Risse 2000, 1). General integration theories (such as neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and federalism) often seek to explain why nation states agree to abandon parts of their sovereignty in order to pool it in supranational organizations such as the EU. These tend to focus on what happens to the state and its sovereignty whereas Europeanization analyses what happens to domestic institutions and actors. (Börzel 1999, 576-577; Major 2005, 178.)

This turn in European Studies took place in the mid-1990s as some scholars with their background in (Comparative) Political Science criticized the dominance of IR-based theorizing on European integration.<sup>7</sup> For instance Hix (1994, 1999) argued that the IR-based theories posed the wrong questions: the question of whether there should be more or less *integration* does not motivate the behaviour of most of the actors involved in the activities of the EU. Rather, these are individuals and groups pursuing their interests within a complex political system (Rosamond 2003, 112). Therefore the re-launch of

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<sup>7</sup> According to Bulmer & Lequesne (2005, 10) the precursors to the literature explicitly termed ‘Europeanization’ dealt with the relationship of state and integration. Three competing conclusions were drawn: Integration strengthens the state (intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik 1993); Integration provides new channels of political access and influence for domestic actors enabling them to bypass the state (neofunctionalist, Marks 1993); the character of state is transformed (Kohler-Koch 1996).

Political Science approaches in European Studies can be seen as a starting point for Europeanization studies. From that perspective previously under-researched questions were located particularly in issues related to the domestic implementation processes of European policies in such fields as environmental policy or transport policy or the European impact on national party systems, political parties and local government. Since the concept was initially developed for communitised policy areas in the first pillar (see Major 2005) foreign and security policy was not a common topic at the first stages of Europeanization studies.

Later on, however, wider or “softer” definitions were presented in which Europeanization was not restricted to complying with EU regulations or transposing and implementing EU directives, but Europeanization could proceed for instance through the framing of domestic beliefs and expectations or by influencing the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making or by changing informal rules, norms and ways of doing things (Vink 2002, Vink & Graziano 2007; Radaelli 2000). Such an approach was suitable for studying national foreign and security policy, too – a policy field where there simply are no EU directives to follow.<sup>8</sup>

The second general theoretical debate related to Europeanization concerns the so-called institutional turn in the study of European integration (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000; Hix & Goetz 2000, 18; Vink 2002, 11). Börzel and Risse note that Europeanization as a new approach “fits nicely with recent developments in international studies in general which increasingly study the domestic effects of international institutions and norms” (Börzel & Risse 2000, 1). Börzel sees a predominance of institutionalist analysis in explaining the mechanisms of change caused by Europeanization (Börzel 2005). According to Vink in answering how European policies, rules and norms (formal or informal, binding or non-binding) actually affect domestic politics and policies “scholars of Europeanization have almost without exception reverted to the broad spectrum of theories that fall under the umbrella of the so-called ‘new institutionalism’” (Vink 2002, 10).

The basic premise of neo-institutionalism can be summed up in the following way: Institutions contain the bias individual agents have built into their society over time. They structure political actions and outcomes, rather than simply mirror social activity and rational competition among disaggregated units. Thus institutions affect outcomes. Institutions are classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating procedures

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<sup>8</sup> Currently CFSP operates as the second pillar of the European Union. In foreign and security policy essential authority remains with EU member states’ governments, although the European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament, are associated with the process. Decisions require unanimity among member states in the EU’s Council. EU has introduced more flexible voting procedures on CFSP decisions by allowing individual governments to abstain, or by using majority voting, or by allowing a majority of countries to act on their own; but unanimity is still required on decisions with military or defence implications. (See Treaty on European Union, Article 23.)

and organizations of government; but for neo-institutionalism an institution also encompasses informal norms, routines and conventions (March & Olsen 1984, 2005; Aspinwall & Schneider 2000, 3; Vink 2002, 11). Neo-institutionalism is usually divided into two or three major variants: rationalist and historical institutionalism or sociological, historical, and rationalist institutionalism (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000).<sup>9</sup> In different definitions the understanding of institutions then ranges from legal arrangements and formal rules to routines and norms. Both formal and informal structures that influence human behaviour are thus included (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000, 4).

### *Europeanization as a process: how does the change take place?*

Different neo-institutionalist branches lead to different views as to how Europeanization takes place and what are the mechanisms of change. What connects most of the variants of Europeanization is the assumption that there are two basic conditions for expecting domestic change: misfit and adaptational pressure. According to Bulmer “misfit and adaptational pressure are the source of the twin track (rationalist and sociological) set of factors leading to domestic adaptation” (Bulmer 2007, 53). Misfit refers to “the incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and institutions, on one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions on the other”. It is misfit that constitutes adaptational pressures necessary for the Europeanization process to happen in the first place.<sup>10</sup> Caporaso notes that theoretization on how, under what conditions and with what response “Europe matters” begins by thinking of the degree of pressure created by Europeanization. This pressure is a function of the degree of misfit between “Europe” and the domestic level: “If there is a good fit, there is little pressure for change at the domestic level. (...) But if the fit is poor (...) greater adaptational pressures will be felt” (Caporaso 2007, 29). Additionally, Europeanization studies typically discuss the role of mediating factors, that is to say the various domestic structural conditions that affect the impact of European integration. These are seen to include for instance cultural factors, formal and informal institutions, as well as so called veto groups (national actors with formal right of rejection or with capability to obstruct, slow down or amend legislation or implementation) (Caporaso 2007, 30-31).

The rationalist institutionalist view leads to “thin” Europeanization: actors make the best of new European opportunity structures by calculating consequences (Vink 2002, Börzel & Risse 2000). This might lead to institutional changes in political organization: the development of an organizational and financial capacity for common action and

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<sup>9</sup> A fourth variant, discursive institutionalism, has also been presented (Schmidt 2004).

<sup>10</sup> For scholarly discussion on the misfit-concept or the “goodness-of-fit” proposition see Börzel and Risse 2007, 491-492; Toshkov 2005.

governance through processes of reorganization and redirecting of resources (Olsen 2003). From a rationalist institutionalist perspective Europeanization leads to domestic change also through differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse 2000). Typical for thin Europeanization is that the adaptational pressure is caused by a so called *policy misfit*: “European policies might cause a policy misfit between European rules and regulations, on the one hand, and domestic policies, on the other. (...) European policies can challenge national policy goals, regulatory standards, the instruments or techniques used to achieve policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving approach.” (Héritier, Knill and Mingers 1996; quoted in Börzel & Risse 2000, 5). What justifies calling this type of Europeanization “thin” is that it is not seen to radically alter the way the Europeanized actor perceives its fundamental interests or identity.

The sociological institutionalist (SI) perspective on Europeanization brings us to the above-mentioned third theoretical debate in European Studies which concerns introducing and applying constructivist approaches to the study of European integration.<sup>11</sup> The SI-perspective contrasts the rationalist “logic of consequentialism” with a constructivist “logic of appropriateness”: rather than maximizing their subjective desires, actors strive to fulfil social expectations in a given situation. “Actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper (i.e. socially accepted) behaviour in a given rule structure. Such collective understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence *the way actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational action.*” (Börzel 2005, 54; emphasis added.) The interpretation of institutions also differs from the RI-perspective: “Institutions do not simply regulate actor’s behaviour by providing opportunities and constraints. They constitute actors by giving them a fundamental understanding of what their interests are and what the appropriate means may be to pursue these interests.” (*ibid.*, 54). Institutions are constitutive, in that they *comprise the criteria by which agents form their identity* (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, 11; Aspinwall & Schneider 2000, 9). The institutional change from SI perspective can also refer to changes in structures of meaning. That is, focus is on the development and redefinition of political ideas – common visions and purposes – that give direction and meaning to common capabilities and capacities (Olsen 2003, 335).

The sociological institutionalist view leads to “thick” Europeanization: actors adopt a new set of preferences, or even a new identity (Vink 2002). From this perspective Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and

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<sup>11</sup> Sociological institutionalism builds on a scientific world view that is constructivist (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). See Rosamond 2003 on the relationship of sociological institutionalism and constructivism in EU studies. Chapter 2.4.2 will discuss constructivism in IR and European Studies in more detail.



structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures (Börzel&Risse 2000, 9). European institutions “entail new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning, which the member states have to incorporate. Domestic actors are socialized into European norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly” (Börzel 2005, 54). Yet, it must be taken into consideration that such “cognitive” or “normative” pressures do not necessarily result in domestic change. Domestic actors and institutions often resist change despite significant pressure for adaptation (*ibid.*). On the other hand, the domestic level can also offer facilitating factors for thick Europeanization: according to Schmidt significant domestic policy change towards the European policies is most likely to occur where a convincing supportive domestic discourse is deployed (Schmidt 2002, 900; Bulmer 2007, 53).

From the SI-based view point the source of adaptational pressure is often called an *institutional misfit*: European policies, norms, and the collective understandings attached to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes, because they do not resonate well with domestic norms and collective understandings. Institutional misfit may trigger collective learning processes and socialisation which could change actors’ interests and identities. It has been argued that such Europeanization might even threaten deeply collective understandings of national identity as it touches upon constitutive norms such as state sovereignty (Risse 2001; Checkel 2001).<sup>12</sup>

In closer analysis the degree of such thick Europeanization depends on two mediating factors: change agents<sup>13</sup> or norm entrepreneurs who mobilize in the domestic change and persuade others to redefine their interests and identities; a political culture and other informal institutions exist which are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing. (Börzel & Risse 2000.) A question posed by SI-oriented Europeanization is thus “to which degree domestic norms and institutions change in response to international institutional arrangements?” (Börzel & Risse 2000, 9.) Consequently the focus is on socialisation processes by which actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of international society “in good standing” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; quoted in Börzel & Risse 2000, 9).

According to Börzel & Risse the two theoretical logics of Europeanization are not mutually exclusive, but they often occur simultaneously or characterize different phases

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<sup>12</sup> Regarding the Finnish case it has been argued that the Finnish conception of sovereignty was revised due to EU-membership and CFSP (Tiilikainen 2003; Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming). For further discussion on the previous studies on the Finnish case see chapter 4.

<sup>13</sup> According to Börzel & Risse (2000) there are two types of norm- and idea-promoting agents: epistemic communities and advocacy or principled issue networks.

of adaptational change (Börzel & Risse 2000). This view is shared by Vink who sees that empirical studies should determine the relative weight of thin and thick Europeanization by developing contrasting hypotheses from the sociological and rational strains of institutionalism (Vink 2002, 13, 17). This idea is followed in this study accepting that in order to achieve a comprehensive view on the impact of European integration on Finnish foreign and security policy it makes sense to look for thin and thick Europeanization, thus utilizing both rationalist and sociological/constructivist view on institutions. Eventually, in the empirical analysis the main emphasis, however, will remain on thick Europeanization and sociological institutionalism; which can be labelled as the mainstream or most common way of looking at Europeanization of foreign and security policy – although, as noted earlier, the total number of studies on long-term Europeanization of foreign and security policy still remains rather limited.

As the above-presented points on the impact of sociological institutionalism on Europeanization studies indicate, the third theoretical debate in European studies that can be linked to Europeanization concerns the constructivist turn in IR and the emergence of constructivist approaches on European integration (see Christiansen et al. 2001).<sup>14</sup> The main contribution of constructivism to Europeanization has been on the social construction of identities and interests. Constructivist Europeanization approach can, for instance, “explore whether national participants in the EU policy process are socialized into different values and behaviour that might impact upon their presentation of national policy” (Bulmer & Lequesne 2005, 15). Norms and values may be uploaded or downloaded as much as concrete policy preferences or institutional models. Moreover, national identity may be understood to be constructed in interaction with the EU (*ibid.*). The connection and compatibility of constructivism and Europeanization is further discussed in chapter 2.4.2.

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<sup>14</sup> Applying constructivist perspectives to European integration is a relatively novel issue (Christiansen et al. 2001, 1). However, Friedrichs (2003) argues that a certain tradition of “proto-constructivism” has existed for decades. Such proto-constructivist views have seen Europe as a man-made social and political construct (Friedrichs refers to integration theories of E. Haas and Deutsch from late 1950s and 1960s). Furthermore, he states that cultural studies and the multidisciplinary debate on the “idea of Europe” have shown how boundaries of Europe are geographically and conceptually contested and contingent. Studies on European identity in the early 1990s also deal with social identity and build on the assumption that Europe is an ‘imagined community’ (cf. Anderson 1983) or a ‘world of our making’ (cf. Onuf 1989). Checkel (2001) argues that theorizing social interaction in the context of European integration has produced good results that build on a constructivist starting points. Furthermore, since Christiansen et al presented their argument on the lack of constructivist turn in integration studies the number of constructivist-oriented studies on European integration has steadily increased. Also theoretical work that builds on constructivist premises has emerged.

### **2.3 Europeanization of national foreign and security policy: dimensions and directions**

Although the majority of studies dealing with Europeanization concern other fields of policy than foreign and security policy, both theoretical and empirical studies on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy have emerged. Hence foreign and security policy is not considered immune to Europeanization, despite its many special features (Wong 2005, 137). The deepening of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy since the 1990s (see chapter 3) has been seen to advance the Europeanization of national foreign and security policies. Yet in the general theoretical debate foreign and security policy is often seen as a special case in which Europeanization is less versatile than in many areas of social and economic policy (see e.g. Featherstone 2003). The reason for this is often located in the highly intergovernmental nature of CFSP or in the traditional link between state sovereignty and national foreign and security policy (see Gross 2007, 503). According to Bulmer and Radaelli the potential mechanisms of Europeanization are particularly influenced by the fact that CFSP consists of "facilitated coordination, Open Method of Coordination, political declarations or 'soft law'" (Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 345-351). Because of this most of the studies on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy are based on SI-oriented thinking and thick Europeanization and are thus more or less constructivist in their orientation. However, as will be pointed out below in connection to the Finnish case, it is also possible to look at the Europeanization of foreign and security policy from a rationalist institutionalist perspective. It will be seen that such an exercise does not prove wholly unfruitful. Yet, the limits of the rationalist institutionalist approach on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy become soon evident.

Usually the interpretations of the Europeanization of foreign policy are in some way or another based on the following SI-oriented idea on state behaviour: states adopt the logic of appropriateness according to which they follow institutional rules, unless this explicitly infringes one of their vital interests, because they fear being considered untrustworthy or 'inappropriate' (March and Olsen 1998). Because of this institutions can "penetrate into a foreign policy standard operating procedure and influence decisions" (Andreatta 2005, 32). Consequently "a process of 'Europeanization' could follow which, like a coordination reflex, could progressively draw national positions closer" (*ibid.*). Moreover, the conceptualisations of the Europeanization of foreign and security policy typically point to the lack of real supranational powers in that field of integration: CFSP is "made through intergovernmental negotiations or looser exchanges. Legal measures are downplayed in favour of political declarations, targets and so on" (Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 355). Based on this it is then asked how powerful can

Europeanization be in the case of “governance by coordination”. The answers usually refer to the SI-oriented logic of change presented above: the Europeanization of foreign and security policy is thus characterized as being “more voluntary and non-hierarchical”, “ideational convergence” and “essentially horizontal and dependent of learning.” (Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 355).

Another character of foreign and security policy that sets its mark upon Europeanization is that it is a highly elite-led and securitised policy field, both on national and European level. Therefore the Europeanization of foreign and security policy is seen as a “process of learning amongst national elites” that is based on “changes in the cognitive frameworks used by policy-makers to understand and assess reality” (Bulmer & Radaelli 2005, 355). What drives Europeanization forward are ‘horizontal’ exchanges between member government and the resultant learning of shared policy principles” (*ibid*, 355). The influence of SI-thinking is apparent as it is seen that the Europeanization of foreign and security policy “shows how institutional changes and development may affect identities and interests, as well as how changing identities may create pressures for the new institutional forms and modes of behaviour” (Wong 2005, 149).<sup>15</sup> Consequently, the concept has a strong focus on interrelationship of institutions and identities (*ibid.*).

In the following I present three dimensions of Europeanization of foreign policy, which can also be seen as three different ways to study the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy. Additionally, a tentative assessment of their applicability on the Finnish case is done in the light of previous studies (most of which do not use an explicit or manifested Europeanization approach<sup>16</sup>, but yet deal with Finland’s foreign and security policy and the European Union) in chapter 3. Further analysis, that is to say applying these concepts to the Finnish case is done in the chapters 4, 5 and 6 devoted for actual empirical analysis of the Finnish case. The following classification is based on the work of Reuben Wong (2005, 2006, 2007) on the different ways to analyse the Europeanization of foreign and security policy. Wong’s aim is to develop Europeanization as an alternative way to understand the foreign policies of EU member states. To this end his purpose is to build *an operational theory of Europeanization*. According to Wong the concept of Europeanization can be applied to studying national foreign policy in the following ways: 1) Europeanization as a top-down process of national adaptation; 2) Europeanization as national projection, that is to say a bottom-up process involving the export of national preferences and models; 3) Europeanization as the socialisation of interests and identities, i.e. identity reconstruction. Wong calls these the three *dimensions of Europeanization* in national foreign policy that are most relevant

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<sup>15</sup> Note the connection to social ontology, (IR) constructivism and identity change, which are discussed in the chapter 2.3.

<sup>16</sup> With the notable exception of the comparative studies by Jokela 2010 (on UK and Finland) and Rieker 2004 (on Norway, Sweden and Finland).

and potentially useful for the purpose of studying member states' foreign policies (Wong 2005, 141; Wong 2006, 7).

Wong's classification embraces both sociological and rationalist institutionalist variants of Europeanization described above. However, it should be noted that the way Wong defines the three dimensions is problematic in the sense that the first two of them are defined in terms of the *direction* of the influence (in national adaptation the member state is *Europeanized*; in national projection the member state *Europeanizes*, see more on this below), whereas the third dimension refers more to the sociological institutionalist aspects of the process (identity reconstruction). Hence there appears to be a logical incompatibility between the dimensions. Thus the following presentation on the different ways to conceptualise the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy is followed by critical remarks as well as a suggestion how to better acknowledge and utilize the two different institutionalist logics explained above. Eventually, a reconceptualisation is suggested in which there are two *directions* (top-down adaptation and bottom-up projection) and two *dimensions* (RI-oriented thin and SI-oriented thick Europeanization). This fine-tuned version is then used in analysing the Finnish case in chapters 4, 5 and 6.

### 2.3.1 National adaptation

The first way to analyse the impact of the EU on a member state's foreign and security policy is to conceptualize Europeanization as a top-down process of *national adaptation*. It is used in the Europeanization literature to explain the *top-down* adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU. The adaptation pressure is seen to come from outside the national system, that is to say from the EU. In order to rid of the misfit in question, the member state is reactive and makes adjustments in its domestic politics and structures in compliance with the constraints and requirements of European institutions. At the same time the EU's political and economic dynamics may become "part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making" (Ladrech 1994, 69). (Ladrech 1994; Hanf & Soetendorp 1998; Wong 2006, 8; Wong 2007.)

The national adaptation may lead to bureaucratic organization and constitutional change as well as to increased salience of the European agenda. The latter refers to the growing importance of the CFSP and ESDP in national foreign policy and to an increased importance of the EU's security institutions in the minds of national decision-makers. This results in "advocating increased application of instruments located in the two institutions", that is to say CFSP and ESDP (Gross 2007, 505). Other related indicators

of this type of Europeanization of national foreign and security policy are adherence to common policy objectives, policies agreed for the sake of EU unity, and relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions (Gross 2007).

The empirical studies conducted from top-down perspective point to the following two main findings: The capacity of national institutions to resist or adapt to the impact of European integration depends on national factors. These mediating factors (as defined above) make the impact of top-down Europeanization different in different member states. (Wong 2005, 137.) Top-down studies often build on positivist search for causalities. The emphasis on causality has also been presented as the major weakness of the approach: when the change takes place as an undetermined transnational process, it is difficult to prove that the reason for change is the EU and not something else (Featherstone 2003, 12). Consequently, numerous intervening variables complicate the presented mechanisms of change (Bulmer & Lequesne 2005, 15).

### *2.3.2 National projection*

The second "school of thought" in Wong's classification defines Europeanization as promoting and exporting nationally defined policy models, ideas, goals and interests into the other member states and to the EU level (Wong 2006, 9). In other words, it is a question of bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to supranational level (Wong 2007, 325). In contrast to the previous approach the member states are not seen as passive or reactive actors but as the primary actors of change. They are motivated mainly by their pursuit of nationally defined goals. National projection can happen via ideational export; example setting (pledging funds and resources); strengthening cooperation by involving other international organizations; or by discursive influence. If such "uploading" of national goals is successful it might lead to emergence of new policies or structures at the EU level, too. In analysing this type of Europeanization Wong finds the following criteria central: "Has the state pushed for its national foreign policy goals to be adopted as EU goals/policy? Has the state benefited from the 'cover' of the EU? How indispensable is the EU to the achievement of national foreign policy?" (Wong 2006, 16.)

There is a variety of mechanisms through which an EU member state can commit national projection. Firstly, "ideational export" refers to the promotion of national ideas on the European level. Secondly, by "example setting", for instance by pledging funds and resources a member state can encourage the other member states to follow the

nationally preferred common European actions. Thirdly, a member state can try to strengthen the EU cooperation by involving other international organizations in the process. Finally, a member state can also invest on “discursive influence”. (Wong 2005, also Miskimmon 2007.) Ideational export can also follow a “horizontal pattern” between the member states. Concepts like “cross loading”, and “horizontal Europeanization” have been used when referring to modifications coming from other countries, policy areas or institutions, with the EU being rather the frame for change than its origin (Major 2005, 181). According to Vink & Graziano, horizontal effects “may be understood as the result of both increased competition and cooperation between countries and also of increased exchange of information and mutual learning simply by being part of an integrated Europe” (Vink&Graziano 2007, 10).

A general benefit of the bottom-up approach is that it recognises the role of the national initiatives and domestic political debates. The problem, however, is that the analysis rarely reaches the question how the national interests regarding EU issues are created in the first place. Especially, when based on the rationalist view on institutions and their transformation, the national projection approach fails to acknowledge the impact that European interaction might have in the construction of the national interests, ideas and policy models. National interests or identities should not be considered exogenous to the interaction taking place in the context of European integration. From a wider IR theory perspective the problem is that state identities and interests are here taken as “given”, and the impact of interstate interaction in constructing them is disregarded (cf. Wendt 1994).

The third approach, presented in the following, builds on the assumption that although the member states export their nationally defined foreign and security policy interests into the EU, they cannot avoid simultaneously participating in a process of interaction which holds the potential to affect the quality of those interests. This constructivist aspect incorporated in the approach significantly increases its suitability for analysing Europeanization of foreign and security policy.

### *2.3.3 Identity reconstruction*

The third approach in Wong’s classification on the Europeanization of foreign and security policy differs from the two others especially in that its applicability in a rationalist institutionalist framework is limited. In the third approach Europeanization is conceptualised as the socialization of interests and identities, or identity reconstruction. According to Wong “Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity and interest convergence so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to

take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape them”(Wong 2007, 325). It does not regard member states’ preferences, interests and identities as being somehow external to the action at the EU level. The approach rests clearly on sociological institutionalism as it is seen that the EU’s common policies have encouraged new conceptions of interest and identity among its member states (Wong 2006, 10; Wong 2005, 145). The constructivist tone of the approach is evident as norms, values and identities are presented as objects of Europeanization, among the decision-making structures, legislation, national policy modes and concrete political preferences. Norms, values and identities are reconstructed socially and primarily in interaction among the national decision-making elites. Concerning foreign and security policy it has been argued that the CFSP institutions have a strong ”socialising” effect: “Prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU Member States and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines” (Wong 2005, 138). In this convergence process the socialisation of elites plays a central role. On the level of individual identities Europeanization studies have come to the conclusion that officials in the Commission and other EU institutions in Brussels are increasingly thinking in ‘European’ rather than ‘national’ terms: “intense and repeated contacts have socialised not only EU officials, but also national officials working in EU institutions. Even national diplomacies are becoming more ‘European’ and displaying a ‘coordination reflex’ in foreign policy-making.”<sup>17</sup> (Wong 2005, 138)

Tonra’s study on the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland is a good example of this approach. He looks at whether the development of CFSP has constrained or empowered the national foreign policies of those (small) states. His approach is constructivist in that he analyses ”the inter-relationships between agents and structure” in order “to see where structure enables/disables action and where action reproduces/changes structure” (Tonra 2001, 9). He argues that social interaction may result in identity change leading to reconstruction of foreign policy. Additionally, he sees that there has been an “apparent identity-shift in national foreign policies as a result of participation in European foreign and security policy” to which constructivism offers an explanation (*ibid.* 14).

From a constructivist IR perspective it has also been argued on a more general level that European integration forms an interactive context that is favourable for state identity change (Wendt 1994). This third Europeanization approach has been seen to have a connection to the concept of security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957) – as it “suggests the possibility of eventual convergence of national foreign policy” (Gross 2007, 506) – and to the broader IR literature on national identity, as well as to neofunctionalist

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<sup>17</sup> “Élites involved even in the governmental bargaining process of ECP/CFSP show surprising signs of internalising supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to their national capitals” (Wong 2005, 146). Wong refers to the following studies: Øhrgaard 1997; Smith 2000; Bellier 2000.



integration theory (e.g. Haas 1958), since the focus on the redefinition and negotiation of identities mirrors “a neofunctionalist reading of a gradual transfer of identity and affiliation towards a new supranational Europe” (Gross 2007, 506).

#### *2.3.4 Critical assessment and reconceptualization*

As was explained in chapter 2.2 Europeanization as an approach rests on three turns in the theoretical debate in European Studies. First of these originated in the work of comparative political scientists that succeeded in putting emphasis on the domestic impacts of European integration. The second turn related to neo-institutionalism and the third brought in constructivist theoretisation. Wong’s three-class conceptualization of Europeanization of national foreign and security policy reflects these turns: both impact on domestic level and European level are present, as is the legacy of neoinstitutionalism. Furthermore, constructivist underpinnings of such concepts as “socialisation” and “identity reconstruction” are recognized.

However, while the rationalist/sociological institutionalism-division seems to be observable in Wong’s theoretisation, a problem is that national adaptation and national projection tend to be explained overwhelmingly in the terms of rationalist institutionalism: bureaucratic organization and constitutional change, adaptation of domestic structures, projection of national policy models and goals and the like. Hence identity reconstruction remains somehow isolated from adaptation-projection dynamism. In Wong’s classification identity reconstruction is placed outside the two first dimensions, adaptation and projection, and is constituted as a individual “dimension” of Europeanization. Yet it is not comparable with national adaptation and projection as they are mainly about the direction of the process, whereas identity reconstruction refers more to the sociological institutionalist aspects of the process in stating that European integration shapes member states’ interests and identities. Furthermore, some of the studies on foreign policy Europeanization conclude that national adaptation can result in elite socialization (e.g. Smith 2000, Tonra 2001). Similarly, national projection can be approached from a SI-perspective for instance by looking at how “Europe” or “European interests” are conceptualised and utilised in the domestic political processes and debates in which the national goals, models or preferences to be projected to the European level ultimately are decided on.

Therefore it is argued here that adaptation and projection should rather be seen as the (top-down and bottom-up) directions in which both rationalist institutionalist and sociological institutionalist Europeanization can happen. Europeanization of foreign and security policy can take place in two main *directions*: there is top-down national

adaptation and bottom-up national projection.<sup>18</sup> Identity reconstruction should thus not be seen as a separate analogous category as national adaptation (i.e. downloading) and national projection (uploading). Rather, there are two interconnected *dimensions* in this process: rationalist institutionalist “thin” Europeanization and sociological institutionalist “thick” Europeanization. The former refers to changes in national or European level structures and policies; and the latter to changes in perceptions and identities (see Table 1). All in all, Wong’s theoretisation is found here very useful for the purposes of the study. Fine-tuned with these clarifications and slight modifications it will serve as the foundation for the theoretical framework to be used in studying the Finnish case.

		<b>Directions of Europeanization</b>	
		Adaptation	Projection
<b>Dimensions of Europeanization</b>	Sociological institutionalist	Top-down thick Europeanization	Bottom-up thick Europeanization
	Rationalist institutionalist	Top-down thin Europeanization	Bottom-up thin Europeanization

*Table 1:* Directions and dimensions of Europeanization in foreign policy

Another critical issue from the viewpoint of this study concerns the link between identity reconstruction and national foreign policy change. The above discussed Europeanization literature suggests that identity reconstruction takes place through socialization and social learning of elites. Consequently, an underlying theoretical assumption appears to be that the Europeanization of identities of the members of the foreign policy-making elite results in Europeanized national foreign and security policy.

<sup>18</sup> The adaptation/projection dualism includes sideways movement between member states (“cross-loading”): adaptation can be a result of indirect effects (increased exchange of information and mutual learning between member states) or a state can purposefully project its policy models, goals, perceptions and ideas towards other member states, which in turn can lead to adaptation.

In other words, a causal connection is assumed to exist between identity reconstruction in the *individual* level and national foreign and security policy change. The assumed logic in the "Europeanization-through-elite-socialisation" is that "prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines" (Smith 2000, 164) which in turn eventually manifests in changes in the national foreign policy of a member state (Wong 2007, 329). Changes in self-conceptions, in ideas about who 'we' are, are seen to be "intimately bound up with long-term foreign policy change (Aggestam 2004, 82). Accordingly, in analysing Europeanization of national foreign and security policy the individual level and the identities of individuals (officials, diplomats, etc) get an overemphasized position. Consequently, the way much of the Europeanization literature deals with foreign and security policy change has a strong anthropological or social psychological feel to it. Studies focusing on individual identity reconstruction analyse the personal identities and perceptions of the foreign policy elites with interviews. Typically two types of elites/groups of individuals that may have become Europeanized are presented in the literature. Firstly there are EU officials that are seen to be increasingly thinking in "European" rather than "national" terms. Anthropological studies suggest that Commission officials exhibit traits of cultural "hybridization": "national being" was becoming a "European being" (Bellier 2000, 149-150; Wong 2007, 329). The second group of socialized elite consists of national officials working in EU institutions as well as national diplomacies. Based on multiple in-depth interviews with the foreign-policy makers (see e.g. Tonra 2001<sup>19</sup>) these studies find that national elites interacting with Commission, Council and other EU members states' national diplomacies are "becoming more European and displaying a "coordination reflex" in foreign policy making" (Tonra 2001, Øhrgaard 1997; see Wong 2007, 329).

Some studies concentrate on even more "subjective" dimension of foreign policy and apply a political-cultural approach on foreign policy by looking at "role conceptions" or "role identities" – concepts that originate from sociology and social psychology – and analyse how foreign policy makers themselves perceive and define their (national and European) roles in a "boundary position from which they must mediate between two worlds of foreign policy-making: one in the national capital, the other centred in Brussels" (Aggestam 2004, 85-86). According to Aggestam role concepts provide methodological tools by offering an "analytical and operational link between identity constructions and patterns of foreign policy behaviour" (*ibid.*, 82). Role identity and role

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<sup>19</sup> Sometimes these studies rest methodologically on the tradition of foreign policy analysis – which according to Tonra's definition is "branch of international relations which focuses upon the formulation of national foreign policy" (Tonra 2001, 48) – and commit in-depth interviews with diplomats and other officials and to analyse their behaviour. Tonra's influential study on the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark builds on such approach. See also White 2004 for a theoretical discussion on foreign policy analysis as a framework for studying European foreign policy.

concepts “suggest how cultural norms and values are translated into verbal statements about expected foreign policy behaviour and action orientations” (*ibid.*, 82). Yet, this approach fails to tell us how, actually, the socialisation/identity reconstruction of a foreign policy-maker actually results in changes in national foreign policy.

The purpose here is not to commit an anthropological study on Finnish officials, but to concentrate on the level of state identity. Consequently, it will be asked if Finnish foreign and security policy has been reoriented along CFSP/ESDP lines, and whether this change has been profound enough to impact on the key concepts of national foreign policy – and thus alter the Finnish state identity. The purpose is to see if new conceptions of interest and identity, encouraged by European institutions and EU’s common policies, have emerged and found their way to into the official Finnish foreign and security policy (or, into the “dominant domestic discourse” as defined in chapter 3 below). Thus, rather than offering an in-depth study on Finnish elite socialisation or on the changing “foreign policy culture” the study should be read as a comprehensive analysis of the key national foreign and security policy concepts during the Finnish EU-membership and how the related changed – and possibly Europeanized – perceptions on national interest and security appear in the parliamentary debates, government proposals and reports and eventually in the official Finnish foreign and security policy. Identity-wise the focus is thus on the level of state identity – a collective level social construction, that is produced by the domestic foreign and security policy-making process and in interaction with the international environment.

Accordingly, in this study an axiomatic assumption of a connection between individual identity reconstruction and national foreign and security policy change is found problematic: How can we conclude national foreign and security policy change from individual level socialisation and identity reconstruction?<sup>20</sup> The solution adopted in this study is to stick to the level of state identity and complement the theoretical framework with constructivist IR theoretisation on state identity reproduction and foreign policy (conceptualized as a political practice in which state identity is constructed and reproduced) as well as with the methodological solutions stemming from there.

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<sup>20</sup> Critical voices in the Europeanization debate have so far mainly concerned the individual level emphasis from a methodological perspective (e.g. the reliability of interviews as primary research material). Wong notes that “Studies on foreign policy Europeanization have also tended to rely heavily on interviews with national officials and Commission in Brussels for evidence. But can these officials seriously be expected to tell the researcher that they do not subscribe to the ideals of a coordinated, coherent CFSP?” (Wong 2007, 331.) According to Larsen a problem might be that “although individual civil servants get to know each other in the EPC/CFSP working groups and in the political committee, in diplomacy individuals are generally very mobile, continually replaced. There is not the personal continuity which would provide for a person-based ‘*communaute de vue*’” (Larsen 2004, 77).

Thus the study will now turn to look at constructivist IR theoretisation on foreign policy and state identity (i.a. Wendt 1994, 2004; Campbell 1992; Adler 1997; Christiansen et al. 2001; Checkel 2006). The theoretical exercise is also used to give support the conclusion presented in this study that the previous studies on the impact of European integration on Finnish foreign and security policy often fail to grasp the real depth of the change in question.

## **2.4 Foreign policy and state identity reconstruction**

### *2.4.1 Introduction*

The following part looks at the IR theoretical debate on state identity from the viewpoint of the sociological institutionalist version of Europeanization, which, as was explained above, is generally considered to be the most suitable approach to study the Europeanization of foreign and security policy. The chapter also sheds light on the related metatheoretical and philosophical assumptions in constructivist IR theory and considers the methodological implications of them. In the centre of attention is particularly the usefulness of the constructivist views on state identity in studying Europeanization. The chapter will show that constructivist theory on state identity reproduction (through foreign policy) has much in common with how the Europeanization literature presents the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy.

Concerning the Finnish case the study will argue that the vehicles of state identity production have changed significantly, and that the European integration process has had a role to play in this change. A goal of the following theoretical discussion is thus to develop a better foundation for analysing the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy. The theoretical guidelines and conceptual tools presented here will help to deepen the picture of Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy. This takes place by complementing the rationalist institutionalist view (thin Europeanization) on changes in the national political system with a constructivist analysis of the factors defining the Finnish state identity and their transformation, as well as the political processes linked to the change. To this end, foreign policy is in the following conceptualised as political practice that reproduces state identity. Additionally, constructivist theoretisation on foreign policy and state identity are brought to the context of Europeanization. In a resulting theoretical framework a central question is “How has European integration, and participation in EU foreign, security and defence policy particularly, influenced the process of state identity (re)production?”

### *2.4.2 Europeanization and constructivist IR theory*

In International Relations constructivism is typically defined as an “approach that draws attention to the impact of national identity and culture on both foreign and domestic

policies. It rejects the idea that state interests are determined by the structure of the international system, and instead postulates that they are socially constructed and vary between states. For a constructivist [...] state identity emerges from interaction in different social environments, both domestic and international.” (Catalinac 2007, 74-75.) According to constructivists norms<sup>21</sup> can have a causal effect on state policy independent of material interests, by reshaping actors’ interests, self-understandings, and behaviour (Katzenstein 1996, 4). In other words, international norms have capacity to reconstitute state interests by acting to socialize states into international society (Catalinac 2007, 75; Finnemore & Sikkink 2001). As to the question of how such international norms came to exist in the first place the constructivist literature refer to a variety of possible mechanisms, such as purposive efforts of individuals and groups to change social understandings (so called norm entrepreneurs), role of international organizations in disseminating new international norms and models of political organization, political effects of experts with specialized knowledge and shared normative understandings (so called epistemic communities), and the role of argument as a mechanism of social construction. It is notable that the Europeanization literature pays attention to all these as well (see chapter 2.2 above on sociological institutionalism and 2.3.3 on identity reconstruction).

The arrival of constructivism into IR has been well documented elsewhere (see e.g. Fierke and Jørgensen 2001, Kratochwill 2001, Zehfuss 2001, Checkel 1998) and there seems to be a growing consensus that constructivism is no longer in a marginal position but occupies a relatively visible place in the discipline (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001, 3; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998).<sup>22</sup> At the more philosophical level constructivists tend to build on the (late)-Wittgensteinian interpretation of language.<sup>23</sup> Language is no longer seen as a mirror, the meaning of a term no longer consists in its

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<sup>21</sup> In the constructivist literature norms are defined typically as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Catalinac 2007, 75; cf. p. 10 above on social institutionalist understanding on the logic of appropriateness).

<sup>22</sup> Christiansen et al. (2001, 6) identify three moves that have contributed to the constructivist turn in IR. The first move took place when Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) pointed out that the then-prevailing positivist epistemology of regime analysis that assumed actors’ interests as given was incompatible with the inescapably intersubjective quality of regimes. The second move was Wendt’s article (1992) where he argued that “anarchy is what the states make of it”, that is to say that the structure of the international system resulted from social interaction among states. The third move consists of establishing different constructivist research programmes.

<sup>23</sup> In philosophy the linguistic turn can be traced back to Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) and *Philosophical Investigation* (1953). Wittgenstein argued that language use is a form of action that is constitutive of the world, and that individual speech is dependent on a pre-given system of linguistic meaning, which precedes intentionality. This challenged the classical notion of autonomy and the idea that rational agents have control over their actions. Different constructivisms in IR have somewhat differing philosophical roots. The pioneering constructivists like Onuf (World of Our Making 1989) in IR built on Luckmann and Giddens; not on Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida and the like (who have somewhat different reading of language). (Fierke & Jørgensen 2001) From a philosophical perspective the conventional constructivism (e.g. Adler 1997, Checkel 1998, Wendt 1999 – see Friedrichs 2003) seems to be compatible with moderate forms of philosophical realism (Niiniluoto 1997, 128-129, 228-234).

exact correspondence to an object in the “outer world” but in its use in speech. Attention was thus put to the conventional and pragmatic character of language: it “objectivates” shared experiences, which is crucial for making shared conceptions of reality possible (Berger & Luckmann 1966, 36-40; Zehfuss 2001, 69). Consequently, the human world is not simply given and natural but “constructed” through the actions of the actors themselves (Kratochwil 2001, Searle 1995).

Jørgensen (2001) has presented that there are different ways to approach the meaning and role of constructivism in IR.<sup>24</sup> Firstly, constructivism can be considered as a philosophical category. Inside that category there are different versions of constructivisms – the radical versions claim that everything is socially constructed whereas other versions do not reject philosophical realism. Secondly, constructivism can be seen as a metatheory. In the IR debate constructivists were active in the wave of metatheoretical criticism directed particularly against neorealism.<sup>25</sup> By asking “what is theory?” constructivists wanted to stress that there should be more than hypothetico-deductive mode of theorizing only (Jørgensen 2001, 44). New views on the units and levels of IR theory were presented for instance in Wendt’s (1987)<sup>26</sup> and Onuf’s (1989) work concerning relations between agency, structure and process. The third way of seeing constructivism is to concentrate on constructivist theorizing. In Jørgensen’s view every possible paradigm in IR can be cast in constructivist terms.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, Jørgensen argues that there are two ways to do constructivist theorizing on IR: Firstly, one can reformulate existing theories into constructivist mode. Secondly, it is possible to employ constructivist “generic” theories: theory of speech acts, theory of communicative action, modern systems theory, sociological interactionist theory (Jørgensen 2001, 49).

Constructivist theorizing on *states* and their behaviour in the international system has taken place in both the above-mentioned ways.<sup>28</sup> However, employing “generic”

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<sup>24</sup> Smith (2001, 196) lists other attempts to classify different constructivisms as follows: Ruggie (1998, 35-36): neo-classical, postmodernist, naturalistic; Adler (1997, 335-336): modernist, rule-based, narrative knowing, postmodernist; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998, 675-678): conventional, critical, postmodern; Christiansen et al. (2001): sociological and Wittgensteinian constructivism.

<sup>25</sup> The metatheoretical work has also caused fierce criticism: Moravcsik’s critique that IR constructivists have concentrated too much on meta-theory (on the expense of elaborating concrete concepts, theories, empirically testable hypotheses, and methods). “[M]eta-theory is not the solution but the problem. Philosophical speculation is being employed not to refine and sharpen concrete concepts, hypotheses, and methods, but to *shield* empirical conjectures from empirical testing. (Moravcsik 2001, 186.)

<sup>26</sup> According to Moravcsik “Wendt’s article on the agent-structure problem signaled the advent of a self-conscious ‘constructivist’ theoretical approach to the study of world politics” (Moravcsik 2001, 176).

<sup>27</sup> For instance the realist theory on security complexes has been casted into a constructivist version of security complexes by the so-called Copenhagen School (Buzan et al 1998).

<sup>28</sup> Speech act -theories are widely used for instance in studying security - also at the state level (see e.g. Buzan et al. 1998 on military security and securitisation). Wendt work offers a good example of constructivist re-reading of IR’s basic concepts



theories has often lead to approaches which discard or downplay the state as a research object, and prefer focusing on “multinational corporations, new social movements, transnational and intergovernmental organizations” (Wendt 1992, 424). Therefore the dominant way of bringing constructivism into theorizing on state has been to build on existing IR theories and casting them into more constructivist mode. This reconstruction of a state-centric international theory has been criticised by proponents of more “radical” versions of constructivism as being too state-centrist (see Friedrichs 2003).<sup>29</sup> In answering this criticism the “state-centrist” constructivist have argued, for instance, that “in the medium run sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system” and, more importantly, that “statism need not be bound by realist ideas about what “state” must mean” (Wendt 1992, 424).

This study adopts a conventional constructivist approach and thus does not reject the state as a research object but looks at it from a constructivist angle. The approach puts emphasis particularly on how state identities and interests are constituted and how they can change through interaction. In other words, state interests are treated as endogenous to interaction, that is to say that interaction at the international systemic level changes state identities and interests. (Wendt 1994, 384). This approach is suitable for the purposes of this study particularly because what is under scrutiny here is the *change* of (Finnish) state identity in a context where the state in question has committed itself to a profound integration process at the state system level (that is to say joined the European Union). What also speaks on behalf of the suitability of the approach in the EU context is the fact that the European integration can be seen as a process of cooperation that holds the potential for collective identity formation. The EU member states are involved in a process that – according to the Europeanization literature (see the previous chapter) – reconstitutes “identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments” (Wendt 1992, 417).<sup>30</sup> Constructivist scholars have stressed that “European integration is uniquely linked to inter-subjective ideas and social institutions. As a transformative process, European identity is suited to change substantively the

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such as anarchy, interests, identity and interaction – resulting in developing new theoretical propositions (e.g. Wendt 1992, 1994, 2004).

<sup>29</sup> Mainstream constructivism has also been criticised by “radical” scholars for remaining epistemologically positivist or “foundationalist” (and thus compatible with neorealism), that is to say committed to truth-seeking by scientific methods, and to the belief that causal generalization in the form of middle range theories is possible. Radical constructivist, then, prefer post-positivist contextual interpretation rather than empirical observation for analysing identity (Risse & Wiener 2001, 200; Friedrichs 2003, 4.)

<sup>30</sup> From the view point of European Studies it is interesting to note that Wendt utilized general integration theory its views on collective identity. It should be noted that the theoretical tradition in question did not explicitly deal with *European* integration (or any other specific regional case); Wendt referred to integration theory generally as focusing on the formation of community at the international level, but he also made a number of specific references to European integration and the issues that were in the centre of the EU debate in the mid-1990s, such as the Maastrich Treaty, debate on democratic deficit, spill over, and European defence policy (Wendt 1994, 392-393).

character of European state system and to reshape the identities, interests and behaviour of the individual member states.” (Friedrichs 2003, 15; Christiansen et al. 2001.)

Although the question whether European integration has generated, or is about to generate, a collective European identity falls outside the scope of this study, from the viewpoint of EU studies it is also worthwhile to take notice of the point Wendt makes on collective identities: through interaction states might form collective identities and interests; and “[t]he structures of regional or global international systems constitute interaction contexts that either inhibit or facilitate the emergence of dynamics of collective identity formation.” (Wendt 1994, 390). The mechanisms in this process are similar to those described by the Europeanization literature: “[A] systemic process that may encourage collective identity formation is the transitional convergence of domestic values. [...] [T]his change in the interaction context may affect only behaviour, but it may also change identities and interests. [...] By engaging in cooperative behaviour, an actor will gradually change its own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that new identity for itself. (Wendt 1994, 390.)

Wendt defines intersubjective systemic structures (that facilitate the emergence of dynamics of collective identity formation) as consisting of “the shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat complexes, in terms of which states define (some of their) identities and interests” (Wendt 1994, 389). From the perspective of constructivist approaches to European integration the EU indeed forms such an institution. Furthermore, it can be argued that this is the case also regarding European foreign and security policy: “studies from the late 1990s indicate that ECP/CFSP institutions that have a strong ‘socialisation’ effect; élites involved even in the intergovernmental bargaining process of EPC/CFSP show surprising signs of internalising supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to their national capitals (Wong 2005, 146).

From the Europeanization perspective it is useful to note that constructivism finds that these influential norms can be held at both the international and domestic level (Catalinac 2007, 75; Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 397; Checkel 2001). It can be argued that European integration and CFSP produce such norms and clearly form “collective expectations for the behaviour” of a member state. For a student of the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy an essential task would thus be to see how these expectations affect and manifest themselves in the domestic policy-making process. Additionally, the bottom-up direction is of interest: how nationally defined expectations find their way to the European level. Constructivism acknowledges this dimension too: “norms embedded in *domestic* social structures also exert a powerful influence on policy makers’ perceptions of the range of foreign policy options available” (Catalinac 2007,

75, emphasis added; Risse-Kappen 1996). Hence, in the domestic foreign and security policy-making process European and national conceptions clash, and possibly converge, with each other. A related question presented in the constructivist debate has been “the relative weight to assign to the international or domestic sphere” in the construction of state identity (Catalinac 2007, 76). According to Finnemore and Sikkink “constructivists agree that state identities were constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics” but disagree on “the weight of international versus domestic environments in shaping state identities” (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399). As was described in the previous chapter Europeanization as an approach taps exactly into this relationship between international and domestic environments.

The interest on the relationship of international and domestic politics combines Europeanization and IR constructivism. Europeanization allows the researcher to “inquire into the nature of the ‘reciprocal relationship’ between the European and the national levels” (Börzel 2002, 195; see also Gross 2007, 504). Constructivists, then, share the view that state identities are constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics – although there might be different interpretations among them as to the relative weight of international versus domestic environments in shaping state identities. Some emphasize the impact of international environment while others see identity arising mainly from national ideologies of collective distinctiveness. (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399.) Essential questions in constructivist IR work are, for instance “how internal and external factors interact to produce actors with particular identities and how, in turn, such identities affect state action.” (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399).<sup>31</sup>

This notable compatibility of Europeanization with constructivist IR theory is largely due to the fact that Europeanization is located exactly at the intersection between domestic and international that is so central also to constructivist IR. To quote Finnemore and Sikkink:

“Not only do different states react differently to the same international norms, he [Checkel 1997, 1998] argued, but the mechanisms by which norms are internalized within states differ as well. Without understanding how these *domestic processes* worked, we could not understand the *political effects of these global social structures*. By bringing investigation of global norms back into domestic politics, Checkel and others have created *an important point of intersection between international relations and comparative politics*.” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 397; emphasis added).

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<sup>31</sup> As this Europeanization study on Finland tackles these questions in the context of EU Studies the eventual research findings might be read in the light of both the constructivist IR debate and Europeanization debate.

Such a refocusing on domestic politics appears to be an almost identical move with what Hix and other advocates of Comparative Political Science have done in EU Studies (see chapter 2.2 above): by emphasising the comparative politics approach to European integration they turned the focus from the European level to the domestic processes and to the question how does European integration impact on the national level. Analogously, the Europeanization studies embrace the notion that Europeanization brings different results in different (member)states – that is to say that there is national variation – and that the mechanisms of Europeanization differ within different states.<sup>32</sup> In constructivist literature a similar perspective is present as constructivists consider “how international norms may affect states differently because of their different state identities” (Catalinac 2007, 76; Gurowitz 1999).

As was noted in chapter 2.2, a constructivist turn has also been located in EU Studies<sup>33</sup>. It has even been argued that the classical debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism has been replaced by a debate between rationalism and constructivism (Pollack 2005). According to Smith constructivism has challenged the dominance of rationalist approaches which have restricted the development of the literature on European integration, and can offer social convincing and deeper explanations of European integration (Smith 2001, 192): “Constructivism can offer powerful accounts of European governance precisely because it is based on a notion of intersubjective understandings and discourses being central in shaping over time the identities, interests and interactions of actors (Smith 2001, 196).

This study follows the assumption that in order to utilize the identity concept properly it is necessary to adopt a constructivist approach. This is the case especially when identity change is put under scrutiny. The version of constructivism to be selected here enables the study of *state* identity, by keeping state-oriented approach feasible – in contrast to those variants of constructivism that are keen to cast state aside and focus on other objects (cf. Wendt 1994, 385). When applied in IR, and in this study, the concept of *identity* typically has a collective nature and it is strongly political. This is important to keep in mind since it distinguishes IR’s identity concept from psychologically oriented considerations at the individual level. Furthermore, the identity questions of IR are not sociological questions about how people *are* or *live* (Wæver 2002). It is the collective and political aspects of identity which make it applicable for studying such objects relevant for IR as the nation and the state (and minorities/nation-like ethnic units,

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<sup>32</sup> In this light one could argue that Europeanization approach has contributed, more or less purposefully, to the strengthening of constructivist thinking in European Studies.

<sup>33</sup> In the book titled “Social Construction of Europe”, published in 2001 (many of the chapters of the book were originally published in a special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy* in 1999) Christiansen et al. argue that they introduce a “novel perspective to students of European integration” by bringing “the potential of constructivist approaches for studying the social construction of Europe to the attention of scholars engaged in European studies” (Christiansen et al. 2001; i, 201).

civilizations, religions, race). The previous chapter concluded that in the Europeanization literature this issue remains often without adequate theoretical reflection: when talking about socialisation and social learning as mechanisms through which Europeanization as an identity change takes place, the level-of-analysis is often blurred. It is not sufficiently defined whether it is a question of personal identities of key-decision makers and officials (those are the actors that increasingly interact at the European level) *or* of collective political identity, such as national identity or state identity. Their relation is seldom questioned, and thus it remains unclear how changes in the former lead to changes in the latter (see chapter 2.3.4 above).

In analysing the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy this study utilizes the connection of national foreign and security policy and state identity. National security and foreign policy tells us how the state in question sees its position in the international system. According to Campbell the constitution of identity is achieved through “the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’” (Campbell 1992, 8). Hence the key vehicles of state identity production can be located in foreign and security policy. Identity of state is contained and reproduced through foreign policy. “[T]he boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation of danger integral to foreign policy” (Campbell 1992, 3; see also Wallace 1991, 65). Campbell sees that conventionally foreign policy is understood as the external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities, but it should be retheorized as “one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates” (*ibid.*, 75). Building on these theoretical claims we can argue in the context of Europeanization that the European level enters this domestic political practice and contributes to the construction of the “inside” and “outside, “self” and “other”. This definition is clearly compatible with Wong’s definition on Europeanization as identity reconstruction (see chapter 2.3.3), but adds a deeper dimension to it which introduces epistemological and methodological rigour as well as notions on the ontological essence of state identity – which the Europeanization literature largely fails to deliver.

## 2.5 Ontological and epistemological premises

*How do we know an identity if we see one?* (Catalinac 2007, 76)

Is the state an actor or a structure? Is it nothing more than the sum of individual government actions, the empirical behaviours of government officials? Or is it a ‘ghost in the machine’, some kind of undefined and undefinable essence (Wight 2004, 276)? Does it make sense to talk about a collective level identity that somehow represents the individual identities of citizens and yet at the same time is more than the sum of those, that is to say is non-reducible to individual interests? Can we talk about the Europeanization of a state’s identity or should we say that it is the identities of key politicians and government officials that have changed due to the European integration? Is there a difference between these two?

When we connect Europeanization with state identity reconstruction we come to the question concerning the ontological and epistemological status of state identity: “what is state identity and how can we measure it and its change?” So far we have learned that state identity is reproduced by foreign policy and that this reproduction process is affected by interaction at the international (European) level. Ontologically this means that contrary to the realist and rationalist accounts state identities are not fixed or “given”.<sup>34</sup> Neither are they solely historically constructed, as historical institutionalism tends to claim, but largely constructed in and by social interaction. Constructivism thus sees state identity as a *social fact*. According to Searle (1995; a frequently cited source in constructivist IR literature) the term refers to things like money, sovereignty, and rights, which have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 393).<sup>35</sup> An implication of this view is that identities and interests are actually “always in process during interaction” (Wendt 1994, 386). On the one hand state identity fundamentally shapes state preferences and actions; yet on the other identity can change and is changeable by social and political action (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399).

Like many other conceptual tools, “identity” has actually been imported into IR from other scientific disciplines. In philosophy and psychology it is originally a concept that concerned the individual level, but in IR identity has been moved to another level-of-

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<sup>34</sup> Neorealist and neoliberalist views take self-interested actors as constant and exogenously given. From those perspectives questions about identity- and interest-formation were therefore not important to students of international relations. Neorealism aims at integrating sub-state conflicts between antagonist ethnic and nationalist groups within a structural theory of international system, but without revising the ‘identity of the constitutive unit’ as being that of self-help (Wæver 2002).

<sup>35</sup> According to Campbell “with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (Campbell 1992, 11).

analysis: it most often concerns different types of collectivities, such as states and nations, or ethnic minorities, tribes, clans, religions, civilizations or races (see e.g. Buzan et al. 1998, 123). Consequently, the first fundamental theoretical dilemma regarding state identity concerns the borrowing of the concept and moving it to another level of analysis. In this respect the IR debate has dealt with questions such as “does the explanatory value of the concept endure when it is moved from individual level to state level?” or “what theoretical assumptions concerning individual identity are valid when talking about different collectives such as the state?” In introducing collective identity to IR the theoretical debate has therefore started from the philosophical debates on individual level identity (see e.g. Neumann 1995, Wendt 1994). Although state identity is by now a routinely used concept in IR, in order to avoid too vague a use of identity concept a certain philosophical reflection is needed. Too often different versions of identity theory are taken and used as unproblematic IR, making identity a “catch-all term” (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 399). In the following the ontological debate on state identity is revisited from the perspective of constructivist IR. After that we will move on to the methodological implications of the selected theoretical framework and of the ontological and epistemological starting points.

In the light of Jørgensen’s classification of different constructivisms (see chapter 2.4.2 above) it can be noted that the constructivist approach adopted in this study is closer to philosophical realism than some other variants of constructivism are. According to Wendt “To say that worlds are defined intersubjectively is not to say they are malleable, however, since intersubjective constructions confront actors as obdurate social facts. [...] Intersubjective structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act” (Wendt 1994, 389).<sup>36</sup> The middle ground constructivist approach on which this study builds on is based on subjective ontology and objective epistemology.<sup>37</sup> Table 2 depicts the relationship of this constructivist approach to other ontological/epistemological standpoints. (As was explained earlier, there are actually different variants of constructivism, all of which do not possibly share the ontological and epistemological stances presented here (see Smith 2001, 197).)

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<sup>36</sup> Zehfuss notes that Wendt presents a structural theory based on a state-centered ontology. But structure only exists and has causal powers as process, that is, through actors’ practices. Self-help and power politics, for instance, are institutions that have developed out of interaction in the international system and are sustained by such interaction. (Zehfuss 2001.)

<sup>37</sup> Such combination has also been a source of criticism: Friedrichs argues that the (successful) attempt to establish and mainstream constructivism as a theoretical ‘third way’ between rationalism and post-positivism has lead to “estrangement from the post-positivist challenge to that mainstream” and “simultaneous adoption of a positivist epistemology and a post-positivist ontology”. (Friedrichs 2003, 1.)

## Ontology

<b>Epistemology</b>	Objective “There is a world out there”	Subjective “The world is socially constructed”
Objective “..which can be measured and analysed”	POSITIVISM	CONSTRUCTIVISM
Subjective “Contested nature of knowledge production”	CRITICAL THEORY	POSTMODERNISM

*Table 2 (Adapted from Manners 2002)*

On both ontological and epistemological terms a division to positivist and post-positivist approaches forms the basic line of demarcation in the table. The traditional positivist approach, objective both in its ontological and epistemological starting points, assumes that “there is a world out there” (objective ontology) “which can be measured and analysed” (objective epistemology). On the opposite corner of the figure, being post-positivist in ontological and epistemological terms, stands the postmodern approach, which according to Manners (2002<sup>38</sup>) departs from the basic assumptions that “the world is socially constructed” (subjective ontology) “which cannot be easily measured and analysed because of the contested nature of knowledge production” (subjective epistemology). Conventional constructivism (“constructivism” in Table 1) sees that “while symbolic interaction constructs meaning, it is assumed that social reality does exist beyond theorists’ view”. Consequently, constructivists stress the importance of empirical work (Christiansen et al. 2001, 8).

In constructivist thinking the social construction of the “world” revolves largely around identity: our ideas about ourselves and our environment shape our interactions and are shaped by our interactions; thereby they create social reality. Collective meanings constitute the structures which organize our actions. Identities are relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self. Identities provide the basis for interests, and these are defined in the process of defining situations. A relatively stable

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<sup>38</sup> Manners used his table originally in the context of security studies.



‘structure’ of identities and interests is an institution. Change is possible when actors alter their identities because of critical reflection upon the self. Through identity change, other patterns of interaction, and thus other realities, can be created. (Zehfuss 2001, 58; Wendt 1992, 405).

According to Jackson the debate on the ontological status of *state* consists of two different philosophical aspects. Firstly, there is ‘philosophical ontology’ which “deals with the way in which entities are considered to exist in the first place” (Jackson 2004, 257). Secondly, ‘scientific’ or ‘practical’ identity “details the kinds of things that exist in the world demarcated by a particular theoretical approach” (*ibid.*).<sup>39</sup> With the help of Bartelson (1998) we can distinguish between the state as a *type* and the state as a *token*. Type identity concerns the identity of the state as a general concept<sup>40</sup>, whereas token identity concerns the common characteristics of individual states (Bartelson lists the following: indivisibility, distinctness, continuity). In Jackson’s categorization “state as type” falls into the category of philosophical ontological considerations, whereas “state as token” is more related to the scientific/practical identity. In light of Bartelson’s and Jackson’s definitions, in this study the state identity is thus understood as token identity, and philosophical ontological questions on which way states “are considered to exist in the first place” or on the “general conditions of statehood” are largely cast aside.<sup>41</sup> Instead, the focus is on changes that take place in the characteristics of a particular state. It is, in other words, argued that the state identity of Finland has changed, and the change might be due to interaction among other states (that are engaged in an integration process in which shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge play a significant role).

Regarding the conception of state this implies rejecting the “*givenness of the state*”, a view according to which the state is a brute fact of international reality. This view claims that the state is intelligible by virtue of its existence as an irreducible part of international political reality, and the main function of the concept of state in theories of IR is to represent a portion of ready-made political reality, thus making it accessible to theoretical and empirical knowledge (Bartelson 1998, 299). Instead, the selected approach implies *constructedness of the state*: the state is an institutional, man-made

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<sup>39</sup> Among IR scholars a debate on the ontological status of the state goes under the title “person-hood of state” or “anthropomorphising the state”. According to Jackson (2004, 258) the question of state person-hood is important for IR theorists because the international system, as a topic of IR theory, is shaped and structured by a notion of states as actors. The question of state-personhood also “has implications for how we think about agents and agency in world politics”.

<sup>40</sup> General conditions of statehood, “the question of state identity is a question of being of the state, and what makes a state a state and not something else” (Bartelson 1998).

<sup>41</sup> Although from the perspective of European Studies it might be interesting to pose the theoretical question can a state be Europeanized to a point where it ceases to be a state in ontological sense, that is to say that it no longer meets the general conditions of statehood – for instance by loosing sovereignty over issues that are considered essential for a state (typically: defence, territory, etc).

fact. The state ultimately exists because it is *believed* to exist or because agents act as if it existed, and has therefore been institutionalized as behavioural patterns in international society. Identity of the state has been constituted through interaction, this identity is also bound to dissolve sooner or later. Bartelson sees that "the most obvious way for this to happen is through increased interdependence or internalization, so that the emergent mutuality of interests sooner or later will spill over into new forms of identity of perhaps a shared one" (Bartelson 1998, 305).

These differing views also have their impact on what sort of answer is given to the question concerning the *intelligibility* of state – under what conditions is the state accessible to human knowledge and human action. Is the state accessible to understanding because it exists, or whether it exists only by virtue of being instantiated in political practices? (Bartelson 1998, 297.) In the context of this study the latter option applies; and foreign policy is seen as the political practice through which state identity is reproduced. Therefore we can approach state identity via analysis of foreign and security policy documentation and domestic debates and the key concepts therein. In the following the methodological implications of the selected theoretical approach are explained in more detail.

## 2.6 Implications on Methods and Material

The key methodological offering of the theoretical debate and the selected theoretical framework is that due to its collective and political nature state identity is ontologically a “social fact” which can be approached with the methods of discourse analysis.<sup>42</sup> Any political identity is a discursive and symbolic construction. Therefore there is no need to get inside the heads of the individual actors in identity analysis. In contrast to individual level identities and their psychological and cognitive analysis, collective identities do not possess “internal life” but are “superficial” and constructed (Campbell 1992). In studying the dominant domestic discourse what interests us is “neither what individual decision makers really believe, nor what are shared beliefs among a population, but which codes are used when actors relate to each other” (Wæver 2002, 26). These codes can be identified through a systematic study of nation-states’ official documents and the speeches of its leaders (Wæver 2002, also Rieker 2004, 371). Therefore it is the domestic foreign and security policy discourse that serves as the primary material from which the Europeanization (as state identity reconstruction) can be read. Discourse is understood here as a macro concept: in contrast to the approaches which engage in detailed textual analysis (such as critical discourse analysis), the focus is on broadly based discourses which are identified in relevant texts. Discourse can be defined as a limited range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings which are formed and changed in social interaction. Hence discourses are not seen as the product of individual language users’ brains or psychology. According to Larsen this definition of discourse entails that “[a]n analytical focus on the views of an individual or a politician is therefore only relevant as expression of broader societally shared discourses” (Larsen 2004, 65). The analysis stays at the surface of the text and pays attention to the vocabulary in the text – and not on what is ‘really’ meant by a particular text or statement. (Larsen 2004, 65.)

The primary material to be looked at when analysing the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy consists firstly of the official documentation on foreign and security policy: Government Reports (white books) on security and/or defence policy (1995, 1997, 2001, 2004) and related speeches by key decision-makers<sup>43</sup>; legislative amendments or new laws (Government proposals) concerning foreign and security

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<sup>42</sup> Variety of empirical research methods is used in constructivist studies: for instance discourse analysis, process tracing, genealogy, structured focused comparisons, interviews, participant observation, and content analysis (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 395).

<sup>43</sup> This view is similar to Rieker’s approach who sees in her study on the Europeanization of Nordic security identities that “it is possible to identify the security identity of a nation-state by studying official documents and speeches produced by the political leadership.” (Rieker 2006, 514). In doing that Rieker put a “special focus on the language used in speeches, official texts and documents that express the national security identity.” (*ibid.*, 515.)

policy (which most often relate to Finnish participation in UN, EU, or NATO-led peace-keeping and crisis management operations; e.g. peace-keeping/military crisis management legislation of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006); Government material stems also from national preparation for EU intergovernmental conferences (IGCs, 1996, 1999, 2004) as well as from reactions to CFSP and ESDP development (European Security Strategy 2003, EU crisis management operations, and EU battle groups; see chapter 3 for discussion on these). Secondly, to give a richer picture of the national discourse the official documentation on foreign and security policy is supplemented with the related parliamentary debate (political discussion in the plenary sessions), and statements and reports of Parliaments Committees (Foreign Affairs Committee, Defence Committee, Constitutional Law Committee and Grand Committee).<sup>44</sup>

Regarding the Government Reports on security and defence policy as sources it is interesting to note that these so-called white papers, or white books, used to be prepared by a body consisting of parliamentarians but parliamentary committees have later on given way to governmental preparation. A result of this is, as Ojanen notes, “[i]n Finland, in fact, the Parliamentary Committees may not necessarily share all the views expressed in the reports” (Ojanen 2002, 205). This aspect is useful for the purposes of this study since it means that there is a lively political debate – documented word for word in the official parliamentary documentation – between Ministers and parliamentarians, and between opposition and government party members in the Parliament. In that debate there are contradicting views, contrasting perceptions and different ways to use “European” argumentation, different ways to perceive CFSP and its significance and consequences for Finland. By integrating this dimension into the material reach of the study a more comprehensive view of the Europeanization process of Finnish foreign and security policy can be acquired. The parliamentary political discussion gives a vantage point to the process in which national dominant discourse on foreign and security policy is formed. By chronological analysis of the primary material the possible changes in the meanings attached to different foreign and security policy concepts can be observed. Moreover, the political construction of adaptation pressure can also be analysed with the help of this material.

During the Cold War an essential feature in Finnish security and defence policy was that it was directed by the President. In the 1970s parliamentary defence committees were established, consisting of parliamentarians and experts appointed by parties and defence administration. The committees (1970-1971, 1975-1977, 1980-81) can be seen as

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<sup>44</sup> In acquiring the relevant primary documentation the on-line databank of the Parliament ([web.eduskunta.fi](http://web.eduskunta.fi)) was utilized and the parliamentary documents from Finland’s EU-membership era (and the pre-accession phase; 1994-2008) were checked with search words such as “foreign policy”, “security policy”, “defence policy”, “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, “European Security and Defence Policy” (all in Finnish).

attempts to increase parliamentarism and openness in Finnish policy-making but security issues were not very openly or widely discussed in the Finnish society. According to Linnéll the Finnish security policy debate became more open and political after the end of the Cold War and the EU accession. The definition of security concepts and threat pictures has since become more clearly a *political* and debatable issue. (Linnéll 2008, 1; Visuri 2003, 31.)

Since the mid-1990s Government Reports have been the main method of Finnish foreign, security and defence policy definition.<sup>45</sup> The first Government Report on security policy was given to the Parliament in 1995. After that security and defence policy reports have become an established *modus operandi* and the Government gives its foreign, security and defence policy definitions in the form of a Government Report to the parliament (as well as to the Finnish society) once during every electoral turn. (Linnéll 2008, 2.) The official parliamentary glossary of the Finnish Parliament defines Government Report as a “report submitted by the Government to the Parliament dealing with the governance of the country or with international relations and on which a vote of confidence cannot be taken.”<sup>46</sup> This method has become a central feature and tool in Finnish foreign, security and defence policy-making. These white books are political documents, presented by the Government as their definition of policy which they will then defend in public and to which the Government is expected to commit itself once the approval of the Parliament is received. The Reports are discussed and considered rather thoroughly in the Parliament and its committees.<sup>47</sup> Related parliamentary debates and committee handlings have become a key forum in Finnish foreign, security and defence policy. According to Linnéll this has dismantled elitism in security and defence policy-making, and has also increased the parliamentarization of Finnish foreign, security and defence policy. Although the Reports lack juridical binding force and do not automatically imply a vote of confidence (on whether the government or a particular minister enjoys the confidence of Parliament) Governments have largely followed the policies presented in the Reports. According to Linnéll the Government Reports also act as a political message from Finland to the world on how Finland sees its security environ and its threats and problems, as well as on how Finland will prepare itself for these threats (Linnéll 2008, 2). This characteristic of the Finnish Government Reports is highly compatible with the theoretical approach of the study, in which it is seen that state identity is contained and reproduced by foreign policy, and Europeanization might contribute to the construction of threats and “self” and “other” causing changes in the

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<sup>45</sup> In Finnish the process is called “selontekomenettely”.

<sup>46</sup> Finnish Parliamentary Glossary, <http://mot.kielikone.fi/mot/eduskuntasanasto/netmot> (19.1.2011)

<sup>47</sup> Linnéll has counted that during the preliminary debate (referral debate) on the security and defence policy white book (Government Report 6/2004) 206 speeches were given in the parliament, and the follow-up debate consisted of 162 speeches (Linnéll 2008, 2). The material analysed in this study consists of thousands of parliamentary speeches (see the list of documents and related parliamentary debates in the bibliography).

vehicles of state identity production (see chapter 2.4.2). Limnell sees that white books carry a domestic communicative, even educational, significance in that they give the citizens information on Finnish security and defence policy. He notes that procedures around the Government Reports can well be described as “national security therapy”, as Väyrynen has done (Väyrynen 2007). Limnell depicts the Government Reports as a focal point where parliamentary debate, expert discussions, public opinion and media meet. The public expectations regarding the reports are huge. (Limnell 2008, 2-3.)

A purpose of the Reports is also to seek for wide acceptance and consensus in national foreign, security and defence policy. In addition to the Parliament’s Committee handlings, an security policy monitoring group (“seurantaryhmä”) has been since the Report of 2004 been involved in the preparations of the reports. The groups consist of members of parliament from different parties – including opposition parties. The goal has been to ensure the commitment of parliament and parties to the policies presented in the white books.

Concerning the nature of the discourse it can be noted that as foreign and security policy is typically a highly elite-led sphere of politics, the dominant discourse is produced by highly institutionalized actors and is considered to concern issues of exceptional importance (such as “national security”, “sovereignty” etc.). Therefore it is often difficult to gain credibility and understanding – let alone political success – for ideas that are not in line with the dominant discourse (see e.g. Buzan et al. 1998, Wæver & Hansen 2002). However, the empirical analysis presented in the following chapters locates a number of cases in which significantly contradicting political argumentation on national foreign and security policy line appears. Such cases are in the analysis regarded as indicators of potential turning points in how national interests and state identity are perceived. When such events are observed in the primary research material they are taken under closer scrutiny.

The above-presented methodological and material solutions imply putting emphasis on the domestic political and legislative process as the process where the national foreign and security policy is eventually formulated, or where the final approval for the policy and changes in it must be attained. Consequently, the interplay of norms, expectations and adaptation pressures originating from the European level on one the hand, and the domestic expectations on the other is expected to be observable there. This is in line with the conclusions and findings of the current studies on the Finnish foreign and security policy decision-making system. They indicate that the Parliament’s role in foreign policy decision-making has strengthened. There have been, for instance, procedural changes in the parliament act which have given the parliament a change to

follow closely the definition of Finnish foreign and security policy.<sup>48</sup> (Forsberg 2001, Tiilikainen 2007, see also chapter 3 below.)

Together the above-mentioned documentation and the parliamentary debate form the primary research material for the study. Secondary material, consisting of research literature on the Finnish case, is reviewed in chapter 3. The empirical analysis will proceed chronologically and is divided in three phases (1994-1996, 1997-2002; 2003-2007). As will become evident in the empirical chapters, the division is based on the finding that the character of the Europeanization process differs significantly in each phase. Primary material related to each of these phases is described in more detail in each consecutive chapter.

In the pre-study phase the parliamentary debates proved to be a particularly suitable source material for the purposes of this study. Basically, in this study “domestic debate” is a broader term and consists of more than the mere parliamentary debates but in the pre-study phase it became clear that the majority of relevant issues in the broader national debate conducted in the public sphere on Finnish foreign and security policy have found their way into the parliamentary debate. All the main themes of the domestic debate could be located in the parliamentary debates. Furthermore, the parliamentary debates contained direct references to practically all the significant speeches, news paper articles, public comments by experts, items of news and so on to which the secondary material referred to. The parliamentary debates therefore lie in the heart of the domestic discourse. Much of the analysis and conclusions presented in this study are based on the parliamentary debates, and this is because they are seen to carry significant weight as evidence when it comes to the research questions set for this study.<sup>49</sup> All in all, the foreign, security and defence Government Reports together with the legislative amendments and new laws on peacekeeping and crisis management and related parliamentary debates form a most suitable primary material for a study based on a theoretical framework that builds on constructivist IR theoretisation on state identity reproduction. As this study focuses on state identity that is reconstructed through foreign policy, the material produced by the foreign and security policy-makers in the Government, Parliament and its Committees is essential.

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<sup>48</sup> A significant issue in this respect is the fact that the Prime Minister gives a report to the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on the Finnish positions on CFSP before participating in EU Council meetings. Compared to many other EU member states the Finnish parliament plays a strong role in decision-making on EU affairs. The Government and each minister must enjoy the confidence of Parliament in activities within the EU as well. The parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee has to be kept informed and speaks for Parliament with regard to the CFSP. In other issues the Grand Committee serves as Parliament’s EU committee. International treaties, including amendments to the Union’s treaties must be approved by the Parliament’s plenary session.

<sup>49</sup> Such delimitation of material also made it possible to carry out a longitudinal study that covers most of the Finnish EU-membership era so far. If material produced by, for instance, civil society actors, media, interest groups or smaller political formations was included, the amount of primary material would have been too overwhelming for thorough enough analysis.

References to the particular speeches are made when they are considered significant with respect to changes in broader common understandings in the discourse. The parliamentary speeches constitute a large material segment. References to the MPs' speeches are in this study done in the following way: when the abbreviation e.g. (*exempli gratia*, "for instance") is used in the footnote – as in "e.g. MP Siimes 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006" – the speech in question is considered to represent a view shared by a considerable number of MPs. That piece of primary source material is thus found significant when the common understandings or changing perceptions regarding the issue in question are assessed. The name of the MP is in such cases of secondary importance, as the reference is selected on the basis that it has value in describing the broader tendencies observed in the debate. The parliamentary group, party or position regarding Government and opposition is mentioned only in cases where it provides added value, for instance when it is question of an opposing stance to the Government's view by an MP belonging to a party that is represented in the Government. In some cases the membership or chairmanship in a Parliamentary Committee it is indicated for the same reason. Therefore direct quotes (translated by the author) from the speeches are presented only in order to illustrate certain central changes in the domestic discourse. This is done mainly in connection with the key arguments of the study in each of the three phases. The quotes serve as examples of the dominating way of thinking and broader changes in argumentation and in common understandings. Thus it is not a question of in-depth textual analysis of individual speeches and words or argumentative structures used therein. All the speeches referenced against the names of MPs can be found on the on-line databank of the Finnish Parliament by the title of the debate and the date, both given in the footnotes.

As was explained in the previous chapter the selected approach rejects the idea of aggregating individual level changes in self-perception and equating the result with state identity change – no matter how central persons in foreign policy-making are in question.<sup>50</sup> From a methodological point of view this implies demarcating from approaches that – often along the lines of foreign policy analysis-tradition (FPA) – focus chiefly on individuals and their roles. The individuals in question are typically diplomats placed at the intersection of national and international in EU institutions (such as national officials located in Brussels and in government policy-making machinery) or bureaucrats which are seen through individual level socialization to produce an

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<sup>50</sup> Some have suggested a straight-forward solution to the problem: that indeed the personal identity of certain human individuals, i.e. diplomats, is to be equated with state identity. According to Faizullaev (2006) the state identity becomes part of the personal identity of diplomats – much in the spirit of Louis XIV's famous words *L'Etat c'est moi!* A more down-to-earth solution, perhaps, is to see "foreign policy-makers are understood as agents collectively representing the state as a social actor in foreign policy" (Aggestam 2004, 85).



administrative response of the state to Europeanization.<sup>51</sup> Thus the selected methodological approach does not follow approaches that methodologically rest on in-depth interviews and analysis of “role identities” and personal identities and other individual level socialisation. Often such studies treat biographical and personal evidence as important sources and tend to see Europeanization and the development of CFSP norms as a result of interactions in an informal, clubby atmosphere between individuals involved, particularly political directors (Larsen 2004, 76).<sup>52</sup>

In order to clarify the extent to which the underlying joint European goals, values and threat pictures of CFSP have been adopted the following questions of more detailed nature are used when dealing with the empirical material: What role has been given to EU security arrangements in the post-Cold War Finnish foreign, security and defence policy? Is there evidence of increased general prominence of the CFSP and ESDP in national foreign policy? What about the political construction of adaptation pressure: How is the participation or non-participation in those arrangements justified nationally: is there evidence of adherence to common policy objectives; policies agreed for the sake of EU unity; relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions (cf. Gross 2007<sup>53</sup>)? In the general terminology of the Europeanization approach adopted in this study the questions can be repeated in the following form: Has the Finnish security policy been Europeanized? By what kind of means of *adaptation* to European policies has this taken place: changes in politics, domestic decision-making structure or in legislation (such as bureaucratic reorganization or constitutional change)? What about the *projection* of national preferences to the European level? The steps of the domestic change are analysed with the conceptual tools of Europeanization theory explained in the previous chapter. These include the *policy misfit* between European rules and regulations and national and the *institutional misfit* between European policies, norms and collective understandings and the domestic ones, as well as the facilitating factors.

The empirical analysis scans the domestic discourse for signs of thick Europeanization, that is to say, changes in the way the key goals and values behind national foreign and security policy are defined as well as how threats are perceived. The significance of those changes in the state identity re-construction process is then assessed, and in the final part of this study (chapter 7) the key findings of the three phases (analysed in chapters 4,5 and 6) are aggregated and conclusions are drawn on their implications on

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<sup>51</sup> FPA tools of analysis have been used in Europeanization studies for instance by Vaquer 2001, Tonra 2001 and Aktipis 2007.

<sup>52</sup> Larsen calls these phenomenological/symbolic interactionist approaches (Larsen 2004, 76).

<sup>53</sup> Gross' study on the Europeanization of German foreign and security policy focuses on the role Germany has assigned to policy instruments located in the CFSP and ESDP in crisis management since 1999 (see Gross 2007).

Finnish state identity as a whole. The conclusions will thus concern the extent to which the process of state identity production and the construction of “self” and “other” has been influenced by European integration.

## **2.7 Summary on the theoretical chapters**

The general question and debate in the background of this study is how the EU has changed Finnish foreign and security policy. Basically, the possible logical answers range from “no change at all” or “the change is caused by other factors than the EU” to “change exclusively caused by the EU”. The main promise of the Europeanization approach is that it can give analytical ability resulting to deeper understanding of how the change has taken place and what sort of political processes relate to it. There is a variety of ways in the Europeanization literature as to how to define and approach the Europeanization process. As was discussed above they all reflect different theoretical traditions and thus build on somewhat differing metatheoretical assumptions. However, the three major theoretical turns in IR and European studies – the relaunch of (Comparative) Political Science, institutional turn, and constructivist turn – can be located in the background of Europeanization studies generally. Particularly the institutional turn appeared useful here in clarifying the differences between the Europeanization approaches and conceptual definitions. Furthermore, the closer examination of the rationalist and sociological institutionalist roots of different Europeanization approaches made visible the way in which the approaches can complement each other and coexist side by side when actual analysis on a given EU-member state is committed. The sociological institutionalist and constructivist underpinnings of foreign and security policy Europeanization were discussed and on that basis “thick Europeanization” and the respective misfit-mechanism was defined for the purposes of the empirical analysis to be presented in the following chapters.

From a theoretical perspective this study will also evaluate the applicability of the rationalist versus the sociological institutionalist approach on Europeanization. The conclusions of the study will support the argument that the sociological variant is more suitable for studying the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy. However, it should be noted that the rationalist approach is also capable of uncovering a number of cases of European integration’s impact on national foreign and security policy. But grasping and understanding the real depth of the change requires a sociological institutionalist approach on institutions and their transformation.

Concerning the three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization (as defined by Wong) it was argued that a better conceptualisation would consist of two directions (top-down adaptation and bottom-up projection) and two dimensions: rationalist institutionalist “thin” Europeanization (changes in national or European level structures and policies) and sociological institutionalist “thick” Europeanization (changes in perceptions and identities.) Revisiting IR constructivism from the perspective of

Europeanization studies was seen necessary in order to overcome the theoretical haziness that troubles much of the Europeanization literature when dealing with the socialisation and identity change at the individual level and the link between that and foreign policy change and state identity reconstruction. A conclusion taken in this respect was to focus on state level identity reconstruction. Consequently, foreign policy was conceptualised as the political practice through which state identity reconstruction takes place. The constructivist theory and the theorists themselves – although talking about general IR, not geographically targeted “regional” study – refer on a number of occasions to European integration as an example that supports the theoretical claims presented. These constructivists are clearly inspired by the European integration case. Although the significance of this point should not be overestimated, all in all it can be taken as sign of the conventional constructivisms theoretisation’s suitability for analysing the European case.

The link between foreign policy and state identity was found essential: the approach adopted in this study rests on the theoretical assumption that state identity is contained and reproduced through foreign and security policy. A key methodological implication of the selected assumption that state identity is socially constructed is that it is possible to track down specific concepts in the foreign and security policy discourse (consisting mainly of official foreign policy documentation and related parliamentary debates and statements and reports of Parliament’s Committees) that serve as the vehicles of identity production. The way to study and operationalise state identity change is to analyse these concepts and their change, as well as how they appear in the political argumentation on national foreign and security policy.

### 3. CFSP and Finland: clarifying the starting points for the empirical analysis

This chapter looks at both ends of the Europeanization process, that is to say CFSP and Finland and prepares the ground for the empirical analysis presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6. European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy – and CFSP as the policy level materialization of that – is defined as the *source* of the adaptational pressure that sets the Europeanization process in motion. A related key argument of this chapter is that CFSP indeed constitutes a misfit pressure resulting to Europeanization, and that, consequently, it makes sense to analyse the impact of EU on a member state's foreign and security policy. It is also argued that the adaptational pressure caused by CFSP has gradually increased during the Finnish EU membership era because of the deepening of European integration in security and defence. Particularly starting from the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century CFSP and ESDP have created a significant adaptational pressure on the domestic level. Finland, then, is seen as the “dependent variable” and its role in the receiving end of the Europeanization process is clarified in this chapter.<sup>54</sup> Based on the previous research on the Finnish case (the secondary material in this study) it is suggested that there are certain characteristics in the state identity of Finland and in the related cultural understandings that function as facilitating and mediating factors in the Europeanization process and increase the potential proneness of Finland to adaptational pressures caused by the CFSP.<sup>55</sup>

#### 3.1 CFSP as the source of adaptational pressure

When defining the Common *Foreign and Security* Policy as the source of adaptational pressure in the Europeanization process, it should be noted that according to the constructivist approach followed in this study it is not only a question of whether the EU “really” is an international security actor or how effective CFSP is in practice or what “hard capacities” it possesses for advancing its foreign policy goals. It is also a question of the national reactions to CFSP and how CFSP is perceived in the national policy-making process. The dominant Finnish perception on the security policy significance of the EU membership just after the accession in 1995 was that the EU is a security

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<sup>54</sup> The bottom-up direction of Europeanization, defined as national projection in the previous chapter, is also kept in mind because CFSP, like any EU policy, is originally a process that the member states themselves have created in the first place, and continue to have a say in how it is developed, thanks to the predominantly intergovernmental nature of CFSP.

<sup>55</sup> Concerning the concepts “foreign policy”, “foreign and security policy”, “security policy”, and “security and defence policy” it should be noted that “EU foreign policy” is usually understood as comprising of the national foreign policies of the member states, the EC external trade and development policy and the CFSP (Wong 2007, 322). The term used in this study, “foreign and security policy”, refers to CFSP (including ESDP), and not to “EU foreign policy”. This implies that trade and development policy are excluded from this study. This definition is also more in line with the way in which “foreign and security policy” is typically used in the Finnish vocabulary.

community where solidarity and reciprocity among the members strengthens the security of each (Ojanen 2007, 35). It was seen that the EU had clear security implications and even military implications: the Finnish Government Report of 1995 on security policy states that “Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure” (Government Report 1/1995, 40). Concerning the truthfulness of the Finnish view Ojanen sees that “[t]his may have been much more than what was generally acknowledged within the EU, where the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was at the time very new. Not many believed in a real development toward a common security and defense policy.” (Ojanen 2007, 35). From a constructivist viewpoint, however, the Finnish understanding that the EU membership has security policy significance is a decisive factor and a sufficient element to suggest that CFSP had an impact on Finnish foreign and national security.

Since 1995 and Finland’s EU accession CFSP has developed and gained significance in the eyes of the other member states too.<sup>56</sup> Consequently, the level of Europeanization pressure during the Finnish EU membership era has increased due to a progressive deepening and widening of European integration in the foreign policy. Starting from the 1990s the level of ambition to speak with one voice in foreign affairs has increased to include even security and defence questions (Aggestam 2004, 81). In the EU Studies literature there has been an extensive debate on “the existence of a common European foreign policy” (Wong 2007, 321) which deals with the capacity of European foreign and security policy for instance in terms of EU’s “ability to agree, the ability to act and the resources dedicated to the support of those actions” (Tonra 2001, 54; see also Forster & Wallace 2000). The roots of the debate go back to the question of state versus non-state actors in IR. As Wong notes, “[a]lthough the international system is populated by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in IR still conceives of foreign policy as essentially the *domain réservé* of sovereign governments and therefore exclusive to states.” In light of this traditional view, the combination of EU and foreign policy might appear problematic since the EU is not a unified state actor, nor does it have clear and consistent external objectives, nor a coherent and authoritative decision-making center (see e.g. Bull 1982, Hill 1993, Kagan 2003). Rather, it is seen that there are persistent national foreign policies that operate under or alongside – and sometimes in variance with – “EU” foreign policies defined by the Commission, the European Parliament and/or the Council (Wong 2007, 321-322).

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<sup>56</sup> Some have argued that an intensification of CFSP actually took place due to the forthcoming enlargement of 1995. There were fears that neutral newcomers might hamper the development and functioning of CFSP. In any case, the concerns that the old 12 members had on the negative impact of the neutral countries accession resulted in activated advancing of integration on foreign and security policy *before* the enlargement was to take place. Consequently, when accessing the EU, the new, neutral, member states had to accept a more consistent CFSP along with the other achievements of the integration process thus far. (Ojanen 2000.)

CFSP can indeed be seen as a contested institution (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). Koenig-Archibugi sees that a customary view among policy-makers and scholars is that compared to the economic domain where the so-called Community method<sup>57</sup> prevails, in foreign and security policy supranational institutions have little or no power, and the obligations laid upon governments are vague or frequently ignored. He traces this view back to the skepticism about functional spillovers that integration theorist Stanley Hoffmann voiced in the 1960s: “When the functions are concerned with the ineffable and intangible issues of *Grosspolitik*, when grandeur and prestige, rank and security, domination and dependence are at stake, we are fully within the realm of traditional interstate politics.” (Hoffmann 1965, 88; Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 139). Moravcsik argues from the viewpoint of liberal intergovernmentalism that “the primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik 1991, 75, cited in Wong 2007, 323). Many scholars argue along the same lines that EU foreign policy is not an independent variable, but a variable dependent on the roles played by member states themselves – especially the larger and more powerful ones, in fashioning EU structures and policies” (Wong 2007, 328). In other words, large member states can project their national goals into CFSP or try to increase their international influence with the help of larger European backing. Similarly, Wivel sees that “[e]ven though EU security institutions have been formally strengthened, they have been *de facto* marginalized in the sense that it has become still more acceptable for big EU Member States to create informal *ad hoc* directorates as illustrated in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan” (Wivel 2005, 405).

However, and coming to the viewpoint adopted in this study, states may not simply withdraw from multilateral cooperation if they see that the benefits accruing from cooperation do not compensate the costs incurred. Consequently, the CFSP “has become a critical sociological force and venue that shapes perceptions, structures policy choices, and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining others” (Wong 2007, 382; see also Øhrgaard 1997, Bátorá 2005). Rieker has suggested that the EU is to be regarded as “a comprehensive security actor”. She adopts a broad definition of security and concludes from that perspective that the “EU’s potential to coordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political and military – makes it one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold War context” (Rieker 2004, 370). Rieker sees that the EU’s comprehensive security approach contains both an internal and external dimension. As concrete examples of the latter she presents the enlargement process, the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean

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<sup>57</sup> Koenig-Archibugi defines Community method as “a complex set of institutional rules and practices that ensure a prominent role for supranational agencies and a high level of legalization” (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 139).

Partnership, the programme for Conflict Prevention and ESDP. Examples of EU's comprehensive internal security policy, then, include the European police cooperation, civilian protection and on the fight against money laundering which all are seen as efforts made in order to combat terrorism. (Rieker 2004, 370; also Rieker 2006.)

Furthermore, the recent developments in CFSP and ESDP have challenged the traditional assumption that European integration in security and defence is impossible or highly unlikely (Ojanen 2006, 57). Effective military capabilities have started to appear in form of EU battle groups, military crisis management operations and other instruments of intervention, and related politico-institutional frameworks (see Howorth 2007). In the connection of the Constitutional Treaty a terrorism-related solidarity clause and even a mutual defence clause were initiated. The creation of CFSP and ESDP and EU member-states continuous efforts to create effective institutional structures and to formulate common policies "challenge realist assumptions about the limits of cooperation and pose a general problem for IR theory, as they question the notion of state sovereignty" (Gross 2007, 503). The EU is "neither a state, nor a traditional alliance, and it therefore presents a heterodox unit of analysis" (Andreatta 2005, 19). Howorth sees the emergence of ESDP in many ways a shocking and surprising development that has posed a particular challenge to theories that see security and defence policy as the exclusive domain of sovereign nation-states (Howorth 2007, 22-32). Hence, it can be seen that CFSP has significance not only in the light of being a "critical sociological force" but in terms of harder, non-discursive terms, too. We can safely agree with Hill and Wallace in that even though the precise implication that the CFSP has for national foreign policy is a matter of contention in the academic literature, few analysts would probably disagree with the observation that CFSP has "moved the conduct of foreign policy away from the old nation-state national sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high level networking with transformationalist effects" (Hill and Wallace 1996, 6; Aggestam 2004, 81.) As Whitman has concluded "it now seems more appropriate to suggest that EU Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policy objectives inside a EU context" (Manners & Whitman 2000, 243).

The arguments presented in the debate on CFSP development have varied considerably, but certain consensus seems to exist on the main development trend: the pressure towards more concrete European solutions is increasing, and contrary to earlier attempts some tangible moves have been made. A traditional military-oriented security conception started gaining significance in the European integration process since the 1990s.<sup>58</sup> There has clearly been a shift towards multinational defence planning and the

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<sup>58</sup> The trend is clearly reflected in for instance the following EU documents: Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998 (St.Malo Declaration); Helsinki Headline Goals 1999; Petersberg tasks (Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union),



“post-national” legitimisation basis of armed forces in Europe. The field of defence is no longer seen as a “no-go” area for the EU competence. The idea that “the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence” (Treaty on the European Union 1992) undoubtedly gained more credibility in the 1990s. Similarly, the traditional security and military sector have gained weight in the EU’s security conception (see Palosaari 2009). The events of the 1990s support the argument that common foreign and security policy has developed from “verbal acrobatics” to new institutions and military capabilities commitments with great ease and velocity (Ojanen 2002; Ojanen et al. 2000, 35-36). All this has changed the tone in which issues like common standards, planning, the operating procedures of the armed forces, and even the common defence are discussed. The velocity of events has surprised many observers.<sup>59</sup>

In a social constructivist perspective described in the previous chapter the decisive factors regarding CFSP’s ability to cause Europeanization on the national level lay chiefly in the perceptions of actors. The EU has managed to construct itself as an international actor, with its own interests and policies, vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Larsen 2004, 69). To a large extent other international actors also have conceived of it as an international actor (see Bretherton and Vogler 1999). Whereas in the rationalist reading there is still considerable room for hesitation and debate, from the constructivist point of view it seems clear that the EU constructs itself as an international actor which defends its own interests and has an obligation to take responsibilities in the light of international challenges (Larsen 2000). This discursive practice constructing the EU as an international actor is reflected in policy practice. Larsen has argued that “[u]ntil 1998, the dominant EU discourse was one which stressed the role of civilian means in the foreign policy of the Union in relation to solving concrete international issues [...] Union in the 1990s has constructed itself as a political power which should draw on its political, economic and military means to further its political goals” (Larsen 2004, 71). In the new dominant discourse it is articulated that access to military means might be beneficial in responding to international crises and in contributing to international peace and stability, so that the Union has access to the full scope of instruments” (*ibid.*, 72; see also Palosaari 2009).

Previous Europeanization studies have shown that CFSP indeed causes misfits between the European and domestic level as well as adaptational pressure and thus has Europeanization effects leading to changes in state’s foreign policy as a result of national and European interactions (Gross 2007). For instance, research has indicated changed working patterns among the diplomats of the EU member-states resulting in a

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European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (Cologne European Council Declarations 1999, Annex III); Security Strategy of the EU (European Council 2003).

<sup>59</sup> Ojanen noted in 2002 that mainstream integration theories are “momentarily at a loss” (Ojanen 2002).

coordination reflex going beyond calculated exchanges of information (Nuttall 1992, Forster & Wallace 2000, Tonra 2001). Gross notes that Europeanization studies have also documented changes in national foreign policy as a result of EU accession in the case of Ireland (Keatinge 1984) and Spain (Torreblanca 2001). Rieker has shown that the EU has developed a foreign and security policy discourse independent of its member states, and that this comprehensive EU security discourse has influenced the security approaches of Sweden, Finland and the non-EU-member Norway (Rieker 2006). Rieker sees that “[w]ith the EU becoming an increasingly important provider of security, as well as being more integrated than other multilateral frameworks, there is good reason to expect that its security approach will also have an impact on how security is defined at the national level” (Rieker 2006, 511).

In the following an overview on the key events in the development of CFSP and ESDP is presented. The purpose is to provide necessary background information for the empirical analysis, as these events are frequently referred to when the Finnish reactions and contributions (that is, downloading and uploading) to the development are assessed. When found necessary some of these events are described in more detail later on in connection with the empirical analysis. As was noted in the previous chapter (see 2.6 on material and methodology) the empirical analysis is divided into three phases (1994-1996, 1997-2002, 2003-2007) within which the characteristics of the Europeanization process differ. In this variation the events at the European level have naturally played a significant role.

In the beginning of the 1990s – before the fourth enlargement and Finland’s accession – major changes took place in the EC’s approach to security policy. At Maastricht, for the first time, the member states incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty the objective of a “common foreign and security policy”<sup>60</sup>. The European Political Co-operation became the CFSP and one of the three pillars of the European Union. The Western European

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<sup>60</sup> Already in the 1950s, an idea and initiative on European Defence Community was presented. The pressure from the Cold War, notably the communist expansionism in Europe and Korea, provoked this. Despite the then clear linkage between security and integration (and all the introductions of the idea of a European army during and between the World Wars), the French proposal of European Defence Community with a European army did not succeed. The so-called Pléven plan aimed to create an integrated European army under joint command. This plan was the subject of negotiation between the member states of the ECSC from 1950 to 1952, and led to the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). An outcome of the creation of the EDC was a political project, presented in 1953, for creating a federal or confederative structure. The “European Political Community” would have created a two-house Parliamentary assembly, a European executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The political Community was to have very wide powers and responsibilities and was, in the long run, to absorb the ECSC and the EDC. However, it never came to fruition since the French National Assembly rejected it. (Pinder 2001, Urwin 1995.) On the pre-CFSP development see also Dinan 1994 and Preston 1997. Tonra divides the evolution of the institutional framework into three periods which he calls “the skeleton of a procedural infrastructure (1969-1980), “putting policy muscle on the bones of a procedure (1980-1988); and “developing a stronger physique” (1988-1993). As the titles indicate, via the historical review Tonra documents significant advancing in the institutional development.

Union (WEU) was defined as an integral part of the development of the Union and a reference to common defence was for the first time included in the treaty. Qualified majority voting was introduced in matters of procedure, and “common positions” and “joint actions” were created. The often quoted article of the treaty notes that “[T]he common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 39; Treaty on the European Union, article J.4.1.)

At least the interpretation by the European Commission of this change was an enthusiastic one:

*“Since the Treaty’s entry into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union as such can make its voice heard on the international stage, express its position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union and which it is committed to defend” (European Commission 2003).*

These comments refer clearly to the alleged need to further strengthen the political security structures, and prepare the whole organization and its members for new types of decision-making procedures in questions related to foreign and security policy. The experienced weakness of joint European foreign policy tools in dealing with the crises related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), collapse of Yugoslavia (1990-91) are likely to have boosted the CFSP development (Archer 2008, 10; Howorth 2007, 55). Yet at this point the overall Europeanization pressure emerging from CFSP on member states can be considered rather modest since CFSP as a policy was at an early and largely conceptual stage. But for the new member states, and particularly for Finland, there were significant adaptational pressures emanating from the newly established CFSP. These were also reflected in the Finnish EU accession treaty in that it included a declaration in which Finland committed to CFSP without any national preconditions or constraints (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy 21.12.1993; see chapter 4.1 below). A number of other features that increased the domestic impact of CFSP in the Finnish case can also be located. One can, for instance, refer to the general *Musterknabe* attitude, that is being a constructive and responsive member state, adopted by Finland in relation to European integration. Together with Finland’s aim in its integration policy to secure a place in the EU’s core this attitude materialized as an active support for CFSP development. I will come back to the factors that facilitate the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy in chapter 3.2 below when discussing the distinctive features of Finnish state identity in the context of Europeanization and the proneness of Finland to Europeanization.

According to Howorth in the mid-1990s the European mainstream in the development of the national armed forces was largely about modernizing of armed forces into more mobile, rapid reaction and power projection form. The Cold War era European states' static line defences, based on mass mobilisation of conscripts, artillery and tanks were now considered outdated and unsuitable for the new post-Cold War circumstances. The Gulf War (1991) lessons revealed Europeans' dependence to US military technology, their armies' ineffectiveness and inappropriateness in such post Cold War crisis management. A new strategic culture was emerging according to which new assets were needed, and the first line of defence was to be moved abroad, in the form of 21<sup>st</sup> century crisis management missions. Howorth argues that the development towards ESDP also can be seen part of this process where European states, UK and France and NATO too started to change from the Cold War territorial defence objective to the new post-Cold crisis management tasks.<sup>61</sup> Simultaneous and interlinked transformation processes were ongoing: professionalisation, modernisation, rationalisation of armament and defence planning. In professionalisation and abolishing conscription the motivation lied not only in transforming the militaries into deployable forces for overseas crisis management, but for many countries the purpose was also to downsize and reduce the military budget (such as Belgium, Spain and many CEE countries). At the same time the new wide security concept spread from the academic world into think tanks and to politics and eventually found its place in national security strategies. (Howorth 2005, Howorth 2007.)

The provisions of the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1999. Co-operation in the field of armaments was mentioned as a way in which the member states, as they consider appropriate, can support the progressive framing of a common defence policy. The treaty referred to the defence of the territory of the Union in that it adds to the CFSP the objective of safeguarding the integrity and independence of the Union. Thus the EU was defined as a referent object for security politics. Moreover, such terms as "integrity" and "independence" carried rather traditional security connotations. The treaty also included the tasks of preserving peace and strengthening international security, including the security of the EU's external borders. Furthermore, common strategies were added to the tools of CSFP. The treaty also established the post of a High Representative for the CFSP to represent and also to assist in the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions. A policy planning and early warning unit was also established to assist in achieving shared views and assessments. The purpose of all these structures has been to contribute to the

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<sup>61</sup> According to Howorth this change is manifested in UK Ministry of Defence's Strategic Defence Reviews of 1994, 1995 and 1998; new NATO Strategic concept of 1991; and in France's Defence White Book of 1994 (Howorth 2007, 97-98).

political strength and credibility of the EU as an organization and actor to be reckoned with in international politics.

In this phase the institutional development was relatively successful; the Amsterdam Treaty indeed gave the CFSP new instruments while strengthening its consistency with the European Community's traditional external activities. The EU now had political and administrative structures enabling it to speak "with a single voice" in international politics. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the so-called "Petersberg tasks" into the new Article 17 of the EU Treaty. They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking. This meant that the EU became an actor in the field of crisis management with the competence to deploy military resources as part of its response to international crises (Ojanen et al. 2000, 40; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; see also chapter 5 on the Finnish-Swedish initiative to bring the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the ESDP's range of activities).

This development was strengthened in the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 as crisis management tasks were placed at the core of the process of strengthening the European common security and defence policy. The European Council decided that, to this end, "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO". The Union's relationship to NATO was also discussed in detail in a Franco-British summit in November 1998 that led to the so-called St. Malo Declaration. Before that the member states, France and Britain particularly, were divided on issue of European security and defence policy.<sup>62</sup> Now it was seen, however, that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military force" (Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998). The St. Malo Declaration defines three sorts of multinational military operations involving Europeans feasible: NATO missions, "autonomous" EU missions, and EU missions that use NATO assets (Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998). This summit also played a central role in launching a new phase in European defence issues, especially in the creation of decision-making institutions and in the commitment to increased European defence capabilities. (Bonnén 2003, 45-46; Archer 2008, 10; Howorth 2007.)

Some have labelled the development of a common EU security and defence policy between December 1998 and December 2000 revolutionary, at least compared with the slow progress made during the preceding half century (Rutten 2002). The Union was

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<sup>62</sup> For a long time France had already wanted the EU "to act like a responsible power on its own security identity" (Lang 1998), but Britain had twice vetoed Franco-German proposals for a joint EU defence force in the 1990s.

now provided with a common security policy that covers all matters relating to its security, including the gradual formulation of a common defence policy – this means that the European Security and Defence Policy forms part of the CFSP. This common defence policy could lead to a common defence if the European Council were so to decide and the decision was adopted and ratified by the fifteen member states. It was stated that ESDP does not, however, affect the specific nature of the security and defence policies of certain member states, and is also compatible with the policy conducted in the framework of the NATO.

The Cologne European Council also charted an 18-month timetable to put in place the necessary decision-making framework and operational capabilities.<sup>63</sup> The Cologne Summit decided on the institutional framework for European defence. The ESDP issue was developed further in that the EU's Political and Security Committee (COPS, according to the French acronym) would co-ordinate the CFSP on daily basis, EU Military Committee would give military advice to COPS, and EU Military Staff (consisting mainly of former WEU personnel) would be a planning organ. Successive European Councils have given more substance to the process that aims to give the Union the capacity for autonomous action in international crisis management, where NATO as such is not engaged. Accordingly, the strengthening and securing of the capability of the EU to act autonomously in international politics gained an increasingly central role in the way the EU perceived security politics.

The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 decided to proceed toward the practical implementation of the ambitions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Cologne European Council Declaration. It was decided to establish a European military capacity to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks. The Helsinki European Council defined the headline goal in terms of military capabilities. For the Union this meant being able, by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, a rapid reaction force of up to 60 000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks. It was also decided that new political and military bodies and structures would be established within the Council to enable the Union “to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations” (European Council 1999b, Annex III). Furthermore, a non-military crisis management mechanism would be established to co-ordinate and make the various civilian means and resources more effective, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the member

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<sup>63</sup> See Presidency Conclusions, especially points 55-56, and Annex III, which includes the “European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence” and the “Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence” (European Council 1999a).

states (European Council 1999b, Annex IV<sup>64</sup>). A subsection of ESDP devoted to civilian crisis management (CCM) was established in Feira European Council in 2000. The priority areas of civilian crisis management were identified as police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection (Rutten 2001, 134; Howorth 2007, 125). CCM was advanced in conceptual and programmatic terms especially during the Swedish EU presidency in 2001. The first Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference of EU ministers took place in 2002.

The Nice European Council summit decided to establish within the Council new permanent political and military structures to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, namely the above-mentioned Political and Security Committee and Military Committee, as well as the military staff composed of military experts seconded by the member states assisting the latter. Among the documents dealing with the “implementation of the defence initiative” was a paper entitled “Military Capabilities Declaration”. Although it is explicitly noted in the declaration that it “does not involve the establishment of a European army”, the declaration aroused interpretations suggesting that it “in reality will establish the European army” (EU-Observer 2000).<sup>65</sup> All in all we can conclude that the institutional development from 1992 to 2002, regarding both civilian and military aspects, significantly increased the potential of CFSP and ESDP to cause Europeanization pressure on the member states.

In the Laeken European Council in 2001 ESDP was finally declared functional: “the Union is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations” (European Council 2001, Annex II). Since that, ESDP has evolved both in terms of institutional framework for decision-making and military and civilian capabilities for power projection and crisis management in and outside Europe. According to Howorth the EU’s entire “military mindset” has transformed: the EU is now engaging autonomous military and policing missions under a European command chain and the European flag (Howorth 2007). The first ESDP operation was launched in 2003 (EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina). In addition to the establishment of EU battle groups in 2007, there has been EU military missions in Macedonia (2003), DR Congo (2003, 2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004-), Chad and Central African Republic (2008-) and the coast of Somalia (2008). In the field of civilian crisis management operations have taken place

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<sup>64</sup> Annex IV contains the “Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council on ‘Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ and on ‘Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union’”.

<sup>65</sup> The documents produced by the Nice summit also include points concerning the relationship between the EU and NATO, such as the links between the EU and NATO members not in Union, and standing arrangements for consultation between the EU and NATO. These relationships were discussed already in Helsinki where the main items were the development of an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. Also the “consultation, co-operation and transparency” between the EU and NATO, as well as the need to avoid unnecessary duplication, were emphasised.

e.g. in Macedonia (2004-2005, 2006), Palestinian territories (2005-), Georgia (2004-2005, 2008), Aceh (2005-2006), Iraq (2005-), Sudan/Darfur (2005-2006), DR Congo (2005-) and Kosovo (2008-). (European Council 2009.)

In December 2003, the European Council in Brussels accepted the European Security Strategy (ESS) titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World” which sets out the normative strategic thinking behind ESDP (European Council 2003, Howorth 2007, 199). According to Howorth ESS reflects a comprehensive security view, meaning that security is seen as indivisible and it addresses basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental cooperation as well as peace and stability. ESS also draws on human security and pays attention to “interdependent global goods” such as physical security and stability, enforceable legal order, open and inclusive economic order, general wellbeing, health, education and a clean environment. Howorth sees ESS a compromise between different cultures and approaches among the EU member states. In the global security environment ESS pays attention to the root causes of poverty and global suffering. It identifies five key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts. When outlining the EU’s strategic objectives ESS stresses two features: the first line of defence will often be abroad (via conflict prevention, that is), and none of the new threats are manageable through purely military means. ESS contains commitment to upholding and developing international law and recognizing the UN as the main source of international legitimacy. ESS placed a new emphasis on using the EU’s powerful trade and development policies in a conditional and targeted way, but also mentioned the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters “early, rapid and, where necessary, robust intervention. (Howorth 2007, 200-203; see also Biscop 2005.)

The ESDP operations, together with the European Security Strategy have clearly added a new dimension to the Europeanization of national foreign and security policies of the member states. We will come back to these issues development in chapters 5 and 6 when analysing the Finnish reactions and contributions to the ESDP development.



### 3.2 Finland as the receiver: Beyond structural changes

In light of the previous studies focusing on institutional change rationalist institutionalism draws attention to a number of relevant topics for Europeanization studies in the Finnish case. (As defined in chapter 2 according to the rationalist institutionalist perspective Europeanization is about bureaucratic reorganization and constitutional change, adaptation of domestic structures, projection of national policy models, and domestic change through differential empowerment of actors.) The studies often refer to the connections of the EU membership and the new Finnish Constitution (2000) that changed the national decision-making structure of foreign and security policy. The Constitution distinguishes between "traditional foreign policy", belonging to the President (in cooperation with the Government), and "EU affairs", being the domain of the Prime Minister.<sup>66</sup> It has been argued that a major reason for this strengthening of Prime Minister's power was the EU-membership: it was considered natural that Finland was represented by the Prime Minister among the other prime ministers of EU-members. And in order to be a trustworthy and credible partner in that group, the Finnish Prime Minister needed a suitable and sufficient mandate (Forsberg 2001, Meres-Wuori 1998). In this respect, the reason and pressure for increasing the Prime Minister's power was caused by the European interaction.

Previous studies have indicated that the Government and Parliament have gained more power when it comes to foreign policy-making in the national decision-making system. A reason for this is that as it has become more and more difficult to draw the line between issues regarding European integration belonging to the domestic and foreign policy sphere, it made sense to parliamentarize foreign policy – similarly as in other EU member states. The Constitution of 2000 reflects the parliamentarization and the increase of the Prime Minister's status by giving decision-making power in all EU-issues, foreign and security policy included, to the Government. The President is responsible for the "traditional", non-EU foreign policy in cooperation with the Government. A usual conclusion has been that the Constitution clearly moved power in foreign and security policy-making from the President to the Prime Minister and the Council of State – partly because the majority of foreign policy issues can be seen to have a connection to EU affairs in one way or the other. This development has been strengthened also by the termination of the Defence Council [puolustusneuvosto] in 2000 and the moving of its main tasks to Government's Cabinet Committee on Foreign

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<sup>66</sup> According to the old model the President decided on Finland's relationships with other states. The Parliament had a role when decisions on war and peace were made. Additionally, it was stated that the borders of Finland could not be changed without the consent of the Parliament. (Jansson 1987, 73.)

and Security Policy. Additionally, the previous studies have pointed out that the Prime Minister's position has been strengthened in that the EU secretariat is responsible for the coordination of EU affairs has been relocated from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister's Office and is now called Government Secretariat for EU Affairs. (Forsberg 2002, Tiilikainen 2007.)

From the perspective of Europeanization these examples of institutional changes that have often been traced to the EU membership's impact fall into the category of thin Europeanization and related rationalist institutionalist reading of institutions. In a theoretical Europeanization framework a problem is, however, that in these cases it would be difficult to demonstrate a clear misfit-pressure that would be the sole or key cause of the change in question. In fact, the whole rearrangement of Finnish decision-making on foreign and security policy could be quite convincingly explained by referring to the general parliamentarization of that policy field (on the parliamentarization of Finnish foreign policy see Raunio 2008). Thus the change becomes part of a broader process of decreasing the presidential powers – a process that can be seen as independent of European integration. Forsberg and Vogt (2003) have pondered upon this "measuring problem" of Finland's Europeanization as follows:

"It is not fully clear how much of the recent change in Finnish foreign policy can be explained by the EU-membership. In any case, it cannot be said that the change is exclusively due to the membership, since the Finnish EU-entrance and the consequent adaptation to the common foreign and security policy were largely due to *deeper forces of change* in the international position of Finland. Many of the rearrangements would have been made even if Finland had not joined the EU; but at the same time it seems undisputable that the membership has speeded up, deepened and widened the change of Finnish foreign policy."<sup>67</sup> (Cursives added.)

Another significant impact of the EU membership highlighted by the previous research which can be interpreted as thin Europeanization concerns the general structural changes in Finnish foreign policy. After the EU accession a considerable amount of bilateral relations with other European states became part of *internal* EU cooperation. A portion of Finland's foreign policy got converted in this sense into domestic policy. A

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<sup>67</sup> Original text in Finnish: "Ei ole tietenkään täysin selvää, kuinka paljon Suomen ulkopolitiikan viimeaikaisesta muutoksesta voidaan suoranaisesti selittää Euroopan unionin jäsenyydellä. Joka tapauksessa muutosta ei voida palauttaa yksinomaan jäsenyyteen unionissa, sillä liittyminen ja sitä seurannut sopeutuminen yhteiseen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaan on ollut paljolti seurausta syvemmistä muutosvoimista Suomen kansainvälisessä asemassa. Mikäli Suomen jäsenyys EU:ssa ei olisi toteutunut, monet uudelleenlinjaukset olisi todennäköisesti tehty muutenkin, mutta samalla lienee kiistanonta, että jäsenyys on vauhdittanut, syventänyt ja laajentanut Suomen ulkopolitiikan muutosta." (English translation by the author.)

documented structural consequence of this has been that the competence of the traditional foreign policy actors, such as the President and Foreign Ministry, has declined, whereas the Government, Parliament and sectoral ministries have gained more competence. (Tiilikainen 2007, 186; Jyränki & Nousiainen 2006.) Another change took place when a significant part of Finland's relations with other international actors was incorporated in EU's external affairs and CFSP. On the one hand, Finnish-Russian relations, for instance, became part of the common position making. On the other hand, CFSP introduced new geographical areas and issues to the Finnish agenda which started to require Finland's own contributions and position taking. (Tiilikainen 2007, 186.)<sup>68</sup>

The previous studies suggest that the national decision-making structure has clearly changed, and possibly Europeanized (cf. the RI-oriented claim on differential empowerment), but attempts to unambiguously verify the source of change and the chain of causality soon run into trouble – or into complex “contra-factual” thinking on whether or not certain changes could have happened without the EU-membership. All in all, analysing Europeanization of such issues proves out to be problematic if the approach used rests merely on rationalist measurement and straightforward causal thinking.

As was discussed in the previous chapter, national projection is usually seen as a domain of the bigger EU-members (Wong 2005, 137). Still, in light of the previous studies it would seem possible to apply a bottom-up approach to the Finnish case to a certain extent, too. For instance the Finnish initiatives on the Northern Dimension of the EU or civil crisis management (in the context of the so-called Petersberg tasks) can be read as Finland's attempts to “customize” the EU into a form that is more suitable and useful for Finland (Ojanen 1999). With the help of the back-up provided by the EU Finland has also transformed its Russian relationship from a bilateral mode towards a more multilateral arrangement (Pursiainen 2000). The Finnish attempts to project its foreign and security policy interests into CFSP (and particularly into the EU's Russia strategy) as well as the promotion of Nordic governmental traditions (such as transparency) are further examples of such Europeanization (Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming). These issues could be analysed as cases of national projection, but have not yet systematically been analysed in the terminology of Europeanization studies (however, see Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming).

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<sup>68</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs was reorganized from topical into geographical sub-divisions in the early 1990s because of the forthcoming EU-membership. Although this type of reorganization in ministries might eventually have certain implications on the way the national foreign and security policy is constructed (for instance by changing the division of power between key officials), the Europeanization impact on Finnish foreign and security policy resulting from such purely structural changes *inside* the ministries is in the context of this study regarded rather limited.

In the above-mentioned examples the institutional change is approached from a rationalist institutionalist perspective. As was discussed in the previous chapter the sociological institutionalist understanding is dominant in actual Europeanization research literature on foreign and security policy. According to that perspective institutional change is about the development and redefinition of political ideas. Collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. An obvious example of such institutionalist change mentioned in the previous research on the Finnish case is the fact that Finland has given up the notion of neutrality (e.g. Vesa 1998, Huru & Jalonen 1995, Forsberg & Vogt 2003; Forsberg 2002, Tiilikainen 2006, Ojanen 2000, Rieker 2004). For instance according to Rieker the source of the adaptational pressures that have led to this change in Finnish foreign and security policy concepts appears clear: "With the establishment of a political union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Finland found that it would have to change its security doctrine to make membership possible" (Rieker 2004, 172). Similarly as with the above-presented examples of thin Europeanization the picture is complicated by other possible intervening factors: in addition to the EU-membership, this change can be caused by "deeper forces of change" (see Vogt & Forsberg above): after the end of the East-West confrontation there was simply no possibility for the traditional type of neutrality between the two blocs (cf. Joenniemi 1993, 26). Quite similarly, the debate on the legislation regarding peacekeeping in the 1990s was intertwined in an undetermined combination of pressures and expectations of EU-politics on one hand and deeper changes in world politics (regarding the role of the United Nations as well as the EU's international *actorness*) on the other (see more on this topic in chapter 4).

The previous studies on Finnish EU-politics that use the identity perspective seem to conclude that the Finnish foreign and security policy has not been significantly Europeanized. A few studies dealing with the Finnish EU-membership have analysed the relationship between national history, identity and European integration (Tiilikainen 1998, Browning 2002, Moisio 2003), thus leaning towards a SI-oriented approach. The interpretations have varied especially concerning how vulnerable to change the national identity is seen to be and how solid boundaries national history sets for identity. Those views emphasizing the historical construction of national identity are more likely to highlight the durability of identity – which makes it less open to the impact of Europeanization. In light of the studies building on historical institutionalism the Finnish way to approach integration is based on historical factors that define state identity, such as the Lutheran tradition (Tiilikainen 1998). This means that national history also defines for its part the current Finnish EU politics. When applied to European integration historical institutionalism generally tends to stress the role of prior

commitments and institutional and policy “stickiness”, which can counter the adaptational pressure caused by Europeanization and slow down the institutional change.

Some of the studies, however, build on the argument that national history has actually been interpreted and used quite flexibly in the “national identity project” (Moisio 2003). According to this reading Finland has been actively Europeanised in the *domestic* politics in that national history has been purposefully re-interpreted in a way which supports the current pro-integration policies. Consequently, a purpose of Finnish membership and active pro-integration policies has been to correct the “wrong” geopolitical and identity political positioning of Finland. In the same fashion the Finnish EU-membership has been politically presented as a natural return to home, to the West (Browning 2002, Browning 2008). Thus, according to these studies it has been a question of a political attempt to present a European narrative of Finland – and to present the decisions made in Finnish foreign and security policy after the Cold War as a logical continuum to the previous decisions. These explanations have often aimed for uncovering hidden intentions behind the rhetoric of the decision-making elite. On the other hand, they have rightly pointed to the *political* nature of arguments based on values, culture or identity – even identities are not positive truths but socially constructed, historically changing and under constant reproduction.

In light of this interpretation Finland has used and uses the EU-membership and active pro-integration politics as a tool with which to prove the European identity of Finland. The EU is an instrument in making identity politics, rather than a source of adaptational pressure. Therefore the Europeanization of Finland does not appear deep in this reading. The pressure to change the direction of national foreign and security policy came from *inside*, and the EU-membership was only picked up as a channel for making the identity political move towards the West. This move was made possible by the end of the Cold War, and would thus have been possible even without the EU, too. Consequently, it was not a question of learning or socialisation or other mechanisms of identity reconstruction, but the changes required, for instance, by the sudden advance of CFSP were simply accepted as inescapable facts”. Moreover, attempts were made to minimize the negative impact of those changes on the traditional foreign and security policy by projecting national interests to CFSP (see the point on “customizing” above). The aim was thus to reconstruct a European identity for Finland but at the same time to counter or slow down the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy.

Rieker has studied the impact of EU’s security policy on the national “security identities” of Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland from a constructivist/sociological institutionalist viewpoint (Rieker 2004). Rieker observes a misfit between national

security identities that are constrained by their legacy from particularly the Cold War period and the EU's norms, values and rules that have been developed in a post-Cold War European security context without such constraints (Rieker 2004, 372). According to Rieker the European integration process is currently the most important tool of Finnish security policy and the Finnish security discourse has Europeanized – meaning that a new vocabulary on foreign and security policy has been introduced, and some changes in the way the actors define security threats and instruments of security policy have taken place. However, she sees that these changes have not been profound, and the traditional security concept still dominates Finnish security thinking. She argues, that all the changes that have taken place in the Finnish security policy have been legitimized by references to how they help to strengthen the territorial defence of Finland. Rieker argues that no “learning” or “socialisation” has taken place, but in the Finnish case it is question of mere “instrumental adaptation”. This means that there has been no identity change and no (social) institutionalisation of the change into a part of national thinking. The changes such as giving up neutrality, active support to EU-integration, political initiatives (Northern Dimension, Petersberg tasks) are instrumental in nature: in Rieker's reading they only aim at strengthening of territorial defence. Finland's security policy is thus best characterized by “continued traditionalism” (Rieker 2004, 174-175).<sup>69</sup> Instrumental adaptation means that reactions can be observed in the Finnish national security discourse for instance to the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of a political union; development towards the ESDP as well as development towards a comprehensive European security approach in the EU. However, Rieker argues that all changes made in the national foreign and security policy are also defended with rather traditional arguments related to national territorial defence (Rieker 2004, 384). Therefore, although the impact of the integration process is most evident in Finland, compared to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, it is question of mere instrumental adaptation. This means that Finland has started to instrumentally adjust its discourse and actions to community norms, but at the same time tries to find “new” ways of preserving traditional interests. Proper Europeanization in the form of socialization and learning would happen only when “the actor becomes convinced by the community's discourse” (Rieker 2004, 384). Consequently, Rieker's conclusion is that there are still no signs of a change in Finnish security identity” (Rieker 2004, 384).

What seems to connect all the interpretations presented above is that they tend to see that “real” Europeanization has not taken place in the Finnish case, but Europeanization

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<sup>69</sup> Rieker draws the line between “adaptation” and “learning” with the help of Cowles et al. (2001).

“Adaptation” refers changes which occur when actors merely adjust their behaviour to external factors (‘strategic adjustments’), whereas “learning” implies changes in actors' preferences or identities. She also refers to the three ways of change defined by Goldmann (1988): (1) Learning: revision of policies in the wake of negative feedback; (2) changes in domestic balance of power: when a new group with different ideas comes to power; (3) adaptation to changes in the external environment. A fourth class added by Carlsnaes (1993) is also mentioned: actor's capacity for innovative thinking.

has rather been in an instrumental role: providing (rhetorical) justifications for promoting old goals and interests. This lack of genuine change would also imply that the main features of Finnish state identity remain unaffected.<sup>70</sup> Regarding the previous studies on Finland it is suggested in this study that they have often underestimated or failed to acknowledge the role played by CFSP in redefinition of the key foreign and security policy concepts. The link between foreign and security policy and state identity is likewise inadequately recognized. Furthermore, the following empirical analysis will document an escalating emergence in the domestic political debate of expectations, values and foreign policy goals constituted at the European level. The transforming interplay and frequent clashes between the traditional national interest oriented reasoning and more internationalized thinking in the domestic political process deserve to be analysed closer and through a more systematic and comprehensive look into the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse. By looking closer into the parliamentary debates and the legislative and other processes where the official documentation is decided on new arguments, new understandings of national interest, security and identity can be located. A richer and more nuanced picture of the Finnish case can be achieved also by stretching the time span to the years 1994-2007.

Concerning the Finnish case the tentative argument thus is that the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy might actually be more profound than the previous studies on the Finnish case indicate. This is mainly based on the suggestion that in addition to changes in the organizational structure and output of national foreign and security policy-making, the Finnish *state identity* has changed significantly due to the impact of European integration. Based on the theoretical views presented in the previous chapter it is argued that European integration has played a role in the transformation of the ways the central actors of Finnish foreign and security policy perceive the interests and identity of Finland on the international stage. "Finland" has been reconstituted in this process and the EU has entered the process of Finnish state identity reconstruction. The key concepts of national foreign and security policy – which are here seen as factors that define state identity – have not remained untouched by this change. This implies a change in the way Finland is defined in relation to the other actors of international politics.

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<sup>70</sup> Similar logic can be observed in the *Realpolitik*-oriented explanation of Finnish EU-membership: the EU balances Russian power in the area, without provoking Moscow (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 1998). The assumption of non-change of Finnish state identity could also be supported by the argument presented by Joenniemi: For Finland, like in many North European states, "the end of the Cold War did not signify the end of the East-West divide. It was rather comprehended as presenting a new context within which one's position might be shifted further to the West." (Joenniemi 2005, 144).

### *Features that facilitate the Europeanization of Finnish security policy*

Based on the previous research on the Finnish case it is suggested that there are certain characteristics in the state identity of Finland that function as facilitating factors in the Europeanization process and increase the potential vulnerability of Finland to adaptational pressures caused by the CFSP. In chapter 2 it was noted on the mediating factors that facilitate Europeanization in that they contain various domestic structural conditions (such as cultural factors, formal and informal institutions) that affect the impact of European integration.

Firstly, it can be noted that there has been a general responsive tendency – a pursuit of a place in the “core” of the Union – in Finland’s policy towards EU. Particularly in the early years of Finnish membership, “the Finnish government was consciously trying to move from the periphery to the core in order to maximize its political influence.” (Ojanen 2007, 36; also Antola 1999, Forsberg 2001, Tiilikainen 2006, 213). This so-called *Musterknabe* attitude, being an active and constructive good pupil, is often used to describe early Finnish EU policy (see Mouritzen 1993). The non-aligned Finland had to work hard against the suspicions about being potentially difficult as a neutral member and to participate actively in CFSP development. The logic of sociological institutionalist thick Europeanization is very compatible with the *Musterknabe* idea: as Ojanen has suggested “participation changes Finnish policies, and the very interests Finland is furthering are being defined anew in the process. Without doubt, the *Musterknabe* allegiance leads to revised interpretations. [...]“The need to move within the majority of the EU countries, or its most active core, pushes Finnish positions: in order not to obstruct the others, and in order not to visibly give up its own priorities, it most probably has to redefine its own goals.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 119)

Secondly, non-alignment can be treated as a facilitating factor to the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy. Rather than causing obstacles or counteracting the impact of CFSP on Finland, non-alignment has actually become an outstanding example and indicator of change: it has transformed, been redefined and repeatedly reconstructed in the Finnish discourse.<sup>71</sup> The implications of EU membership, CFSP and ESDP have been heavily debated in domestic politics. Referring to the *Musterknabe* issue it can be seen that non-alignment has facilitated Europeanization because it forced Finland to work hard to ensure the other member states and the EU that non-alignment does not make Finland a hindrance to CFSP development. Furthermore, it has been argued in

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<sup>71</sup> Ojanen et al. wrote already in 2000 that “while Finland has maintained its non-alignment and thus certain continuity, its policies and interests have changed. The results of the “Europeanisation” of Finnish foreign and security policy can be seen in the increasingly flexible interpretation of what non-alignment means.” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 142.)



research literature that non-alignment has made Finland promote civilian aspects of the EU's external relations and emphasize crisis management instead of defence in the development of CFSP as well as to lobby for civilian means and non-military aspects of crisis management (Ojanen 2002, 168-173). What non-alignment obviously means in practice in the Finnish case, is that Finland is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This clearly increases the significance of the EU and the ESDP in Finnish security policy considerations. For instance, the debate on the mutual defence commitment introduced in the draft Constitutional Treaty carried a totally different weight in the Finnish domestic debate than in other member states (see chapter 6 of this study).

Thirdly, the Finnish emphasis on efficiency in all EU's actions can be seen as a facilitating factor since it has implied "open-mindedness toward qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy even in matters other than implementation, and even toward application of flexibility or enhanced cooperation in security and defence policy cooperation" (Ranta & Vierros-Villeneuve 2006, 305-306; cited in Ojanen 2007, 36). Additionally, the Finnish public opinion has been positive as regards to ESDP. Raunio and Tiilikainen note that "[w]hen it comes to ESDP, it would seem that Finnish people in general support it even more than the politicians" (Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003, 135). People actually see EU membership as the factor that contributes most to the strengthening of Finnish security (MTS public opinion poll 2006). In this light the public opinion would not pose significant hindrances to the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy.<sup>72</sup> The overall significance of security issues was appreciated in the national perspective also when the EU-membership was pondered upon, by both elites and the public. Huru notes that already in 1992 the Finnish political leadership quietly regarded foreign and security policy interests as an essential reason for joining the EC/EU (Huru 1995, 175). The cultural understanding of "centrality of security policy" has meant that the EU has been seen from a security policy standpoint after the accession as well. It has also shaped Finland's position on the ESDP (Ojanen 2007, 34).

Lastly, the small stateness can be seen as a factor that enhances the proneness of Finnish foreign and security policy to Europeanization. Wivel argues that small state security identity usually portrays the small state as promoting a multilateral and non-military approach to security policy based on ideals of conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence and a just world order (Wivel 2005, 395-396). Furthermore, it has been argued that states with insecure international identities, respond more to international norms than countries with secure international identities (Gurowitz 1999). Small state identity is

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<sup>72</sup> According to the MTS poll of 2006, 56 % saw that the EU should keep to its present peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. 27 % preferred common European defence, and only 14 % saw that the EU should completely abstain from military tasks. (MTS public opinion poll 2006.)

defined in contrast to the great power politics of strong international actors. Traditionally in IR small states are usually seen as the main beneficiaries, and thus also supporters, of international institutions. This is because institutions constrain the actions of great powers, facilitate peaceful conflict resolution and provide voice opportunities for the lesser powers. In traditional IR terms international institutions cushion the effects of international anarchy by regulating the use of force and reducing the importance of power asymmetries. (Wivel 2005, 395-396; Antola 2002, 74-75.)

### *Locating the conceptual vehicles of identity production*

In light of the research examined above there appears to be certain volatility in the factors which according to this research define Finnish state identity. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provided a "situation of strong uncertainty"<sup>73</sup> where the previous foundations of Finnish foreign and security policy had to be rethought – starting from the fact that neutrality between the Western and Eastern blocs was no longer possible as these blocs ceased to exist. The close connection of foreign policy and state identity – state identity is reproduced by and in foreign policy – implies that the rethinking and redefinition of key foreign and security policy concepts has consequences on the Finnish state identity. Conceptualizing Europeanization as identity reconstruction rather than structural changes in the politico-administrative system guides attention to these vehicles of identity production.

A potential way to challenge the previous studies' conclusions on the relative lack of Europeanization in Finnish foreign and security policy is to underline the connection between foreign and security policy and the construction of state identity. This means contrasting the previous findings (such as the superficial adaptation of traditional foreign and security thinking to the changed circumstances) with a deeper change that touches upon the state identity – from which the foreign and security policy ultimately stems from. As was discussed in the previous chapter this is best done by incorporating constructivist IR-theory's views with Europeanization, both concerning the sociological institutionalist mechanism of change and European integration as a general context of interstate interaction. Such a framework is instrumental in recognizing how Finnish state identity has changed, and what the role of European integration, and CFSP particularly, has been in the reconstruction process of state identity.

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<sup>73</sup> According to Checkel cases in which actors change their identities and interests – as opposed to merely adjusting their means and strategies (cf. RI-oriented Europeanization) occur rather rarely and usually take place after critical policy failure or in perceived crises and in situations of strong uncertainty (Checkel 2001). Marcussen et al. argue similarly: "Shifts in nation-state identities occur at critical junctures when the political environment is receptive to new kinds of social identities and self-categorizations" (Marcussen et al. 2001, 102).

As was discussed in the previous chapter the key concepts in the current Finnish foreign and security policy are observable in the Finnish official documentation on foreign and security policy as well as in the parliamentary debate and in the speeches of key politicians and officials – in some cases explicitly, and in other cases rather as more veiled political values that guide and give justification for the policy. The change in these key concepts of national foreign and security policy, i.e. vehicles of identity production, becomes apparent when one looks at the key concepts of Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War. Firstly, Finland was – or rather saw itself as – neutral. The conception of neutrality was for a long time a key issue in Finnish state identity (no matter how well, or by what means it was conducted in practice). Secondly, Finland was ‘Nordic’; the Nordic countries and various Nordic cooperation forms provided almost the only international forum on which Finland could safely act without risking its neutrality. Moreover, Finland considered itself clearly a small-state, and somehow peripheral and Northern in a negative sense. The political conclusion drawn from this was that Finland could not afford to escape the *Realpolitik* of the Cold War but always had to base its policies on geography and careful consideration of current power politics. (Tiilikainen 1998, Rieker 2004, Forsberg 2000b.)

Based on the previous research literature on Finland, and on the pre-study of the primary research material supported by intuitive reasoning, the key categories of vehicles of identity production to be looked at in the empirical analysis are defined as follows. The first category, *neutrality and alignment*, focuses on those aspects of Finnish foreign and security policy discourse that cluster around the change from neutrality to non-alignment and eventually to political alignment and defence cooperation within the frame of ESDP. Related to it are also domestic political debates on Finland’s position taking in and with the EU. The second category embraces the change taken place from UN-mandated traditional *peacekeeping* to participation in *military crisis management* operations led by EU and NATO. Conventional peacekeeping and participation in UN operations have since the 1950s played a crucial role in Finland. Peacekeeping has been perceived as an important factor in Finnish state identity and it remains a constant topic of domestic media interest. Behind the related changes in legislation concerning the using of Finland’s military assets abroad interesting and contradictory features in the domestic discourse can be located. There are, for instance, clearly new understandings of the value basis of national foreign and security policy as well as new ways of argumentation regarding CFSP and ESDP and Finland’s preferred relation to them.

The third category, collecting together the themes in the empirical research material that relate to *small stateness*, consists of three dimensions: firstly, looking inside the domestic foreign and security policy-making, small stateness has traditionally implied a generally accepted claim for consensus in national foreign and security policy-making.

Regarding this question the chronological empirical analysis will, however, document a diversification in the domestic discourse and a gradual fracturing of consensus. “Post-consensus” is characterized for example by policization and parliamentarization of foreign and security policy, meaning that previously highly securitized issues are more openly debated in the Parliament. Additionally, a new European level of decision-making has entered the stage and this has had influence on the domestic decision-making procedures and culture. Secondly, closely related to small state identity has been an understanding of a “legitimate security interest of small state” that rests on *nationally* defined interests. As will become evident in the following chapters these have been countered by a view that sees foreign and security policy interests as common interests and defined in common European processes. The third dimension of small stateness is related to geography and to the changes in the extent to which geography is seen to delimit the room for manoeuvre for Finland’s foreign and security policy. The emerging new understandings of the Finnish geopolitical position fall under this category. The ongoing process in which the geopolitical implications are thought over produces various arguments and reconceptualizations which are relevant in the Finnish state identity reconstruction. For instance, empirical analysis with respect to this category looks at the transforming roles of North/Nordicness and Europe as vehicles of state identity production.

The purpose here is not to argue that this would be the only possible way to classify the key Finnish foreign and security policy concepts. But for the purposes of this study the above-described categorization is found useful: it structures the empirical analysis when trawling through the primary research material, that is to say the Finnish domestic discourse on foreign and security policy, for signs of sociological institutionalist thick Europeanization. In all these categories we come across concepts that are redefined or replaced by new ones during the Finnish EU membership era. Indicators of thick Europeanization and sociological institutional change are to be located in the domestic discourse as new ways of argumentation and new understanding of national interest and security threats and solutions. This brings the analysis, and the empirical findings to the level of state identity and to the question of “how has European integration influenced the process of state identity (re)production?” By aggregating the findings on the different categories and phases conclusions can be drawn in the final chapter regarding possible changes in the constitution of “Finland”, “self” and “other”, “foreign” and “domestic”. This way it can also be concluded if it is a question of just continued traditionalism or whether there are deeper, yet uncovered aspects of Europeanization that extend to the factors that define Finland’s state identity.

#### **4. First phase (1994-1996): “The decision to join follows the active and pragmatic Finnish security policy”**

*“Finland’s EU membership is connected with the Post-Cold War international radical change. The decision to join follows the active and pragmatic Finnish security policy”* (Government Report 1/1995, 39).

##### **4.1 Introduction**

###### *Notes on the pre-accession period*

Finland, Austria and Sweden joined the European Union in the first wave of post-Cold War enlargement in 1995.<sup>74</sup> The rules for accession were set by the Copenhagen criteria, which include the following economic and political conditions for membership: “a stable democracy, respect of human rights, the rule of law, the protection of minorities, a functioning market economy, and the adoption of the common rules, standards, and policies that make up the body of EU law” (European Council 1993). According to the criteria, the applicants were expected to accept the *acquis*, which is the detailed laws and rules adopted on the basis of the EU’s founding treaties, mainly the treaties of Rome, Maastricht, and Amsterdam. The view of the Commission regarding the enlargement was that “widening must not be at the expense of deepening. Enlargement must not be a dilution of the Community’s achievements” (European Commission 1992, 11). In addition to the single European market and the Maastricht provisions on Economic and Monetary Union the applicants had to accept and be able to implement the common foreign and security policy (European Commission 1992). This criterion was implicitly aimed at the neutral applicants of Austria, Finland and Sweden (Sjursen&Smith 2001, 7; Sjursen 1997).<sup>75</sup> Hence for the applicants it was a question of adapting to a common foreign and security policy that was clearly reflected in the membership criteria.

An obvious defining moment for the analysis of Europeanization of Finnish security policy is provided by the EU-accession of Finland. According to Ojanen et al. “[i]n a sense, EU membership replaced neutrality as a new tool in security policy” and the

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<sup>74</sup> The Central and Eastern European Countries presented their official applications for EU membership in 1994 (Poland), 1995 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia) and 1996 (Czech Republic, Slovenia).

<sup>75</sup> According to Miles the Swedish neutrality was “voluntary and active”, whereas Finland’s neutrality was “semi-mandatory and passive”. In his classification the Austrian neutrality was “mandatory”, “in many ways passive” and “a mathematical function of the East-West power conflict”. (Miles 1997, 89-92.) The Finnish Government White Paper of 1988 had stated that EC membership was *incompatible* with Finnish neutrality.

change from neutrality to non-alignment was a notable step towards a new security policy (Ojanen et al. 2000, 103). However, it should be noted that European integration has actually had potential impact on Finnish foreign and security policy before the EU accession took place in January 1995, especially during the pre-accession period and the membership negotiations.<sup>76</sup> The Parliament approved the membership application in March 1992 and the application was submitted on the same day. The political commitments regarding the Finnish foreign and security policy and CFSP were likewise agreed upon before the accession, during the accession negotiations, which started on 1 February 1993.

It was acknowledged in the Commission opinion on Finland's application for membership that "Finland has indicated that as a member of the Union it will support the security of the other members in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" and that "President Koivisto recently confirmed the Finnish acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*, the Maastricht Treaty and the *finalité politique* of the European Union" (European Commission 1992, 23). The Commission concluded that "Finland could fulfil all common foreign and security policy obligations". A noted reason for this was that in contrast to some other countries the Finnish neutrality policy was seen as less developed and "not rooted in national or international law" (*ibid.*, 22-23). Furthermore, although neutrality continued to appear as a public description of Finland's security policy, it was reformulated as "military non-alliance combined with an independent defence" – a move that found fertile ground in Brussels (Karvonen & Sundelius 1996, 254). However, in the European Commission's reading there appeared to be a considerable misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy and CFSP's defence dimension. The Commission noted that Finland had "not yet fully clarified its position regarding the eventual framing of a common defence policy and in particular regarding the possible establishment in time of a common defence." (European Commission 1992, 23) . Furthermore, it was seen that the anticipated effects of the policy of neutrality – "or what is left of it" as the report formulated – could pose problems for the Union:

"The question is whether the Finnish policy of neutrality – even reduced as it is to its core of military non-alignment and credible, independent defence – might stand in the way of a full acceptance of the Union's external policies. Moreover, in respect of the common foreign and security policy, the question arises to what extent Finland, which, as an armed neutral, has always laid great emphasis on the capability of defending the national territory, can fully share some of its objectives, such as the safeguarding of

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<sup>76</sup> The Europeanization literature offers several examples of studies on how European *non-EU-members* have adapted to European integration in various policy areas, foreign and security policy included (e.g. Svedrup 1998 and Rieker 2004 on Norway, Kux 1998 on Switzerland, and Thorhallsson 2004 on Iceland).

the independence and security of the Union (Article J.4).” (European Commission 1992, 22.)

Regarding this question the Commission called for further confirmation and specific and binding assurances during the accession negotiations with regard to Finland’s political commitment and legal capacity to fulfil the obligations of the common foreign and security policy. This was needed “in order to be satisfied that this would not hamper the possible evolution in time of a common European defence” (European Commission 1992, 23.) The Finnish response came in the form of Minister of Foreign Trade’s confirmation that Finland was ready to contribute constructively to the development of the defence dimension of the EU. The core of Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy was referred to as military non-alliance combined with an independent defence (Finland’s opening statement in the membership negotiations, Salolainen 1 February 1993, Brussels; Karvonen & Sundelius 1996, 254; Ojanen et al. 2000, 100).

Eventually, Finland together with the three other countries applying for EU-membership at the same time (Sweden, Norway and Austria) gave a declaration in which it committed to CFSP without any national preconditions or constraints (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy 21.12.1993). The declaration is included also in the accession agreement.<sup>77</sup> When Finland joined the EU the official national interpretation was that Finnish military non-alignment and CFSP do not contradict with each other (Government Report 1/1995, 39).<sup>78</sup>

Consequently, the misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy and the requirements of the EU accession was eliminated by a manoeuvre of national adaptation in which the meaning of neutrality was redefined. What also contributed to the reduction of the misfit was the rather narrow way in which CFSP was constituted in the domestic discourse: in its Integration report the government emphasized that CFSP only complemented national foreign policies and was limited to non-controversial areas. Likewise, it was stressed that CFSP did not imply a need to alter bilateral relations, and that the responsibility for defence would remain national, and that independent national

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<sup>77</sup> “[T]he new Member States will, from the time of their accession, be ready and able to participate fully and actively in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union; the new Member States will, on accession, take on in their entirety and without reservation all the objectives of the Treaty, the provisions of Title V thereof, and the relevant declarations attached to it; the new Member States will be ready and able to support the specific policies of the Union in force at the time of their accession.” (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy, 21.12.1993.) The EU found the newly established CFSP vulnerable, and saw that the neutral new-comers might undermine it. The experience with the one Nordic country that was already a member was not encouraging in this respect: Denmark had managed to achieve opt outs in CFSP, meaning that, for instance, it would not participate on development of common defence.

<sup>78</sup> Also e.g. MP Tuomioja 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

decision-making was still possible. The CFSP's aims were seen to be in general issues such as peace, security and promotion of human rights (Government Report 2/1991, see Ojanen et al. 2000, 98). Arter has argued that the government's references in the report to the core of neutrality, that is to say military non-alignment and credible national defence, were targeted to the domestic audience and served as a "fig leaf" used at hiding the political alignment implied by the Maastricht Treaty and EU-membership (Arter 1994, 20). According to Karvonen & Sundelius "[d]uring the period after applying for membership, Finland's foreign policy leadership pursued with great skill the art of having its cake and eating it too" meaning that Finland partly described itself as non-aligned and partly strived for a common defence (Karvonen & Sundelius 1996, 245-246).

Although it can be concluded that the reinterpretation of neutrality, a key concept in the national foreign and security policy, was required by the EU accession or at least "spurred by suspicions on the part of some EU member countries and the Commission about whether Finland as a militarily non-aligned country would really be able and willing to fulfil all the requirements linked to the eventual development of a common defense policy" (Ojanen 2007, 36), this change cannot be explained exhaustively by Europeanization and taken merely as the first indication of national adaptation caused by the EU. As was noted earlier, the meaning and contents of neutrality were fundamentally transformed by the deeper international forces of change: after the end of the bipolar international security architecture the traditional Cold War era neutrality between East and West was no longer a possible option. The process in which neutrality was reconstructed had actually started already in the beginning of the 1990s. Neutrality was "reduced to its essence" by a series of government communications and reports between 1988-1992 (Ojanen et al. 2000, 92).<sup>79</sup> At the same time neutrality became depicted as having less and less instrumental value and giving an unclear picture of Finland's preferred international position (*ibid.*, 105).

The Finnish foreign and security policy did not remain unaffected by European integration before the accession in 1995, but in the changes that took place in Finnish foreign and security policy during that period a significant role was played by the large scale changes in the international security architecture, that is to say the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the bipolar antagonism between the Western and Eastern bloc, rather than by European integration. Applying for the EU-membership was rather a

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<sup>79</sup> "First, the doctrine of neutrality ceased to apply in broad humanitarian issues, with the exception of those where the interests of the great powers were in direct conflict. Secondly, economic integration was detached from the field where neutrality policy was applied." (Ojanen et al. 2000, 103-104) What was left then, was the military field and narrowly defined matters of security policy – "the core of neutrality implied staying outside military alliances in order to enable neutrality in war" (Ojanen et al. 2000, 104, Möttölä 1993).



suitable solution, an instrument, selected in order to take advantage of the changed international security environment than a cause of foreign and security policy change *per se*.<sup>80</sup> The actual Europeanization effects (and particularly the “thick” ones), then, become observable during the years of EU-membership, via the everyday participation in the European integration process in which Finland is faced with decision-making regarding the evolving and deepening CFSP.

All in all and taking the previous in consideration the main focus of this study is on the EU membership era and the changes during that time – in what way being a member of EU has changed the national foreign and security policy. There are already a number of studies on the national decision to join the EU and related political debate on Finnish EU application and events linked to it in the early 1990s. Likewise, the events immediately after the end of the Cold War, such as Finland’s unilateral revisions of some of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty and FCMA-treaty in September 1990 and the replacement of FCMA-treaty by a treaty of good neighbourly relations with Russia in 1992 have also been covered by political scientists and political historians. (E.g. Moisio 2003, Tarkka 2002, Tiilikainen 1998, Törnudd 1993, Penttilä 1992, Möttölä 1993, Möttölä 1998, Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003, Ojanen 2000, Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, Arter 1996, Ingebritsen & Larson 1997, Karvonen & Sundelius 1996). Studies that reach the 21<sup>st</sup> century are, however, not that numerous. So far, Finland has been included only in two comprehensive studies on foreign policy Europeanization, both of them comparative studies: in Pernille Rieker’s doctoral study on the Europeanization of Nordic “security identities” (Rieker 2004) the material analysed ends in 2002; Juha Jokela’s study on UK and Finland reaches its analysis till 2001 (Jokela 2010). Comprehensive studies with a time-span beyond that are lacking.

### *Notes on the key documents and events in phase 1*

There are three key national documents (and the related national parliamentary debates) that set the tone of the domestic discourse in the first phase. The Report by the Council of State of 1995 titled *Security in the Changing World* (hereafter called Government Report 1/1995) given shortly after the EU accession serves as a declaration of the Finnish interpretation of the post-Cold War international security environment. In defining the new corner-stones of the national foreign and security policy it offers a good basis for analysing the vehicles of Finnish state identity production, their change, and the impact of European integration on that change. It also spells out the perceived

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<sup>80</sup> Hanna Ojanen has argued that although it is often said that Finland joined the EU for reasons of security – the memoirs of president Mauno Koivisto (1995, 554) are often referred to in this context – “it would seem that Finland did not join in order to enhance its security but rather because it felt safe enough to do so, or because joining no longer affected its security in a negative way: Joining the EU no longer was politically controversial or compromising to security.” (Ojanen 2007, 35.)

security policy significance of the EU membership for Finland. Thus it is below analysed as the first key document of the first phase of the Europeanization of Finnish security policy. According to it the transition period started by the end of the Cold War had been left behind and geopolitical realism was supplemented or even replaced by value-based foreign and security policy that builds on European values (democracy, human rights, rule of law, and market economy).

The Government Report 3/1995 (titled “Finland’s participation in the military implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty”) and the related Parliament’s Committee reports and plenary session debates on Finnish participation in a new type of crisis management, that is to say the IFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, depict the national views on the novel and previously excluded tools of security policy that were now seen necessary. Their argued necessity derives directly from the new interpretation of the international security environment. In the national discourse this question revolves around the term “enhanced peacekeeping” (“laajennettu rauhanturvaaminen” in Finnish) which referred to peacekeeping operations implemented by other organisations than the UN and could potentially include stronger use of force than the traditional forms of peacekeeping in which Finland had been involved until that. In the parliamentary debate these documents, the Government Reports 1/1995 and 3/1995 are closely intertwined. Practically the national debate is here a combination of a wide scope of general security policy questions and the Bosnia IFOR operation, the latter including also a number of very detailed and technical questions related to the operation. The *third* cluster of primary material is provided by the Government Report 1/1996 (“Finland’s points of departure and objectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference”) and the related parliamentary debate and Committee report and statements. In dealing with the national preparations for the forthcoming intergovernmental conference (IGC) it gives a picture of the national expectations on and attitudes towards CFSP and its further development.

As will become apparent in the following analysis, the key themes rising from this material include military crisis management and peace enforcement, rapid reaction capability (the question of establishing and training of a Finnish rapid reaction force to be used in crisis management), the relationship between national defence and crisis management, and the preferred roles of the defence dimension and crisis management in CFSP and in its future direction. Furthermore, OSCE occupies a rather central place in the documentation (Government Report 1/1995 particularly) whereas the view on the EU’s role as a security actor appears relatively minor. Much of the EU related security policy issues are, however, discussed in terms of WEU. Additionally, on a more general level it can be noted that *politics* is clearly returning to foreign and security policy, in the sense that there are frequent calls for the traditional national unanimity in issues that are considered nationally vital. The government and opposition parties accuse each other of

breaking the traditional consensus in foreign and security policy. Often these relate to worries and differing views regarding the compatibility of military non-alignment and CFSP/ESDP. This “post-consensus” tendency gains more ground in the later phases. What comes to the direct references to Finland’s role and identity as an international actor, the Government Report 1/1995 states that the EU-membership has become part of the Finland’s international identity. Yet, in the parliamentary debate it is the traditional small state identity and non-alignment that prominently stand out. The following analysis will point out that below the surface, however, new views on political values and identity are emerging.

## 4.2 Non-alignment meets CFSP

In Finland a central purpose of the Government Report 1/1995 was to spell out the Finnish view of the new international security environment and to define the security policy means by which Finland can adapt to the new circumstances.<sup>81</sup> In doing this it also provided the basic justifications for the renewal of the national peacekeeping legislation. The official Finnish view on the post-Cold War security environment described by the Government Report is dominated by a “broad and comprehensive concept of security” which includes several new security problems, such as political instability, regional and internal disputes, uncontrollable migratory movements, nationality disputes and environmental problems (Government Report 1/1995, 10-11). It is seen that in addition to political and military aspects of security, “security means respecting human rights and consolidating the rule of law, together with economic cooperation and mutual solidarity in protecting the environment” (*ibid*, 11). In the new international circumstances characterised by continuing change “security policy applies not only to military issues but also to all the external factors that affect the welfare and security of Finnish society.” Consequently, security policy also deals with “promoting stable development on the basis of democracy, respect for human rights and a market economy.” “It should in accordance with the broad concept of security incorporate the external factors that affect the attainment of Finnish society’s values and goals” (*ibid*, 4-5). On the other hand, an aspect of the adopted broad security conception is that military conflicts are seen to possess new features too: “armed conflicts (...) are increasingly connected with internal or historical ethnic or religious disputes or nationality issues. Conflicts sometimes lead to a collapse of state structures (...) The forms violence takes include violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and terrorism. The result of the conflicts is often a wave of refugees in nearby regions and elsewhere” (*ibid*, 8).

Regarding the EU and its general impact on Finnish foreign and security policy it is notable that the Government Report 1/1995 states that the major changes in the international security architecture, that is to say the end of the bi-polar antagonism between the two superpowers, have made the Finnish EU-membership possible in the first place. Secondly, even though the role of the EU as a security policy actor on a practical level is regarded rather limited in the sense that the significance given to the CFSP and its instruments is modest, the EU-membership is clearly associated with “cohesion security”, and “cooperational security”. That is to say it provides a basic point of departure in Finnish foreign and security policy from which Finland can in different

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<sup>81</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

ways participate in building the new European security system. It is seen however, that in this building process other organizations than the EU play a more decisive and practical role. In describing the interrelationship of the “security policy organizations” the Government Report highlights the role of the OSCE: it is the organization that defines the relationships both *between* and *inside* states. The other organizations in Europe, then, base their actions and the legitimacy of those actions on the principles of the OSCE. The role of the EU is seen to build on its broad economic assistance programmes. WEU is referred to as an organization building on crisis management capability. NATO’s post-Cold War role is seen to be based on its superior military capacity; whereas the Council of Europe “possesses human rights expertise and instruments”. (Government Report 1/1995, 36.)

Prior to the EU accession the dominant view was that even an observer status in WEU would be incompatible with neutrality and non-alignment.<sup>82</sup> The European Commission placed direct Europeanization pressure on Finland in this issue: the Commission was not satisfied with Finland’s wait-and-see attitude on the WEU question (Finland wanted to postpone its decision on how it would relate to WEU) and contested the Finnish way of perceiving the WEU chiefly as a crisis management organisation. The policy misfit was solved as Finland became a WEU observer (together with Denmark, Austria and Sweden) in February 1995, despite the earlier intentions to consider the matter longer (Ojanen et al. 2000; 107, 146, 127). At the same time in the Finnish official discourse the WEU membership was reconstituted as being compatible with military non-alignment. The government argued that “WEU is not a full-scale military alliance” (Government Report 1/1995, 57) but rather should be seen as a CFSP instrument in implementing decisions related to peacekeeping and military crisis management (see Jalonen 1995, 115). The observer status was seen to increase Finnish possibilities to gain information and to influence without implying any change in Finland’s position as a military non-aligned country that sustains independent, credible defence. Any direct link between the WEU observer status and membership in WEU or NATO was denied (Government Report 1/1995, Prime Minister Aho 11.10.1994<sup>83</sup>). Differing views were also presented in the related political debate, for instance by the chairmen of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees (Jalonen 1995, 115-116).

In the evolving post-Cold War organizational security architecture Finland placed much emphasis on the development of cooperative security and saw the OSCE as

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<sup>82</sup> E.g. chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee MP Paasio 29.11.1993 (Helsingin Sanomat 30.11.1993, see Ojanen et al. 2000; 107, 147).

<sup>83</sup> Speech on civil defence courses in Helsinki, quoted in Ojanen et al. 2000, 108.

indispensable.<sup>84</sup> Equipped with a comprehensive security conception the OSCE was held capable of tackling the challenges posed by the current turbulent times (Government Report 1/1995, 38). What was also seen to increase the importance of the OSCE was its nature as a forum in which Russia is included and where crises concerning Russia could be dealt with. With respect to UN, the OSCE's role is to solve the local disagreements or to delegate them to the UN Security Council if needed. The final responsibility for international peace and security is seen to lie in the UN (*ibid.* 37). Compared to the later phases of Finnish foreign and security policy, it is striking how much faith is put on the OSCE: it is seen to offer an overarching security policy model and framework that embraces all other aspects of security politics and thus forms the foundation on which the future European security system can be built. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Halonen notes that the OSCE security model is closely reminiscent to that presented in the Finnish Government's Report on national security policy<sup>85</sup>. Although the OSCE continues to hold a place in the national security policy debate during 1990s, it is gradually getting sidelined. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century national security policy terminology the "Helsinki Summit" no longer refers to the 1992 OSCE meeting but rather to the Helsinki EU Council of 1999 and the Helsinki Headline Goals (see chapter 5).

In the Government Report the Finnish security policy is based on the view of a ongoing European and global security policy transition period. The post-Cold War security architecture is unstable and constantly on the move. The main principle and guideline in Finnish policy is to adapt to this change in a controlled manner (Government Report 1/1995, 42, 43). According to the report, the major challenge for Europe is to construct a new common security order that will replace the old bipolar system (*ibid.* 9). Military conflicts inside states or former federal states are seen as threats for European security. The likelihood of such conflicts escalating into a European major-scale conflict is considered small, but yet they may harm the European value community on which the post-Cold War security policy cooperation is based. In addition to this potential harm done on the norms and principles of the new and united Europe such conflicts might undermine the credibility of international organizations and lead to humanitarian catastrophes. This is especially the case if the conflicts have their roots in local ethnic, religious, minority or national issues. (*ibid.* 19-20)

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<sup>84</sup> "Finland supports the strengthening of OSCE's prestige and capacity. No other institution can replace it as a value community." ["Suomi tukee ETY-järjestön arvovallan ja toimintakyvyn vahvistamista. Mikään muu instituutio ei voi korvata sen roolia arvoyhteisönä."] (Government Report 1/1995, 37.)

<sup>85</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995; also MP Salolainen 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on Government Proposal 185/1995.

The more concrete security policy solutions for the above mentioned problems are chiefly located in stability policy, early warning methods and conflict prevention, peaceful settlement of conflicts and crisis management. When it comes to *political* crisis management and conflict prevention the OSCE is the sole organization referred to. However, the OSCE and the EU's failure to prevent the escalation of the constitutional and political crisis in the former Yugoslavia into a full-scale war is presented as a justification for other organizations' participation in the implementation of future peacekeeping operations, such as NATO and WEU. The question of participating in the NATO-led IFOR operation naturally brings the issue of military non-alignment into the national political debate (see chapter 4.3 below).

Regarding the role given to the EU and CFSP in Finnish foreign and security policy and the related steps towards the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy the evidence is mixed. According to the Government Report 1/1995 the EU's security policy significance to Finland actually depends on Finland's own activity and contribution: the EU offers new opportunities to influence the change of the security environment and its stability. The EU membership is regarded as a tool for both advancing national interest and contributing to broader international security.<sup>86</sup> Concerning military security it is noted that it remains Finland's own responsibility but the EU membership "will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure" (Government Report 1/1995, 39) – even without any particular military security clause in the EU treaties. Neutrality is now referred to as a policy of the past, which is no longer applicable since the bipolar antagonism between the East and West has ended. Neutrality is replaced by "active participation in international political and security policy cooperation" (*ibid.* 39). However, it is made clear that this does not imply military alignment of any kind: "The decisions Finland has made do not involve any military security guarantees, or any other obligations concerning a common defence. The EU is not a military alliance, nor is it an independent actor in the field of defence" (*ibid.* 39). It appears a widely-shared view in the parliamentary debate that although the EU-membership does not provide direct military security guarantees, it has preventative significance. This is illustrated well by the following extract from a speech by a member of parliament in the preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/995:

"It is evident that EU-membership has strengthened the security policy position of Finland. The EU, obviously, is not a military union, but a political community building on common European values. Therefore the EU-membership does not provide military security guarantees as such, but it does prevent others taking decisions on the fate of Finland without us being

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<sup>86</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995; Government Report 1/1995, 40.

able to have any influence, as has happened many times in history. (...) Any actor threatening Finland has to take into consideration that Finland is in a union with a community of 350 million inhabitants and that the EU does not accept the intimidation of any one of its member states.”<sup>87</sup>

In addition, the adoption of a broad security concept in the official national foreign and security policy further increases the EU's weight in Finnish security policy. The broad security concept increases the perceived significance of common values, particularly human rights and democracy, and international institutions in building security.<sup>88</sup>

All this implies a rather contradictory picture in what comes to the indicators of Europeanization and the role given to EU security arrangements in Finnish foreign and security policy. On the one hand the official Finnish view that EU membership helps Finland to repel any military threats suggests that the EU is associated with a considerable security policy significance. On the other hand, non-alignment as a continuing key element of Finnish foreign and security policy is simultaneously stressed.<sup>89</sup> The gap between these two aspects is attempted to be closed by a “construction of *compatibility*” through redefinitions of both the Finnish key concepts of foreign and security policy and CFSP (see Ojanen et al. 2000, 86)<sup>90</sup>. European expectations and adaptation pressures have clearly led to rethinking and redefinition of the meaning of non-alignment. But at the same time there is an ongoing redefinition of CFSP that rests on national preferences and emphasizes those aspects of CFSP that are seen most convenient from a national viewpoint. For instance, crisis management is stressed at the cost of the defence dimension of CFSP (see below).

From the theoretical Europeanization perspective complete compatibility would imply that there is no misfit between Finnish security policy and CFSP, and consequently no adaptational pressure and no Europeanization process to talk of.<sup>91</sup> However, CFSP's development makes this construction of compatibility a continuous process of redefinition: as Ojanen has noted regarding the first 5 years of Finland's EU

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<sup>87</sup> E.g. MP Ihamäki 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>88</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>89</sup> Browning has suggested that this was done largely as a response to domestic expectations and in order to safeguard the image of continuity in the national foreign and security policy line (Browning 2002).

<sup>90</sup> According to Ojanen the nationally presented proofs of this compatibility were twofold: firstly, the compatibility argument was supported by the view that common defence was not on the CFSP agenda, and even if it did one day make its way onto the agenda, it would still remain in the realm of unanimous decision-making and veto right. Second main proof of compatibility was the assumption that the goals and values behind CFSP and Union's policies were identical with Finnish ones (peace, security and the promotion of human rights). Furthermore, “it was also pointed out that the CFSP did not imply a need to alter bilateral relations with neighbors” (Ojanen 2007, 35.)

<sup>91</sup> “If there is a good fit [between “Europe” and the domestic level], there is little pressure for change at the domestic level” (Caporaso 2007, 29; see chapter 2).



membership, “the contents of the Finnish policy of non-alignment follow the steps taken by EU policies” (Ojanen et al. 2000, 86)<sup>92</sup>. Europeanization thus takes the following logic: when CFSP proceeds further the misfit pressure begins to build; in order to maintain this compatibility there is a need to reorientate national foreign and security policy.

*Debating the underpinnings of national foreign and security policy: “Legitimate security interest of a small state” versus European value community*

By looking at the Government Report 1/1995 as a declaration of the official Finnish foreign and security policy one is left with the impression that Finland has successfully adapted its security policy to the post-Cold War environment and has adopted a modern value-based view on security and threats shared by the European value community. In this picture there is no observable contradiction between the promotion of national security interest on one hand and that of the international community on the other. They are seen as complementary, being almost the same. However, the scrutiny of the parliamentary debate on the Government Report reveals that the picture is more complicated than that. There appears to be a significant tension that revolves around the question how national security interest should be defined, and what is the relation between international/European and national goals and values in it. This tension manifests itself in the form of political disagreement on the practical level decisions concerning the preferred development of national security policy, such as decisions on peacekeeping and crisis management operations as well as on the need of establishing and training rapid reaction forces. Although this disagreement does not explicitly find its way into the official foreign and security policy documentation<sup>93</sup>, it is essential to realize its existence – otherwise the picture of the Europeanization of Finnish security policy and the significant political processes linked to it remains incomplete. The acknowledgment of these tensions might be helpful also in explaining certain formulations in the official foreign and security policy. This is the case particularly with the gradual revising of the peacekeeping legislation (in 1995, 2000 and 2006). These differences in the approaches on security continue to play a certain, even if changing and somewhat diminishing, role also in the later phases of the Europeanization process (see chapters 5 and 6).<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ojanen has sarcastically noted that “the most salient feature of Finnish non-alignment seems to be the continuous adaptation and flexibility with which Finland reformulates its position.” (Ojanen 2000, 87).

<sup>93</sup> Although it is observable in the form of written objections in the Parliament Committee Reports and differences between Committees’ Reports and Statements during this phase.

<sup>94</sup> From a theoretical view point a reason for their continuing impact can be seen in that they are connected to the vehicles of state identity production. The factors that define the state identity are often quite persistent to change and thus shifts in

A widely shared basic assumption in the parliamentary debate is that there is no significant military threat against Finland currently or in the near future. However, when it comes to the question of what kind of threat pictures Finnish foreign and security policy should be based on the views are more diversified. Two competing main lines appear in the domestic discourse in this respect, neither of them holding a clearly dominant position. The more traditionally and nationally oriented approach nicely demonstrates the persistence of historical factors in security thinking. It is presented that based on the national historical experiences on other states' actions Finland needs to be prepared for the worst options too, that is to say to a situation where Russia would cause a military threat to Finland, much in the same manner as was realized during the second World War. In the core of this reasoning is an assumption of a "legitimate security interest of a small state"<sup>95</sup>, as illustrated by the following extract from an address of a member of parliament in the plenary debate on the Government Report 1/1995:

"There is no military threat in sight for Finland. Yet, what the past centuries have taught us is that we have a right and a duty to prepare also for the most difficult and worst alternatives. This is the legitimate security interest of the small state." (MP Ihamäki 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.)

The logic behind this reasoning is anchored in a hard and narrow security conception: the main threat picture is military and territorial by nature. The consequent means of security policy, then, are based on that threat picture and security logic: despite the post-Cold War changes in the international security environment the national defence of state territory is seen as the primary task and the security policy tools must be maintained, developed and prioritised accordingly. Furthermore, national defence should gain a position in which it is considered independent and credible by the other states. The underlined factors that define Finland's state identity are according to this view the geographical location, smallness, history and the permanency of geopolitics. Such a traditionally oriented approach is clearly observable in a significant number of parliamentary speeches, both by government and opposition parties, regarding the Government Report. The Defence Committee of the Parliament also builds its statement on the same approach when discussing, in a negative tone, Finland's participation in the EU's crisis management cooperation (Defence Committee statement 2/1995, see chapter 4.3 below).

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nation-state identities "occur at critical junctures when the political environment is receptive to new kinds of social identities and self-categorizations" (cf. the theoretical chapter; Marcussen et al. 1999).

<sup>95</sup> For discussion of the historical background of the term see Rehn 1994.

The traditional view is challenged by the emergence of more internationally oriented thinking that has its corner-stones in the interests of the post-Cold War international and European value community – to which Finland is seen to have committed itself via the EU-accession. This approach is characterized by a different type of security logic: the threat picture is not based on a direct territorial threat but rather there is a multifaceted mix of political, societal, economic, environmental *and* military problems that might escalate and cause regional, and consequently also international, instability. The key security policy tools in tackling these threats are international conflict prevention and a new type of post-Cold War crisis management in various forms. Adaptation to the new international circumstances and movement towards alignment are important issues (re)defining Finnish state identity. This implies that the ways in which Finland participates in international security cooperation should change accordingly. Participating only in traditional UN peacekeeping is considered a too limited solution. In contrast with the traditional view the safeguarding of national interest is seen to require more commitment to the mainstream European way of creating new European security system, preferably with the same methods as the other EU member states.

The tension between these two approaches becomes evident on a concrete level when the issue of international crisis management is debated and contrasted with national defence in the parliamentary debate on the Government Report as well as on the peacekeeping legislation (Government Report 1/1996) and IFOR operation (see chapter 4.3 below). Thus it is eventually a question of national disagreements on how military capacity as a tool of security policy should best be used. The compatibility of international crisis management with the “legitimate security interest of a small state” is questioned in the parliamentary debate. The debate concerns questions such as: Do the new forms of international crisis management contribute to the pursuing of Finland’s security interests? Can, or should, the participation in international crisis management help national defence?

There are different answers to these questions in the debate – and they are here taken as an indicator that certain vehicles of state identity production have opened for re-definition in the political process. There are clearly different views on how Finland’s national security interest should be constructed. At this point none of them have achieved a dominant position in the domestic discourse. What is notable in this connection is that the traditional role and identity of Finland as an active participant in peacekeeping does not simply translate into a factor that would automatically support participation in the new crisis management. Usually, peacekeeping and crisis management are not seen to compose a continuum of any kind. Quite the contrary, according to the most conformist interpretation (e.g. in the Defence Committee statement 2/1995 and in related the parliamentary debate) participation in military crisis

management is seen to jeopardise Finland's reputation and credibility as a trustworthy and stability-building actor in international politics which has been achieved during the decades of Finnish peacekeeping. Although the Government does not share such a strict view, a clear line is drawn in the Government Report as well concerning the types of crisis management in which Finland can participate (see chapter 4.3 below).

All in all, based on the analysed material, both on the level of official documentation (by the Government) and on level of national parliamentary discussion, there seems to be a certain mismatch or discrepancy that can be explained with the above-explained differences in the logic of security policy reasoning: On the one hand it can be observed that redefined starting points for foreign and security policy have appeared and are visibly promoted in the official foreign and security policy line. On the other hand, a clear persistence of the old key concepts of foreign and security policy can be observed. The traditional territorially-oriented threat picture and the "post-territorial" value-based broad security concept are not easily merged.

### **4.3 Enhanced peacekeeping and the delicate balance between crisis management and national defence**

In the post-Cold War security environment Finland's peacekeeping activities were put under transformation pressure. As discussed above, it was acknowledged in the official domestic discourse that Finland must adapt nationally to the post-Cold War security environment. This was to take place, for instance, by Finnish participation in the new forms of international crisis management. To that end Finnish peacekeeping capacity should be renewed to meet the challenges posed by operations that are broader and more demanding than before. For instance, the troops must be capable of self-defence and prepared to flexibly form new formations required by different missions. The new requirements also included the development of capacities for humanitarian protection and monitoring missions. (Government Report 1/1995). Linked to this was also the question establishing and training a rapid reaction force to be used in international crisis management which became a topic of intense debate and disagreement in the parliamentary debate (particularly in the context of Government Report 2/1996 on Finland's readiness to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations). Eventually, the establishment of a rapid reaction force received the majority's support in the parliament.<sup>96</sup> Finland also decided to take part in the NATO-led IFOR-operation (and its continuation SFOR) starting in December 1995. In the domestic debate these two issues are intertwined.

The question of establishing rapid reaction capacity and participation in international crisis management operations are not unconnected to the CFSP development in the debate. There are different national interpretations for instance as to whether the EU-membership obliges Finland to establish a rapid reaction force or not. The Government's view is that there are no particular political expectations or moral obligations concerning the rapid reaction force that would go beyond those stemming from the EU-membership generally. The connection of the tentative national plans on rapid reaction forces and WEU is denied in the parliamentary debate by the Government.<sup>97</sup> However, according to the Prime Minister, Finland will unavoidably be faced with the question of rapid reaction forces, like it or not, through the international organizations in which activities Finland takes part, that is to say the UN, OSCE, PfP or WEU.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Consequently, a training programme is established in 1996 and the first battalion is declared operational in 1998 (Tiilikainen 2007, 182).

<sup>97</sup> Minister Haavisto 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1994.

<sup>98</sup> Prime Minister Aho 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1994.

From the opposition parties there are critical voices arguing that although the Maastricht Treaty does not clearly contain any juridical obligation, the Government seems to be basing its policy on an interpretation that the EU-membership together with WEU observer status cause moral and political obligations towards establishing a rapid reaction force capable of crisis management. Furthermore, it is argued that the creation of a rapid reaction force would be purposefully targeted as the Finnish contribution to the development of EU's common defence policy.<sup>99</sup> Contrast to that the Government is keener to emphasize the *national* defence dimension of the crisis management. It is seen that participation in international cooperation will contribute to national defence firstly by offering modern field experience and military expertise for the purposes of national defence. Secondly, in light of the broad security concept it is seen that defending the interests of the international and European value community will contribute to national security<sup>100</sup>. The participation in international crisis management is seen to have a defence policy dimension:

“As well as fulfilling its national defence function, Finland must create and enhance its preparedness for international peacekeeping and crisis management operations which are more demanding militarily and also more diversified. Crisis management preparedness must be seen as a growing component in defence policy overall, and as a new tool for security policy and also as an element in strengthening the country's defence capability.”  
(Government Report 1/1995, 6)

In the national political debate and in the parliamentary handling of the Government Report 1/1995, however, such a positive interpretation on the defence dimension of the rapid reaction force and crisis management is challenged. The view of the Parliament's Defence Committee is that crisis management is incompatible with and harmful to traditional peacekeeping:

“In case Finland will participate in crisis management the way the Government proposes, it will practically demolish Finland's qualifications to act as a credible peacekeeper. Crisis management and peacekeeping must be kept apart in time and in space. Same countries cannot operate with credibility in both sectors. If there are battle units and peacekeeping units operating under a common flag in the same target area, the actions of the

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<sup>99</sup> For instance MP Laakso 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>100</sup> Government report 1/1995; see Defence Committee statement 2/1995.

former will be revenged on the latter.” (Defence Committee Statement 2/1995.)<sup>101</sup>

The Defence Committee attempts to draw a clear line between crisis management and peacekeeping. Only the latter is found suitable for Finland as it is compatible with Finland’s traditional state identity and role in international politics as a small state:

”The Government report starts from the premise that Finland will not take part in operations which require the use of force against other states of parties of the conflict. The Defence Committee finds that this is the only solid starting point when weighting what kind of peacekeeping operations a small state as Finland can participate in. The enhanced peacekeeping on which the Government is planning fits poorly with this point of departure.” (Defence Committee statement 2/1995.)<sup>102</sup>

The purpose of the Government, however, is to soften the division between crisis management and peacekeeping. This is done by introducing the concept ”enhanced peacekeeping” which stems from the multifaceted challenges posed by the new international environment as well as from the broad security concept. In practical terms, enhanced peacekeeping is defined as a sort of a middle ground between traditional peacekeeping and military crisis management. The concept becomes a topic of intense debate in the parliament. Critics see it as a “homespun” construction with no significance or equivalence on the international level. As described by the following excerpt of the debate on the Government Report 3/1995, they argue that the concept is aimed only at the domestic audience in order to smoothen the development towards Finnish participation in international military crisis management:

”The homespun concept “enhanced peacekeeping” remains unclear. It is a concept that is used nowhere else in the world. During the last phases of this process we are increasingly forced to ponder whether there is anything else than traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and if the middle

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<sup>101</sup> Translation by the author. Original text in Finnish: ”Mikäli Suomi lähtee mukaan kriisinhallintaan hallituksen esittämässä muodossa, sillä puolustusvaliokunnan näkemyksen mukaan käytännössä tuhoetaan edellytykset toimia uskottavasti rauhanturvaajana. Kriisinhallinta ja rauhanturvaaminen on eriytettävä sekä ajallisesti että alueellisesti. Käytännössä on myös niin, että samat maat eivät voi toimia uskottavasti molemmilla osa-alueilla. Mikäli kohdealueella on sekä taistelu- että rauhanturvayksiköitä saman lipun alla, kostetaan jälkimmäisille edellisten teot.” (Defence Committee Statement 2/1995.)

<sup>102</sup> Translation by the author. Original text in Finnish: ”Selonteossa on lähdetty siitä, että Suomi ei osallistu operaatioihin, jotka edellyttävät voimakeinojen käyttämistä muita valtioita tai konfliktin osapuolia vastaan. Puolustusvaliokunnan mielestä tämä on ainoa kestävä lähtökohta harkittaessa, minkä tyyppisiin rauhanturvaoperaatioihin Suomen kaltainen pieni maa voi osallistua. Hallituksen kaavailema laajennettu rauhanturvatoiminta kriisinhallintajoukkoineen sopii huonosti tähän lähtökohtaan. Valtuutus voimankäyttöön kuuluu olennaisena osana jo laajennetun rauhanturvatoiminnan ominaispiirteisiin, kuten edellä on todettu.” (Defence Committee Statement 2/1995.)

ground [between them] is undetermined to the extent that it does not exist at all.<sup>103</sup>

The delicate balance of national defence and crisis management causes notable disagreement between the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee. Firstly, there is the above-mentioned question of does a rapid reaction force increase or decrease Finland's defence capacity and readiness. Secondly, it is questioned whether the participation in new international crisis management – or in enhanced peacekeeping – abolishes the credibility of Finland as a trustworthy traditional peacekeeper or not. The Defence Committee's view on the first question is that the establishing of a rapid reaction force would not strengthen Finnish defence capability. Quite the opposite: being expensive and funded by the defence budget it would damage the development of other parts of defence forces. Furthermore, it is argued that due to its small size the planned force would not play a significant role from the view point of national defence. The Defence Committee also notes that the mobilisation of the rapid reaction force from abroad back home to defend Helsinki, if so needed, would not be possible *rapidly* enough. (Defence Committee Statement 2/1995.)

The Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee does not share these views. Concerning the first question it sees that enhanced peacekeeping would not obliterate Finland's possibilities to participate in traditional peacekeeping. On the second question the Committee's stance is that a well-trained rapid action force would form an effective part of the national defence system, if needed. Enhanced peacekeeping would not decrease Finnish defence capacity or readiness. (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 12/2005) In this respect the Foreign Affairs Committee's view is thus more in line with the European mainstream of that time in security policy thinking (cf. Howorth 2007).

The political debate on peacekeeping versus crisis management culminated in the participation in IFOR operation and the related new act on peacekeeping. The purpose of the Government's legislative proposal (Government proposal 185/1995) was to enable Finland's participation in enhanced peacekeeping that includes various kinds of operations, particularly humanitarian assistance and civil protection. The purpose was to enable Finnish participation in peacekeeping also when the operation in question has the mandate for a restricted reactive use of coercive means in order to implement the objectives set or when a full collaboration of all parties of the conflict is lacking. Furthermore, the Government proposal aimed at making Finnish participation possible also in operations mandated by the UN or the OSCE but executed by other organisations, such as NATO. Finland's anticipated participation in the NATO-

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<sup>103</sup> MP Juhantalo 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.



administrated multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) operation in December 1995 played a key role in the amendment of the law. The invitation of Finland to take part in the operation had been given by NATO at the end of the December (Aro 2000, 54). Without changes in the peacekeeping legislation dating from 1984 Finnish participation in the military part of the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty would have been impossible.

The task of IFOR was to keep the troops of both parties apart; to monitor the peace line of over 1000 kilometres; and to stabilise the situation in the country. The UN security Council authorised the UN member states to take all necessary measures in order to help ensure compliance with the military provisions of the peace treaty. IFOR had the mutual agreement of both parties to use force beyond the definitions of traditional self-defence in order to implement the peace agreement. The basic rules of engagement of the IFOR operation consisted of self defence, the international legal principles of proportionality and minimum use of force, international law, and regulations concerning war.<sup>104</sup> According to the Government proposal Finland would participate in IFOR with the strength of a “building detachment” of approximately 420 soldiers and staff, amounting to 450 persons total. The reconstruction battalion was to build and repair the working and accommodation facilities needed by the staff and stations of the Nordic brigade. (Government Report 3/1995; Aro 2000, 54-56).

Before the national decision was made the Finnish participation in the operation was discussed in the meetings of the Government and the President as there is a constitutional demand for cooperation between the President and Government in foreign and security policy. The Parliament was also informed on the issue via the Foreign Affairs Committee and by the Government Report 3/1995 on Finland’s participation in the military implementation of Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty (18.12.1995). Participation in IFOR was approved by the Parliament by the following votes: 147 yes, 7 no, 2 absent. (Aro 2000, 55.)

The national decision-making process on the issue consisted of two interrelated processes: firstly, the peace keeping act was amended in order to enable Finnish participation in peacekeeping operations which are implemented by other international organizations than the UN or the OSCE. Secondly, a report was given by the Government to the Parliament on Finland’s participation on the military implementation operation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty (Government Report 3/1995). The new act on peacekeeping dictated that a Government Report is required in cases where

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<sup>104</sup> SFOR, the continuation operation of IFOR began as IFOR mandate ended on 20 December 1996. There were no changes in the regulations concerning the authorisation for use of force, and NATO’s role as the executor of the continuation operation remained the same.

the rules of engagement are wider than in traditional peacekeeping. The operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina met such criteria.<sup>105</sup> Thus it was question of "enhanced peacekeeping" which might include reactive and delimited use of force in order to secure the tasks set for the mission (Government Report 3/1995). Additionally, the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee saw that participation in a peacekeeping operation implemented by an organization with which Finland had not previously cooperated in peacekeeping – that is to say, NATO – was a foreign and security policy issue of such significance that it required Parliament's involvement before the final decision by the President was to be made. (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 22/1995.)

The Government's justification for the proposed new legislation built on the notion that the international circumstances had changed after the Cold War, and as a result of this the forms of peacekeeping had developed into a new direction. Taking the issue to a very concrete level the Defence Minister explained to the parliament that the UN peacekeeping forces had previously been used to form a buffer between the parties of the crisis in question and to monitor an armistice. In the post-Cold War cases where the UN was asked to intervene in conflicts *inside* state borders, states became part of the picture, for instance in the form of state building or humanitarian protection tasks. The possibilities of the UN Security Council to get involved in various crisis situations had also improved – during the Cold War the bipolar antagonism had often resulted in using the veto by one camp or the other.<sup>106</sup> The revising of the Finnish act on peacekeeping was directly linked to this development in the quality and volume of peacekeeping of the international community.

The Government's legislation initiative for amending the relevant legislation stated that the main purpose was to enable Finnish participation in a broader scope of peacekeeping operations, especially in humanitarian assistance and protecting civilian population. Consequently, this meant that Finland was to participate in operations which are mandated to use some degree of force and which might lack the full consent of all the parties of the conflict. A practical effect was that it no longer mattered which international organization implemented the operation, as long as it was mandated by the UN or the OSCE. An additional qualification was that Finland was to have some sort of established partnership with the implementing international organisation. The NATO-led IFOR operation was to be the first of such cases. (Government proposal 185/1995.) Finland had joined the new partnership structures of NATO in 1992.

A significant time pressure for the decision-making process was caused by the international time-table of the IFOR operation. The Government noted that in order for

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<sup>105</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>106</sup> Defence Minister Taina 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on Government Proposal 185/1995.

Finland to be able to participate in the operation, the national decision should be taken as soon as possible (Government Report 3/1995). This external pressure becomes a characteristic feature in the revision of the peacekeeping legislation, which is also observable in the later cases, as will be shown in chapters 5 and 6.

### *Issues in the debate*

There were a number of aspects in the IFOR operation which made national handling smoother. First of all, despite being NATO-led the operation was clearly mandated by the UN (Resolution 1031 1995) and the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace treaty enjoyed the consent of both parties. The parliamentary debate often stressed the moral obligation to participate in a mission which was to return peace and prevent further major conflict in Europe.<sup>107</sup> Furthermore, the operation was seen to carry wider significance in the sense that it included both NATO-members and military non-aligned states and hence contributed to the creation of a new international peacekeeping system as well as new cooperative European security system (Government Report 3/1995). Consequently, Finnish participation in the operation was generally seen as a sign of support to the UN's role in the post-Cold War transition period. More specifically, the participation of non-NATO countries signalled that using NATO and the capacities of a defence union in the implementation of peacekeeping operations was not to become the main rule.<sup>108</sup>

On the other hand, a source of more contestation was provided by the question of broadening the scope of peacekeeping and drawing the line to *peace enforcement*. Although the original format of Finnish participation in the IFOR operation – reconstruction battalion – was clearly not meant to possess military assets required for peace enforcement of any kind, in the context of the new peace keeping act the definitions of peace enforcement, enhanced peacekeeping and peacekeeping became one of the major topics of the debate.<sup>109</sup> Also the possibility of escalation of the IFOR operation into peace enforcement or military enforcement was discussed in length. Questions discussed in the Parliament were e.g.: Should the troops be withdrawn in the case of escalation – and if so, how? What sort of procedure would the withdrawal rest on: was the final decision to be made by the President or the commander of the Finnish troops on the field?<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> E.g. MP Wahlström 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>108</sup> Defence Minister Taina, MP Tuomioja, MP Tennilä 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>109</sup> E.g. MP Tarkka 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>110</sup> E.g. MP Saari 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995; MP Lindqvist 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

In the Government's view the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is clearly defined<sup>111</sup> whereas the line between enhanced and traditional peacekeeping is more wavering.<sup>112</sup> Traditional peacekeeping takes place on the consent of both parties, is neutral and contains the use of force only in cases of self-defence.<sup>113</sup> Peace enforcement, then, is defined as military coercion targeted at a state or another main party of the conflict with the purpose of repelling or striking back an attack. Peace enforcement operations also differ from peacekeeping in that they are established without the consent of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, there is a mandate to use force as much as is necessary for meeting the objects of the operation.<sup>114</sup> The difference between enhanced peacekeeping and peace enforcement is questioned by some MP's in the parliamentary debate, but the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee sees that both are clearly defined and cannot be confused with each other.<sup>115</sup>

Participation in peace enforcement is found unsuitable for Finland both by the Government and the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee. Peace enforcement is seen as a task that belongs to great powers and military alliances and not to "small states like Finland".<sup>116</sup> A cautious approach on the new forms of peacekeeping is also observable in the title of the new peacekeeping act: "peacekeeping" is not replaced by "crisis management" at this stage (this takes place in phase III, see chapter 6). Furthermore, the UN and the OSCE are explicitly mentioned in the title. According to the Foreign Minister the Finnish approach is to follow the development of international crisis management and related processes in the context of the UN, NATO, WEU and the EU from Finland's *own* starting points.<sup>117</sup>

In the domestic discourse there are clearly contradicting political argumentations and different interpretations and ways for using concepts like "Nordicness", "Europeanness", "non-alignment", "national interest" as arguments in the debate on peacekeeping. The debate touches upon issues that define Finnish state identity as it concerns the ways in which Finland should participate internationally in the post-Cold War security environment. Disagreement appears on the issue of how to define and delimit Finland's role in peacekeeping and international crisis management. In the

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<sup>111</sup> The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee supported the Government's view by noting that the definition is "perhaps the clearest such document ever presented in international politics". Paasio 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>112</sup> Defence Minister Taina 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>113</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Reports 12/1995, 21/1995 and 22/1995.

<sup>114</sup> Defence Minister Taina 31.10.1995; also Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>115</sup> The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Paasio 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>116</sup> The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Paasio 31.10.1995; Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995; follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995

<sup>117</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

Government's view Finnish participation in IFOR is a logical continuation of the Finnish peacekeeping traditions. The *Nordic* dimension is presented as an additional factor that speaks on behalf of the continuity: as the Finnish troops are to be part of a Nordic brigade, the operation is also considered to be clearly connected to the traditional Nordic peacekeeping cooperation.<sup>118</sup> The Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee shares the Government's view that the Finnish participation is a logical continuation to Finland's aspirations to actively develop both the European security structures and Nordic cooperation (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 22/1995). However, there are also different conclusions on Nordicism and traditions. For example a number of MPs held that participation in NATO-led enhanced peacekeeping undermines Finnish peacekeeping traditions and might lead to a situation where Finland has to give up traditional peacekeeping totally.<sup>119</sup> The Defence Committee's statement 5/1995 concurs that there still is a continuing strong international demand for traditional peacekeeping and Finland's good reputation and know-how in the area should thus be more visibly noted in the official documentation.

The following excerpt from the parliamentary debate describes the issue tellingly. It designates how Nordic and Finnish peacekeeping traditions and the Finnish image in the eyes of other countries are given different interpretations and can consequently be used in opposing ways when debating the future of Finnish peacekeeping:

Prime Minister Lipponen: *"We do not yet know if the Bosnia operation will take place, but if it does, what shall we say to Russia, the US, other European states, other Nordic countries and perhaps to the parties of the crisis who are asking Finland to participate? Would we stay out of the Nordic peacekeeping force, and leave our place to Poland? [...] What would that look like in the light of Finland's great peacekeeping traditions?"*

Interjection by an MP: *We should concentrate on traditional peacekeeping!*<sup>120</sup>

This clearly points to an emerging interplay of external and domestic expectations on the issue. On the one hand there is domestic pressures to safeguard the heritage of Finnish peacekeeping traditions. On the other hand, some external pressure is emanating from the international level.

According to the Foreign Minister the status of Finland as a *militarily non-aligned* state brings in added-value to the IFOR operation particularly and crisis management in general: participation of the non-aligned countries Finland, Sweden and Austria – as

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<sup>118</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>119</sup> E.g. MP Saari 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>120</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen, MP Pulliainen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

well as Russia and Ukraine, Czech Republic, Poland – ensures that the operation is not implemented by NATO only. A purely NATO occupied operation might lead to “biased peacekeeping in that it would produce new divisions in Europe”.<sup>121</sup> On the other hand the compatibility of Finnish military non-alignment and participation in a NATO-led operation is also problematized in the parliamentary debate. The main opposition party sees the IFOR operation as an exception to the normal state of affairs. In the future Finnish participation in such enhanced peacekeeping operations is seen to require a Government report to the parliament and the consequent parliamentary handling every time.<sup>122</sup> In the Government’s reading the implications of military non-alignment in the context of post-Cold War peacekeeping in Europe are not that radical. The Prime Minister acknowledges in the parliamentary debate that non-alignment makes Finland stand out from most of the other European countries. Yet, he emphasizes that military non-alignment does not mean that Finland would not have a responsibility to “contribute to European solidarity”.<sup>123</sup>

According to the Government Report it is in the *national security interest* of Finland to gain peace and stability in the Balkans (Government Report 3/1995). A link between a potentially escalating war inside Europe and the stability of Finland’s neighbouring regions and the well-being of the Finns is acknowledged and not significantly contested in the parliamentary debate too:

”The EU has its own mission of peace as the bearer of common European peace and stability. This is in the security policy interests of all the participating states, Finland included.”<sup>124</sup>

Yet, contradicting political argumentation appears on what “European solidarity” implies in practical terms and how solid the linkage between it and national security interest is. Especially when it comes to Finnish soldiers and their tasks in Bosnia on a practical level the views become more hesitant. It is often highlighted that the real national interest and the main task of Finnish troops lie in national defence. Consequently, the conclusion is that the peacekeeping force should be withdrawn if the operation in Bosnia is transformed into a peace-enforcement operation. The view is that if the Finns are to fight, that should happen only on behalf of the motherland.<sup>125</sup> A common view is that the Defence Forces should not be allotted other tasks than national

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<sup>121</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>122</sup> MP Korkeaoja 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading).

<sup>123</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>124</sup> E.g. MP Zyskiewicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>125</sup> MP Zyskiewicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

defence.<sup>126</sup> At that time peacekeeping was organizationally handled under the auspices of the Defence *Ministry*.<sup>127</sup>

Despite these differences in the interpretations, there appears to be a widely shared view on the changed nature of conflicts and the international security environment. The need for a new kind of peacekeeping under the changed circumstances is recognized even when emphasizing the continuing call for traditional peacekeeping and the related Finnish expertise and experience. Even though the IFOR operation is presented both as a departure from and continuity of Finnish foreign and security policy line, the Bosnia case is widely seen as an example of future conflicts to which the international community will have to react. Finland is regarded as a natural part of this international value community:

”Finland cannot remain an outsider in a situation where new ways to tackle European and international problems in the spirit of mutual solidarity and cooperation are searched for.”<sup>128</sup>

However, despite the emerging interplay between international and domestic norms and expectations, in the light of the Government Reports and parliamentary debate the political argumentation regarding IFOR and enhanced peacekeeping in Europe tends to build on a nationally-oriented perspective rather than on the adoption of and commitment to international values. This is to say that much emphasis is put on how Finland’s participation contributes to the creation of “cohesional security” in Europe which serves the national security interest of Finland. Moreover, although “European solidarity” is sometimes referred to, references to EU membership and CFSP’s significance are sparse. The occasional more positive views in the debate on the EU’s role as a future security actor highlight the EU’s perceived mission as the bearer of European peace and stability. Additionally, the Balkan case is in some views presented as a lesson-to-be-learned which should result in the development of the EU’s security policy structures and tools.<sup>129</sup> The Finnish participation in enhanced peacekeeping and the related amendment of legislation is not justified in the debate by common EU values and goals or commitment to CFSP’s development. The responsibility for Bosnia should be carried by the whole post-Cold War international community. Finland’s responsibilities originate from being part of this international value community, rather than from the EU membership.

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<sup>126</sup> E.g. MP Lamminen, MP Korkeaoja 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading).

<sup>127</sup> Great symbolical value was put on this organizational solution as it implied that peacekeeping was not among the key tasks of the Defence Forces. MP Lamminen, MP Korkeaoja 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading).

<sup>128</sup> E.g. MP Salolainen 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995.

<sup>129</sup> E.g. MP Zyskiewicz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

All in all, the EU's role in peacekeeping and crisis management was at this point considered to be rather modest. Concerning the EU's role in the new type of peacekeeping it was simply noted by the Government that Finland was interested in participating in WEU's developing crisis management action. The Foreign Affairs Committee spelled this out in more concrete terms: the Finnish status as an EU-member and observer member of WEU was seen appropriate for participation in future operations by the EU and WEU, provided they had a UN or OSCE mandate (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 22/1995). In the domestic debate the views on the EU's future and preferred role in the international security system tend to be quite negative. It is seen, for instance, that the EU could not have limited the violence in the Balkans even if it had had other types of CFSP decision-making procedures or competences. Many addresses concur that the evolution of the EU or WEU into a security actor similar to the OSCE or the UN is unnecessary and unlikely.<sup>130</sup> The Defence Committee states that although there can be crisis management operations mobilized by the EU in the future, it is important that the UN and the OSCE will remain the primary actors giving mandate to peacekeeping operations. The Committee also emphasizes that the new peacekeeping act has not changed the fact that Finland can participate only in operations that are decided on in the UN or the OSCE. The Government's interest in participating in WEU's developing crisis management does not strike a chord.<sup>131</sup> Likewise, the Foreign Affairs Committee holds that with enhanced peacekeeping the purpose is not to connect Finland to the planned defence dimension of the EU – as was suspected by some MP's. According to the Committee's view Finnish participation in crisis management cooperation should be developed on the basis of requirements set by the international community rather than on the basis of the "solutions and choices that we may face later as results of [the forthcoming] EU intergovernmental conference" (Foreign Affairs Committee's Report 22/1995<sup>132</sup>). Indeed, an additional explanatory factor for the lack of political argumentation relating to the EU is that the purpose of the Government was to keep the Government report on security and the new act on peacekeeping separated from the EU context. It was frequently repeated in the debate by the Ministers that any conclusions on the future directions of CFSP and its implications on Finland must be drawn *after* the EU's intergovernmental conference (IGC) that was due to start 1996. The preparations for the intergovernmental conference were presented as a separate process. Therefore the Government Report 1/1995 more or less ignores any questions concerning the institutional aspects of CFSP.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> E.g. MP Tuomioja 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>131</sup> Defence Committee Statement 5/1995.

<sup>132</sup> Also Foreign Affairs Committee's chairman Paasio 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>133</sup> In total, only half a page is dedicated to the intergovernmental conference in the Government Report 1/1995.



### *National preparations for the first intergovernmental conference*

Domestic views regarding CFSP become thus more observable in the parliamentary debate that deals with the national preparations for the forthcoming IGC. However, the debate is inevitably linked to the previously discussed issues since the preferred roles of crisis management and defence cooperation in CFSP became a major question in the discussions. Similarly, the clash between the traditional nationally oriented security thinking and the view that builds more on the perception of the responsibilities and benefits of Finland as a member of the international value community is observable here too. The parliamentary debate on the Government Report 1/1995 focused primarily on the changes in the international security environment, the new types of post-Cold War security threats and on how to respond to these new threat pictures (new crisis management, enhanced peacekeeping, operations implemented by other organizations than the UN, rapid reaction force). The broad security concept introduced in the Government Report was present in the debate. In this debate the European Union did not play a significant role. Other organizations, such as OSCE were considered as more decisive in restructuring the new European security architecture. The urgent question on Finnish participation in the NATO-led IFOR operation in Bosnia (and the necessary amendments in legislation in order to make Finnish participation possible) dominated much of the debate. This also contributed to shifting the focus from the EU into other international organisations and their changing roles in the post-Cold War global security architecture – NATO, PfP, WEU, the UN. The Finnish EU-membership is, however, seen as the unquestionable basis of the post-Cold War Finnish foreign and security policy, but this widely shared perception remains in the background in the debate. Therefore in order to locate primary material that directly and explicitly concerns CFSP and the Finnish attitude on it, one needs to look into the national preparation process for the IGC of 1996 (opened in Turin): the Government Report 1/1996 and the related parliamentary debates and Parliament Committee reports and statements (Foreign Affairs Committee report 7/1996, Constitutional Law Committee statement 6/1996, Grand Committee statement 2/1996).

Concerning the Finnish position on CFSP and its further advancing, the official view was that Finland supported the developing of the EU's capacity of action in the sphere of foreign and security policy as well as the full usage of the intergovernmental means based on EU treaties.<sup>134</sup> Among the official starting points set by the Government for the

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<sup>134</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

IGC is that the EU is and would remain in its basic nature “an association of independent member states”. Furthermore, it is noted that CFSP complements, and not replaces, the national Finnish foreign and security policy. Thirdly, CFSP is seen to offer new means for Finland to carry through its national policies and also to strengthen national and European security. In practical terms that meant that in foreign and security politics Finland wanted to retain intergovernmentalism as the main form of cooperation (Government Report 1/1995, 57-59.) These points figured prominently in the domestic discourse regarding CFSP at that time.

A key message regarding CFSP in the national parliamentary preparations for the IGC was that it is essential to have an CFSP that focuses on crisis management instead of defence cooperation. If a defence dimension is to be developed, it should have an emphasis on “strengthening the crisis management and peacekeeping capacity” (Government Report 1/1996). The intergovernmental nature of CFSP is supported by underlining the member states’ independent decision-making on participation in the operations and by opposing the establishment of the position of a EU “Foreign Minister”, i.e. the High Representative for CFSP.<sup>135</sup>

Finland’s view as to the “eventual framing of common defence” mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty is thus that under the current circumstances the development of defence dimension should mean the strengthening of crisis management and peacekeeping capacity. At the same token, a clear distinction is made between crisis management and “actual defence”. The latter belongs fully to Finland as it is a militarily non-aligned state, but for those EU member states that are members of NATO it is a task of NATO. (Government Report 1/1996). The Parliament appears to largely share this view. The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee is content with the fact that no such issues are proposed on the IGC agenda that would “question the security policy solutions of Finland and other militarily non-aligned EU members for instance by aiming at the implementation of a common defence” (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996). Hence the Committee’s instructions to Finland’s action in the IGC are that Finland should constructively participate in the development of CFSP – but so that the intergovernmental nature will remain and the decisions made are not in contradiction with Finland’s military non-alignment and independent defence. Regarding the Maastricht Treaty emphasis is put more on the paragraphs of the Treaty which acknowledge the national security and defence policy considerations (and reservations) of the member states rather than the paragraph on the “eventual framing of common defence”. All in all the attitude towards the institutional development is quite hesitant: the political willingness of the major EU member states regarding CFSP is regarded

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<sup>135</sup> MP Paasio 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996; Government Report 1/1996.

more essential than its organizational structure or decision-making procedures. In case the common will is lacking, new institutional structures could only uphold wrong expectations and decrease the general confidence on the EU.<sup>136</sup> The implications of possible changes in decision-making procedures are also discussed in the parliamentary debate. In case qualified majority voting method gained ground in CFSP, a possibility to opt out of the common actions should be granted if a country finds that necessary for securing vital national interests.<sup>137</sup> The development of the CFSP on the practical level by increasing qualified majority voting becomes an issue which arouses significantly contradicting political argumentation in the domestic debate. The Government's view was that qualified majority voting should be supported in issues that concern the implication of CFSP. However, this issue did not gain full support in the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee: an objection concerning the issue is included in the Committee's report (signed by the previous Prime Minister Esko Aho) (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996).

In the background of the objection is the view that underlines the centrality of states in foreign and security policy making. In the context of CFSP it is seen that intergovernmentalism secures the role of the state in this respect. This view is promoted particularly by the opposition in the parliamentary debate:

“Decisions made on the terms of the core of the Europe are not automatically suitable for Finland, no matter if they concern national security or the well-being of citizens which are the two fundamental tasks of the state. Therefore, also the starting point for cooperative security should be the recognition of each states' difference and national interests. Nation and state are, undoubtedly, still the most significant and effective actors. Thus foreign and security policy in the EU should remain intergovernmental in nature.” (MP Aho 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995)

A number of questions in the national preparation for the IGC concern the relationship between the EU and WEU: Should Finland aim for the “softening” of WEU or its further advancing as a tool for CFSP? What should be the militarily non-aligned states approach on WEU's crisis management tasks or collective security and solidarity clause?<sup>138</sup> Government's view is that the WEU indeed should be an instrument of CFSP with which decisions made on military crisis management are implemented. The Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee shares this view in the sense that it finds that a

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<sup>136</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996.

<sup>137</sup> E.g. MP Salolainen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996.

<sup>138</sup> MP Paasio, MP Salolainen, MP Pietikäinen, MP Pulliainen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996.

closer relationship between the EU and WEU gives new opportunities to make the EU's crisis management more effective. Yet it is seen that for Finland a full WEU membership is impossible due to the mutual defence clause included in the Article V of the WEU Treaty. (Hence the Committee proposes that the possibility of removing the Article V from the WEU Treaty should be considered.<sup>139</sup>) In the context of the IGC preparations these views are linked to more a general debate in which the federalist tendencies of the European integration process are criticised also in other policy areas than CFSP.<sup>140</sup>

All in all, in the national debate on the future direction of the CFSP there is some indication of an increased level of prominence of CFSP in national foreign and security policy: common European values and goals are accepted to have fundamental significance for Finnish foreign and security policy and the future development of CFPS is considered to be a significant factor in the Finnish perspective. Yet, at the same time it is widely agreed that Finland should call for the acceptance of national interests and reservations in CFSP. Thus, even though it is seen that the value basis and goals of CFSP are in line with the goals of Finnish foreign and security policy, this does not imply that CFSP could replace national policies of the member states or that CFSP should be developed to a more communitarian form. Especially due Finland's national reservations as a non-aligned country, CFSP should remain intergovernmental (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996, Government Report 1/1996).

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<sup>139</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 7/1996.

<sup>140</sup> E.g. MP Jääskeläinen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996.

#### **4.4 Consensus is dead, long live consensus. The initial politicization of national security policy.**

“In Finland we are used to keeping the fundamental line of foreign and security policy above daily disputes. In the background of this aspiration for wide consensus are well-known historical reasons. With the help of our experiences we Finns have realized that a condition of the survival of the nation lies in its unanimity. Many times we have been driven into situations where national consensus has been imposed by the national sense of self-protection – a threat has unified us. But often consensus has been found in cases when we have been striving for something new. We have not been acting under external threat or pressure, but have searched for an advantageous line for us.” (Prime Minister Aho 1996, 10).

Consensus in national foreign and security policy making was defined as an element of the small state identity. As was discussed in the previous chapter, it is a factor that faces change during the EU-membership resulting on one hand from general parliamentarization, and Europeanization on the other. These can be seen as intertwined processes which are fortifying each other. The former implies that foreign and security policy issues are more openly discussed in the parliament and the parliament is having more say in the decision-making. The latter means that due to the EU membership the European level decision-making began to increasingly intervene in the domestic decision- and policy-making and complicate it by bringing new levels to the process, thus making the preconditions of national consensus more complicated. A richer variety of new foreign and security policy issues were introduced to which Finland must take position. Additionally, there is the structural impact on the national decision-making process (e.g. regarding the roles of the President, Government and Parliament, as discussed in chapter 3.2).

The first years of Finnish EU-membership are characterised by a lively domestic debate on national consensus and increasing signs of the erosion of consensus. Yet there appears to be a joint understanding on Finnish history in the sense that the necessity of consensus is seen to unquestionably derive from it. Furthermore, the continuity of consensus is found essential without exception in the parliamentary debate. The government parties acknowledge the right of the opposition to criticise and oppose Government's proposals – but this is not seen to apply on issues that concern foreign and security policy questions regarding fundamental national interests. Such issues are considered to be beyond normal politics. Typically this approach is anchored in the

perception of Finland's small state identity: both the government and the opposition consider national consensus and moving security and foreign policy beyond normal domestic politics imperative particularly for a small state.<sup>141</sup>

The need to conserve foreign and security policy beyond normal politics is sometimes found so pressing that any confrontational setting between the government and opposition in the parliamentary handling is regarded unwelcome. All MP's ought to be in similar position and possess all the information needed to judge the issues at hand.<sup>142</sup> In the spirit of the Finnish consensus tradition, it is considered that once given the relevant facts, everyone arrives at the one and only correct conclusion. Foreign and security policy-making should remain clear of politicization, it should be politics without politics.<sup>143</sup> When dealing with what are perceived as hot topics (such as the Finnish participation in IFOR) a joint responsibility should be "carried with dignity by all".<sup>144</sup> Finnish participation in IFOR was considered an example of such a topic, and the Foreign Minister warned the MP's against sidestepping responsibility in the issue.<sup>145</sup> At the same time the MP's of the opposition parties accuse the Government of breaking the consensus tradition and claims that the Government does not search for the widest possible mutual understanding for national foreign policy.<sup>146</sup> The opposition finds that the Government is not as willing to engage in communication and cooperation with the opposition as has been the case previously. It is stated that the preparations of the amendment of the peacekeeping act took place in a more harmonious manner during the previous Government.<sup>147</sup> The Government is accused of breaking the Finnish tradition of parliamentary consensus.<sup>148</sup> At a more practical level the opposition heavily criticises the way the decision on Finland's participation in the IFOR operation was taken. A related topic of remarkably strong criticism is the concept of enhanced peacekeeping. Both issues eventually result in written objections by a number of MP's in the Foreign Affairs Committee's Report.<sup>149</sup> The Government parties' reply is to accuse the opposition of "talking politics".<sup>150</sup>

The politicisation of foreign and security policy and the "death of consensus" become increasingly visible during the latter phases of the Europeanization process (see chapters

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<sup>141</sup> E.g. MP Zyskowitz 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995; MP Aho 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>142</sup> MP Tuomioja 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>143</sup> E.g. MP Zyskowitz 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>144</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>145</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>146</sup> E.g. MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995.

<sup>147</sup> MP Aho (the former Prime Minister) 8.12.1995, debate on the Government Proposal 185/1995 (first reading).

<sup>148</sup> E.g. MP Kääriäinen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>149</sup> Foreign Affairs Council Report 21/1995.

<sup>150</sup> E.g. MP Kanerva 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

5 and 6). At the same time there is a growing tendency in the domestic discourse of views that reject the perception that it is possible to arrive at one single “correct” national solution in foreign and security policy issues. But at this phase there are mainly general bafflement and mutual accusations between government and parliament on the wearing away of national consensus. The possibilities for a “pragmatic” foreign and security policy are seen to have decreased. What were previously considered eternal truths in the field of foreign and security policy are now turning into issues that can be interpreted differently depending on the international situation.<sup>151</sup> Only a few times this post-consensus gets a positive interpretation in which the politicisation is seen as an unavoidable and welcome result of the change that has happened in the political culture.<sup>152</sup> The demystification of defence policy is actually welcomed by the Defence Minister who calls for open and thorough domestic debate on defence policy.<sup>153</sup>

The erosion of consensus can be seen to relate to the emerging broader differences in the foreign and security policy thinking as well (see chapter 4.2). The policy of the Government at the time (led by Prime Minister Lipponen) is described in an address by a MP as striving for the European mainstream in foreign and security policy issues. In contrast to that the opposition often puts emphasis on the understanding of Finland as a distinct country in Europe.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> E.g. MP Puhakka 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995,

<sup>152</sup> MP Lamminen 16.11.1995, preliminary debate on Government Proposal 185/1995..

<sup>153</sup> Defence Minister Taina 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

<sup>154</sup> E.g. MP Penttilä 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

## 4.5 Conclusions

During the time period analysed in this chapter the general misfit pressure caused by CFSP is lower than in the later phases, first and foremost due to the less-advanced state of CFSP as an EU policy. The CFSP had a strongly intergovernmental nature, and despite the Maastricht Treaty's paragraphs on defence and WEU a common defence was clearly not in sight. Consequently it was possible to construct CFSP in the Finnish domestic discourse as being non-controversial to the national foreign and security policy; CFSP only complemented the national policy. This greatly reduced the urgency to radically change national foreign and security policy. There was no significant *policy* misfit between European rules and regulations on the one hand and domestic policies and national policy goals on the other.<sup>155</sup> The only major exception to this was located in the preaccession phase when the European Commission referred to the problems arising from the Finnish policy of neutrality or "military non-alignment and credible independent defence". The Commission questioned Finland's possibility to commit itself to CFSP's objectives that regard the safeguarding of the independence and security of the EU. Finland was also asked to clarify its position regarding the eventual framing of a common defence policy. The misfit was eventually solved by a declaration on CFSP attached in the EU-accession treaty and by other political statements by Finnish key politicians in the context of the accession negotiation process. However, the downgrading and redefinition of neutrality was found out to be not simply a reaction to external pressures emanating from the EU, but was seen to relate to broader post-Cold War international developments and to have earlier origins independent of the EU-accession process.

At this phase the evidence is rather limited and mixed on any significant thick Europeanization in the form of national adaptation. On one hand it can be concluded that particularly on the basis of the Government Reports that CFSP has achieved a role in Finnish foreign and security policy, especially in the sense that the EU-membership is understood to have security policy significance for Finland (in that it "will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure" (Government Report 1/1995, 40). On the other hand, the parliamentary debates reveal no significant importance of the EU's security institutions in the minds of national decision-makers. Similarly, it can be concluded that any possible relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions is

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<sup>155</sup> The following chapters will point out that given advancing of CFSP, and particularly the emerge of ESDP, it is no longer possible to construct CFSP in the domestic discourse as compatible with the Finnish line as was in the first phase. In addition to the growing policy misfit pressure there is at the same time increasing institutional misfit as a by-product of participation in the daily business of European integration process and policies.



effectively shadowed by the widely-shared national political will to go against the EU mainstream and to prevent the development of the defence dimension of CFSP.

A distinctive characteristic of the phase I is that there is a collective understanding in the domestic discourse that a new international and European security order is currently under construction and the new suitable means for the international community's purpose are sought for (for instance regarding crisis management). The role given to EU security arrangements in that context is modest. Likewise, the pressure for the amendment of national legislation on peacekeeping is seen to result from the broader post-Cold War international development tendencies rather than from European integration. Yet, the EU is now considered the principal way in which Finland is connected to the international value community. In this sense there has been a change in the key foreign and security policy conceptions. The dominant discourse indicates an increasing and openly manifested attachment to the international value community as well as an understanding that being part of this international community is bound to have impact on the goals of foreign and security policy. Furthermore, being a member of the European Union is perceived to have fundamental security policy implications, regardless of what the more national detailed views on the CFSP and its preferred development trends are. Somewhat paradoxically the EU-membership is regarded as a principal point of departure for the national foreign and security policy line, but yet in practical terms the EU is understood as a source of cooperative "cohesive security" and mutual solidarity rather than having any hard security or defence policy significance.

From the viewpoint of the Europeanization approach it can be argued that changes in the Finnish foreign and security policy in the first phase are not caused primarily by the European integration process. To a great extent, then, it is the deeper international transformation processes that are the principal causes of the change. The participation in and commitment to CFSP can rather be seen as an *instrument* by which the adaptation to the new international security environment can be implemented. The causes of the national foreign and security policy change are thus to be located in the broader transformation of the international system. In this sense the EU-membership and supportive stance on CFSP declared during the accession process are instrumental; they are used as proofs that should convince the international community that the reorientation of Finnish foreign and security policy is genuine and permanent. Tellingly, in the parliamentary debate on the Government Report many MP's underlined that the FCMA-treaty no longer defines the international role and *identity* of Finland. It is replaced by the EU-membership, European values, non-alignment and independent defence.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> E.g. MP Penttilä, MP Salolainen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

Nevertheless, at the same time there are elements in the state identity reconstruction process that remain largely unchanged and draw on the traditional foreign and security policy concepts. Particularly the nationally widely shared view that CFSP should be about crisis management rather than defence cooperation stems from the perception of a continuous and traditional Finnish state identity defined by neutrality and non-alignment. Likewise, when debating peacekeeping it is seen that peace enforcement is not suitable for Finland, ultimately because it is alien to Finland's state identity. Peace enforcement is considered the task of great powers and military alliances but not for a state like Finland.<sup>157</sup> By excluding peace enforcement from the list of international activities that Finland can commit a reference is made to Finland's particular state identity. Abstaining from peace enforcement thus becomes a factor which contributes to the reproduction of Finnish identity. It supports and revitalizes the traditional state identity elements related to peacekeeping, which have their roots firstly in an understanding of Finland as a neutral party, a traditional peacekeeper, that does not serve as a judge but rather as a physician in international politics. Additionally, it was observed that non-participation in peace enforcement is justified with references to small state identity. Military coercion against a state is considered a task for great powers and military alliances, not small states.

Despite this, in light of the new the peacekeeping legislation it can be concluded that the more internationally oriented approach and the concept of enhanced peacekeeping introduced in the Government Report 1/1995 gained more ground. Although military coercion was excluded, a step towards enhanced peacekeeping was taken, broadening the scope of Finnish peacekeeping beyond the traditional limits. In this respect the Finnish development follows a similar mode than many other European states: it is a question of adjusting the tools of security and defence policy to the post-Cold War security environment. The broad security concept that figures prominently in the domestic discourse also means putting emphasis on new international security threat pictures such as intra-state conflicts, non-state actors and terrorism. In the Finnish discourse the main reason for changing and enhancing Finnish peacekeeping is in this phase the need to adapt to the new international circumstances and supporting the UN's role in it. Consequently, the primary cause of the amending of the peacekeeping act is not to be located in European integration. The crisis management operations (IFOR and SFOR) on which Finland must make a decision are NATO-led operations and therefore they cause no direct misfit between EU policies and the domestic level. However, it was shown in the analysis that CFSP (and WEU) were tied to peacekeeping and crisis management in political argumentation, and that there were differing interpretations as

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<sup>157</sup> E.g. Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.

to the implications of the EU-membership and commitment to CFSP on Finnish peacekeeping. Additionally, it was observed that the decision concerning participation in the IFOR operation posed considerable time pressure for the national decision-making process.<sup>158</sup> In the next phases the EU (military) crisis management turns into a very concrete and essential theme in CFSP, and is a prominent source of adaptational pressure for Finland (see chapters 5 and 6).

Intense debating was observed on the question of establishing and training a rapid reaction force for the future purposes of the UN and the EU as well as on the more concrete issue of participation in IFOR crisis management operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These issues raise passionate discussion in the parliamentary process because it is eventually a question of two clashing approaches on national security policy thinking. Furthermore, these issues also touch upon the relationship of national defence and international crisis management. Although it is in the end often a question of relatively small issues (sending a lightly armed building detachment to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and technical issues regarding national crisis management training) there are underlying grander themes embedded to them – which are significant from the perspective of the state identity reconstruction process. Thus these questions are ultimately linked to the shaping of Finland's character and self-image as an actor in international politics.

To sum up, it can be concluded that in spite of the new broad security concept and the degradation of the neutrality doctrine a certain construction of continuity is observable in the discourse in all the three main categories of identity production. Firstly, in the Finnish self-perception “military non-alignment” and “credible independent defence” are perceived as a logical continuation to the Finnish foreign and security tradition. Furthermore, it is assumed that these concepts bring rationality and predictability as features that characterize Finland in the eyes of the other international actors. Domestically, the understanding of the continuity of the main line typically connects with a view that supports and finds feasible a “pragmatic” and consensual national foreign and security policy that rests on the analytical identification of the sole correct solution for each given policy issue. Secondly, concerning peacekeeping and military crisis management the analysis pointed a hesitancy towards over-enhancing the means of peacekeeping too far beyond the traditional form. It was widely seen as extremely essential to draw a line between peace enforcement and those activities that were considered inappropriate for Finland's state identity. Thirdly, traditional state identity elements founded on small state appeared to be in place. Arguments building on the legitimate security interest of a small state, tied to Finland's geographical position, were

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<sup>158</sup> This decision-making under time pressure becomes a frequent phenomena in the later phases, then caused by CFSP operations too. In the first phase any CFSP operations are not yet on the agenda.

visibly present in the debate – though they were also challenged to a certain degree by views that put more emphasis on international values as the basis of Finnish foreign and security policy. There were also repeated demands for consensus – seen as the lifeline of a small state – despite the irrevocable politicization of foreign and security policy that was partly caused by the diversified policy agenda and the new levels of decision-making that the EU-membership brought with it.

Yet, it can be concluded that an interplay of international and domestic expectations that is typical for a Europeanization process has evidently started. A number of cases of significantly contradicting political argumentation could be observed in the parliamentary debate. There were different understandings of the EU membership's implications and requirements on Finnish foreign and security policy. European policies did exert some adaptational pressures on Finland, but the collective meanings attached to them varied. The closer analysis of the parliamentary debate uncovered certain heterogeneity and room for manoeuvre in the dominant discourse. An emerging clash of schools of thought in the national debate was observed, as there was a discursive battle on how national interest and security should be constructed, and what should be the roles of "European" and purely nationally defined security interests in it. On a practical level this appeared, for instance, as a debate on the need of special Finnish national reservations to CFSP. This shows how Finland became exposed to new structures of meaning which European institutions entailed. From the perspective of sociological institutionalist Europeanization this can be taken as a starting point for a process that might eventually result in Finland adopting a new set of preferences and a new state identity elements.

Chapter 3 presented a number of ways in which the EU-membership has been seen to impact on the structures of Finnish foreign and security policy decision-making process. It was noted, for instance, that a significant number of the bilateral relationships with European states became part of the internal EU-cooperation and part of the EU's multilateral communitarian system. Additionally, a significant part of the relations with the non-EU countries was incorporated into the EU's external relations and CFSP. A central structural impact on Finland has been in the division of foreign policy into "EU policy" as the domain of the Prime Minister and "other foreign policy" belonging chiefly to the President. The development of CFSP has thus increased the Government's role in foreign and security policy at the cost of the President (see chapter 3). In phase I this kind of Europeanization impact on the national decision-making system is, however, only at an initial stage. The question of the division of power becomes topical in a more concrete way in the later phases in the context of the EU's crisis management operations and the further amending of the peacekeeping act and the Finnish Constitution. Then differential empowerment caused by Europeanization between the President,

Government and Parliament becomes stronger and almost “automatic”: when new issues are added in to the sphere of the EU’s common policies, they concurrently move from the President’s domain into EU-issues belonging chiefly to the competence of the Government (see chapter 6.3.2). In other words, the division of national decision-making power is altered due to European integration. This feature becomes observable in phases II and III, but already during the first two years of EU-membership there are indications of an emerging national debate on how these external impacts should be interpreted and put into practice on the domestic level. Thus, although European integration causes pressures for domestic structural change, it is not in a given form but there is a national political struggle on how the Europeanization impact is to be nationally digested and implemented. There are contesting political views (and later juridical, too) on the interpretation of the national constitution in the face of the developing European foreign policy.

In phase I this issue is well characterized by a question that relates to Finland’s status as an observer in WEU. The actual decision to become an observer in WEU does not raise considerable opposition, rather it is the *procedure* of how the national decision was made that causes strong criticism. The decision was informed to the Parliament through Prime Minister’s announcement, and thus received no parliamentary Committee handling or a Parliament’s decision.<sup>159</sup> It was critically noted in the debate that this was an example of a EU issue that is in the grey zone regarding the division of power. It was found particularly noteworthy since the new practices on foreign and security policy issues that the EU-membership brought were not yet established. The rules that govern the division of powers between the Government and the Parliament were in creation. Different considerations on how to interpret the Finnish constitution’s paragraphs on the roles and competencies of the President and Prime minister during the EU-era were also linked to the issue of WEU observer status.<sup>160</sup> It can be concluded that despite these pressures and impacts on the national decision-making procedures the consequences do not become visible at once but unveil themselves only gradually when carrying out the day-to-day EU politics and when certain developments in CFSP reveal and aggravate the problematic issue in the national system. It becomes evident in the following chapters that particularly the peacekeeping and crisis management operations serve as mobilisators of concrete Europeanization impacts in the domestic decision-making structures.

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<sup>159</sup> The Government’s view was that it was not a question of a international agreement, but rather a case in which based on the mutual political will of Finland and WEU an institutional arrangement was settled. Therefore there was no constitutional need or possibility for a parliament decision on the issue. Prime Minister Aho 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1994.

<sup>160</sup> MP Pykäläinen, MP Tuomioja, MP Ukkola, MP Laukkanen 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1994.

### *Towards the second phase*

In moving from the phase I to the second phase in the Europeanization process of Finnish foreign and security policy the first intergovernmental conference is taken here as a watershed. Characteristically for the first phase the political goals set for the IGC are based on rather purely nationally defined interests free of any strongly perceived constraints or restrictions caused by solidarity towards EU policies or institutions. In the background of this appears a continuing traditional self-identification of Finland as a “small, northern and militarily non-aligned state”<sup>161</sup>. Contrast to that the second phase is increasingly characterised by reacting and adapting to the conceived realities produced by the IGC and the developing CFSP. A new framework for foreign and security policy-making is increasingly taken on board. The next Government Report on security policy (titled “European Security Development and Finnish Defence”) focuses more on Europe than on the general post-Cold War security environment. For instance, casting aside neutrality is manifested and internalized more clearly: it is noted that “as a member of the Union, Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party”, (Government Report 1/1997, 48). Additionally, whereas in the first phase there were no indications of any systematic attempts to export national ideas, preferences or models to the EU level to talk of, in the second phase we witness such *national projection* as Finland tries to affect and contribute to the development of CFSP.

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<sup>161</sup> MP Salolainen 27.2.1996, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1996.

## **5. Second phase (1997-2002): “not impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party”**

*“Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party.”*  
(*Government Report 1/1997*, 48.)

### **5.1 Introduction: Main features of the second phase**

As was explained in chapter 3, considerable advancing in terms of treaties, political agreements, capacities and institutional build-up takes place in CFSP between 1997 and 2002. The Petersberg tasks (of WEU) are incorporated in the EU, giving it the competence to deploy military resources in crisis management. The ESDP gets launched and the first steps are taken to enhance military capabilities for the purposes of the ESDP. For Finland, this implies that more focused domestic debate, position taking and decision-making are needed concerning both details of ESDP development and broader implications of the ESDP regarding Finnish non-alignment policy and peacekeeping traditions. It is no longer possible to follow a vague pro-integration policy and simply state that deeper integration, no matter what practical forms it takes in the sphere of foreign and security policy, is in line with the Finnish national security interests. The deepening integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy inescapably challenges some of the key concepts of Finland’s foreign and security policy. Consequently, compared to the previous phase there is a greater visibility of the EU in the national foreign and security policy discourse.

Although there is a tendency to underline continuity in the official government texts of this phase, the following analysis of the broader domestic discourse, and the parliamentary debate particularly, will reveal a more diversified picture. A central feature in the domestic discourse in phase II is a growing understanding that Finland has arrived at a crossroads and has to, for instance, “choose whether it will follow the European mainstream in security or opt out partially or fully from the European security policy cooperation”<sup>162</sup>. Finland is seen to be in a situation in which the yet unknown consequences of numerous simultaneously ongoing processes – such as NATO and EU enlargements, rearrangement of NATO-Russia relations, the EU and WEU merger, and the EU’s intergovernmental conference – are likely to influence Finland’s security

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<sup>162</sup> MP Kallis 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

policy environment.<sup>163</sup> The Kosovo crisis, transformations in Russia, and development of the EU's common security and defence policy are seen to cause further acute challenges and pressures on Finnish foreign and security policy-making.<sup>164</sup> Consequently, Finland is seen to be faced with a situation in which it has to take a more consistent and committed stance on how it will eventually regard CFSP/ESDP and by what means it will participate in its development: to call for national reservations, or participate fully and actively. Furthermore, it is seen that as an implication of this Finland is impelled to define more clearly than before the meaning and limits of its non-alignment. The intensified debate on Finland's new position in Europe culminates in the question of the EU's defence dimension that comes up in the EU's intergovernmental conference.

The following empirical analysis shows that in the second phase the two key elements of Finnish state identity production, that is peacekeeping/crisis management and neutrality/alignment are closely linked and intertwined. Any reforms in the way Finland practices peacekeeping are seen to have implications on the character of Finland's non-alignment – for instance through the mandate question (can Finland participate in crisis management operations not mandated by the UN or the OSCE?) or through the changes in the relationship of national defence and crisis management (e.g. does crisis management undermine or support national defence?). There appears to be an emerging understanding that Finland cannot remain outside the developing CFSP (including its defence dimension), and that this consequently implies a stronger alignment via the EU and an increasing redirection of national military capabilities towards military crisis management. Thus, although treated at first one by one below (chapters 5.2 and 5.3), when debating peacekeeping the issue of non-alignment is always present, and vice versa.

In phase II there are two major policy issues that relate to the above-mentioned themes that call for an unambiguous and detailed national response and clearly cause adaptational pressures towards Finland's foreign and security policy: Finland's participation in the KFOR operation in Kosovo and the question of the EU and WEU's relationship which becomes topical thanks to the ongoing EU's intergovernmental conference. The development of the CFSP and especially its defence policy dimension is on the IGC's agenda, forcing Finland to reconsider the compatibility of military non-alignment and the EU defence cooperation. All in all, it will become evident in the following analysis that the EU is increasingly perceived as a factor that has impact on Finnish foreign and security policy: in addition to the obvious CFSP-aspect of the WEU

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<sup>163</sup> Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Report 6/1997, 4; MP Dromberg, 27.5.1997, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>164</sup> MP Jaakonsaari 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.



issue, a growing tendency can be observed according to which Finland should “act like other Europeans” when it comes to crisis management. For instance when the KFOR operation and the new peacekeeping act are debated in the parliament, the ways in which Finland’s legislation differs from the crisis management legislation of many of the other EU members are frequently referred to.<sup>165</sup> There also appears to be less emphasis put on the conception of Finland as a “different” state in Europe that has legitimate national reservations on security cooperation as well as security interests that are out of line with the other EU-members. The concluding chapter 5.4 will argue that these can be taken as a sign of new elements taking root in the state identity reproduction process.

In the second phase the national responses to these issues appear both in the form of national adaptation and national projection. A new legislation on peacekeeping is introduced and the EU’s relevance to the amendment of the legislation is debated on in the Parliament. A notable issue in the debate is also the relationship between crisis management and national defence. National projection (bottom-up Europeanization) takes place as Finland together with Sweden try to direct ESDP towards crisis management rather than common defence by proposing that the so-called Petersberg tasks are included in the Amsterdam Treaty, thus making crisis management part of CFSP.

The policy analysis and academic debate that took place at that time also referred often to that Finland was at a turning point and a fundamental decision was to be made regarding Finland’s general approach on CFSP and national foreign and security policy: either to take further steps in the integration of its security and defence policies or to stand outside the process. Auffermann suggested in 2000 that “the very quick development of a common European defence policy will necessarily lead in the very near future to a situation in which ties between the EU and NATO will be intensified in such a way that the difference between an EU member state which also belongs to NATO and a non-NATO EU member will be rather small. Finland would *de facto* lose its status as a non-aligned country.” (Auffermann 2000, 39). This is to say that it is the participation in the developing CFSP, rather than the NATO issue, that undermines and eventually terminates Finnish non-alignment. Tiilikainen saw that at that time Finland was seeking for its identity in the European unification project, and that the position taking for instance vis-à-vis CFSP’s institutional development and the crisis management and defence dimension of CFSP were elemental parts of that process (Tiilikainen 2000). Particularly the Finnish first EU presidency (1.7.-31.12.1999) “can be analysed as a Finnish effort of assessing its own identity in the [European] unification

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<sup>165</sup> According to the national legislation Finland can not participate in “peace enforcement” and the mandate of UN or OSCE is a prerequisite for Finnish participation in any peacekeeping/crisis management operations. (See further references in chapter 5.3 below.)

project” (Tiilikainen 2000, 27). According to Forsberg Finland’s participation in the NATO-led operations in former Yugoslavia intensified public debate over Finland’s new position in Europe. The official Finnish view that NATO’s military action in relation to the Kosovo crisis was necessary despite the fact that it violated the UN charter contributed also to this. Finland was “at the crossroads of Europeanism and neutrality” (Forsberg 2000, 41). Forsberg also located new frontlines that had emerged after Finland joined the EU: ”For the foreign policy elite, the crisis made it clear that Finland can no longer remain withdrawn in its shell. Rather it was understood that EU membership brings with it added responsibility for events in Europe.” Forsberg argued that the Kosovo crisis showed on one hand, that Finland had fully committed itself to the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and had increasingly emphasised human rights over national sovereignty. On the other hand he also saw indications of ”renaissance of neutrality thinking”. (Forsberg 2000, 41.) Ojanen et al. argued that there was a change in the general official approach on European integration after the intergovernmental conference (1996-1997): when preparing for the intergovernmental conference of 2000 the efficiency of the EU was emphasized more strongly than previously, “perhaps at the expense of the notion of the EU as an ‘association of independent member states’” that was so prominent in the Finnish view earlier on.<sup>166</sup> Ojanen concluded that the Finnish discourse and argumentation was in a state of flux as ”new whys and why nots for non-alignment” emerged. She noted that “new moral arguments about sharing responsibility, solidarity, and indeed, even preparedness to assist others by military means in return for their equivalent promise, are also presented.” (Ojanen 2002, 198-199).

#### *Notes on the key documents and events of the second phase*

The material analysed in this chapter consist mainly of the following documents and related debates. Firstly, there is the Report to the Parliament by the Council of State titled *European Security Development and Finnish Defence* (hereinafter Government Report 1/1997). The related reports and statements by the Parliament Committees are: Foreign Affairs Committee Report 6/1997 and Defence Committee Statement 1/1997). This Government report presents *inter alia* Finland’s view on the strengthening of the EU’s effectiveness in foreign and security policy and on the development of the Union’s defence dimension. In addition to underlining the general security policy significance of the EU for Finland, the report contains a passage related to non-alignment noting that “as a member of the Union, Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union

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<sup>166</sup> Ojanen et al. also observed novel readiness for evaluating anew the use of majority voting in CFSP. They take as a sign of growing flexibility in Finnish positions the fact that in 1997 the Finnish government saw that the CFSP development should be decided by unanimity, whereas in 2000 unanimity is mentioned regarding defence policy only. (Ojanen et al. 2000, 124.)

and a third party” (Government Report 1/1997, 48<sup>167</sup>). The Government Report 2/1999 concerns Finland’s participation in the military crisis management operation (KFOR) in Kosovo. The Parliament’s Defence Committee gave a Report on it and the Foreign Affairs Committee issued a Statement. The Prime Minister’s announcement 1/1999 deals with Finland’s EU Council presidency programme and announcement 2/1999 concerns ESDP and crisis management during the Finnish presidency. Central documents in the debate on the new Act on Peacekeeping are the Government proposal (20/2000) and the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Report (4/2000; containing an objection signed by four Committee members) and the Defence Committee’s Statement (3/2000; containing two dissenting opinions).

The second phase (1997-2002) begins with a defence policy white book (Government Report 1/1997) and ends with another: Government Report 2/2001 is titled *Finland’s Security and Defence Policy*. It is followed by a report by the Parliament’s Defence Committee (2/2001) and the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Statement (6/2001), both unanimous. Between the issuing of these two white books the establishment of ESDP takes place, including the European level political decisions, institutional build-up and capacity cataloguing (see chapter 3). From the viewpoint of Europeanization studies this offers an exceptional vantage point on how this development of the EU’s security arrangements is reflected in the national foreign and security policy discourse: how is it perceived and interpreted domestically, and what significance is given to it in national foreign and security policy? Furthermore, if a growing misfit is felt as the CFSP develops further, to what extent it is seen that the national policy must be reoriented to remove that misfit? In the previous phase the compatibility between Finnish and European policy was achieved mainly by redefinitions, and it is interesting to see if the discourse analysed here contains evidence of further redefinition of the same key concepts. On a more theoretical level this also offers a good change to look at the implications of this on state identity reproduction process. There is a same kind of temporal comparison opportunity –“before and after ESDP” – also concerning the vehicles of identity production related to peacekeeping/crisis management: the 1995 peacekeeping act can be compared to the legislation amendment of 2000.

The selected methodological approach proves its usefulness in the analysis of the second phase too. Government texts construct an image of continuity of national foreign and security policy and present the changes that have taken place often as being minor or technical in nature. Moreover, the Government texts only very seldom refer to the EU’s impact whereas in the domestic debate this is a constant and highly visible theme. There appears to be a considerable unbalance between the Government’s official discourse and

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<sup>167</sup> The page numbers regarding the Government Report 1/1997 refer to the official English translation (second revised English version) of the document.

the political debate as to what extent and in what connections the EU's impact on Finnish policy is dealt with. In the domestic discussion the Government texts are frequently "read between the lines", and the overall picture given by the debates is well depicted by a MP during the parliamentary debate on the Government Report 2/2001: "there has been nothing but changes"<sup>168</sup>.

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<sup>168</sup> MP Jaakonsaari 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

## 5.2 Military non-alignment meets ESDP

The preparation process of the Government Report "European security development and Finnish defence" introduced new domestic procedures compared to the previous defence policy reports. There were changes in the way the parliament was involved in the process. When presenting the report to the parliament the Prime Minister noted that the new procedures strengthen parliamentarism in the preparation of national defence policy. The Prime Minister also underlined "the broad significance of defence policy for Finland's choices". Yet, while declaring the Government's commitment to the parliamentarization of defence policy the Prime Minister also called for *consensus* since it was a question of "a fundamental issue for national survival, securing of an independent and credible defence capability".<sup>169</sup> However, the main opposition party saw that the new procedures actually decreased the parliamentarism of the defence policy preparations.<sup>170</sup> Consequently, instead of a broad consensus that the Government called for there was a wider array of views – and not only on procedural issues but the substance of the policy too, as will be pointed out below.

The Government report stated that there is a notable connection between the development of national defence forces and the development process of European security arrangements. The presented reasons for the renewal of the armed forces seem chiefly to reflect the same conclusions as in many of the other EU-member states: modernization, mobility and rationalization were seen essential in the post-Cold War defence thinking. The report acknowledged that the EU's focus is on prevention of conflicts and preparation for crisis management and the national armed forces and international military organizations are developing their capability to undertake peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. "The resources allocated for traditional defence have been reduced in several European countries". It is also noted that "In the circumstances of Europe, no country can guarantee its security on its own." (Government Report 1/1997, 8.) The aim is to adapt Finland's defence to the post-Cold War environment, to enhance national defence capacity (particularly by keeping up with the international advancing of the military technology), and to strengthen the ability to participate in military crisis management.<sup>171</sup> In the end, the conclusions on changes required in the defence policy and national armed forces are not that far-reaching as in the European mainstream (cf. chapter 4.2). While it is stated that "the development of

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<sup>169</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, also Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997 preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>170</sup> MP Aho 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. On the procedures of national preparation of Finland's defence policy see Visuri 2003.

<sup>171</sup> Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997, Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

the defence forces requires new policy definitions”, at the same token it is underlined that Finland “is not in a point zero as to its security policy. The breakdown of the European bloc division has not dropped the bottom out of our defence system (...) The basic line of defence thinking remains despite the changes that are needed in the defence policy and the defence system.” (Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997). In many ways the report thus stands as a peculiar combination of emphasizing continuity on one hand and the necessity of change on the other.

Compared to the Government Report of 1995 a number of main principles remain unchanged in the Report. The key phrase “military non-alignment and independent defence” is repeated and the broad security conception defined and introduced in the 1995 Report continues to define the main characteristics of the potential threat pictures. In the Post-Cold War environment, in which possibility to be engaged in a war is seen to be greatly reduced, the threats relate to issues like environmental catastrophes, uncontrolled migration, refugees, international crime, terrorism and drug trade.<sup>172</sup> It is noted in the report that since the previous report no such changes have taken place in Finland’s security environment that would call for revision of the basic line of the security policy (Government Report 1/1997, 7). All in all, continuity is emphasized as the main character of Finnish security policy in the Report. Continuity is seen particularly important in the way the other international actors perceive Finnish actions and in respect to the expectations they have on Finland. The picture that the security policy gives to the other actors is considered vital. The Prime Minister stated that “adaptation” and “active participation” to Europe’s change should be visible elements in this picture. A purpose of the security policy – and the defence policy report as a central element of it – is that the other international actors recognize the consistency and continuity of the Finnish line and respect the Finnish policy on military non-alignment.<sup>173</sup> In the parliamentary debate and the committee handlings the Government report is faced with criticism which taps into this contradiction between continuity and change. It is also argued that despite the broad security conception serving as the point of departure in foreign policy in the report, when it comes to defence policy and related threat scenarios there are elements resembling the concepts of Cold War era European power politics. Such a combination of old and new elements is seen illogical and leading to a lack of a consistent functional strategy.<sup>174</sup>

The significance of the EU for the Finnish security policy is stated in the report more directly than before. According to the report the three basic factors in Finnish security policy are “military non-alliance, an independent defence and membership of the

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<sup>172</sup> Government Report 1/1997; also e.g. MP Kekkonen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>173</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>174</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 6/1997, 3; MP Aaltonen 27.5.1997.

European Union” (Government Report 1/1997, 47). The Government sees that the EU-membership has an essential status in Finland’s security policy. The membership “has stabilized Finland’s position in the new Europe, and increases Finland’s security”.<sup>175</sup> According to the Foreign Minister the European Union is “in many ways maybe the most important reference group for Finland”.<sup>176</sup> The Government report states that “Finland supports strengthening of the EU’s effectiveness in foreign and security policy capacity and is participating constructively in the development of the Union’s security and defence dimension” (Government Report 1/1997, 6). Nationally this is justified by emphasising that Finland can participate in CFSP development and its implementation without compromising military non-alignment; Finland stays the way it was when it joined the EU. Since the EU accession “Finland has been able to participate in this work [the creation and implementation of CFSP] as an equal and fully” and officially no changes in this respect are seen in the current situation (Government Report 1/1997, 47). Thus, while declaring the need to adapt the defence policy to the new circumstances, the Government report simultaneously highlights continuity and is careful not to refer to any policy misfit between the Finnish policy and CFSP.

Likewise, “constructive participation in the development of the EU’s security and defence dimension” (*ibid*, 6) is seen possible because decisions concerning it will be made unanimously by the member states and it is seen that interests of all the member states can be reconciled and that Finland’s national defence capacity will retain its significance in all situations. It is also specifically noted that Finland has made no reservations on the Treaty of the Union, including the articles according to which the eventual framing of common defence might lead to a common defence (Article J.4, see chapter 3). Furthermore, it is seen that any forthcoming agreement on EU’s crisis management role and affirmation on the goal of common defence will not have impact on Finland’s position as a military non-aligned state (Government Report 1/1997, 48). Since an unanimous decision is needed among the member states on the issue of common defence, it is felt that Finland has a chance to influence the CFSP development. (Government Report 1/1997, 47.) This is often noted also by the parliamentarians.<sup>177</sup> Yet, the Government’s generally approving position on CFSP is criticized in the parliamentary debate for instance on the grounds that it is seen that creating a crisis management capacity for the EU in practice means establishing an organization which can also implement common defence – which, in turn, is considered problematic for non-aligned Finland. Therefore the conclusion is that “No military capacity of any kind should be created for the EU, not even in the sense of the so called crisis management

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<sup>175</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>176</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>177</sup> E.g. MP Vihriälä, MP Kuosmanen 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

mentioned in the report.”<sup>178</sup> Reacting to this the Foreign Minister reminds the parliament on “what has been agreed upon when Finland joined the EU” and how the Maastricht Treaty (and its articles on the eventual framing of common defence) bind Finland. Referring to the lack of any opt-outs the Foreign Minister notes that “the Maastricht Treaty has a totally different status for Finland than for Denmark or the UK”.<sup>179</sup>

Increased prominence given to the EU in Finland’s security policy is visible also in that the rejection of neutrality in Finland’s foreign and security policy – on the grounds of Finland’s EU-membership – is expressed more clearly and manifestly than in the first Europeanization phase. The Government states that neutrality is not a suitable term for defining the Finnish policy. This is because as an active participant in CFSP Finland, together with the other EU member states, is jointly responsible for the status and security of the EU. There are no defence related security guarantees attached to the EU membership, but it is understood to bring with it indisputable additional security.<sup>180</sup> The non-applicability of neutrality is declared in the Government report as follows: “as a member in the EU Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the EU and a third party” (Government Report 1/1997, 48). The fact that neutrality becoming obsolete is connected to the EU-membership is a clear indication Europeanization: the perceived impact of the EU on Finland’s security policy has grown. Yet, at the same time the Government emphasizes that the EU-membership is a logical part of the continuity of Finnish policy, and has thus not caused any radical alteration in the grand Finnish foreign and security policy line. This interpretation of the EU’s increased security policy significance to Finland as well as of the EU-membership’s repercussions regarding neutrality gains a relatively dominant position in the domestic discourse during the phase II. In the parliamentary debates, for instance, the Government’s view is questioned mainly in that it is asked if the security policy significance given to the EU (and especially the declaration of impartiality in a conflict between the EU and a third party) imply that Finland no longer considers itself possessing a right to independently define its position on a military crisis or war in its neighbouring area.<sup>181</sup> Some concern and suspicion is also expressed over the ability of the EU to turn itself into a credible security actor and to establish a functioning European security and defence policy.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> MP Korkeaoja, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>179</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. Halonen also adds poignantly that since the issues in question were accepted by the previous Government in which the now critical MP’s own party held the Prime Minister post, the MP should be aware of the implications of the Maastricht Treaty. The connection of the Maastricht Treaty and the common defence is noted in the debate by other MP’s too, e.g. MP Hurskainen, MP Vihriälä 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. Denmark’s opt-outs concern EMU, ESDP, Justice and Home Affairs and the citizenship of EU; UK’s opt-outs concern EMU and the Schengen Agreement.

<sup>180</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>181</sup> Dissenting opinion by MP Laakso, Laine and Pykäläinen in the Defence Committee Statement 1/1997.

<sup>182</sup> E.g. MP Sasi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.



In the domestic debate there is a visible continuing appreciation of the value of military non-alignment, not only for Finland but also for European security. In the parliamentary debate on the Government Report 1/1997 it is stated, for instance, that

“For a small state like Finland, non-alignment offers a chance to play an active role that is valuable from the viewpoint of other states too, and they should realize it.”<sup>183</sup>

On a more practical level, it is seen that the participation of non-aligned countries increases the “political credibility” of peacekeeping operations in Europe, such as those in Bosnia (IFOR, SFOR).<sup>184</sup> Finnish non-alignment is also seen to support the stability of Northern Europe.<sup>185</sup> It is also appreciated that the Government Report presents Finnish defence as a contribution to EU’s security: “Finland’s credible independent defence capability supports the common security of the Union and its members” (Government Report 1/1997, 48). Reciprocally, a capable EU is seen to be in Finland’s security interests.

Where the general security significance given to the EU is increasing, the emphasis put on the OSCE appears to be declining compared to the first phase. The Government Report notes that “the limits of the OSCE’s capability were highlighted during the crisis in former Yugoslavia” (*ibid.*, 12). The OSCE is now presented more in terms like “quiet diplomacy”, “political crisis management”, “minority rights”, “norms”, “democracy”, “neighbourhood relations”. In the report’s general part on the European security development and Finland the OSCE is given only a very few references. When the report deals with the “basic factors in Finland’s security environment” (*ibid.*, 18-36) the OSCE remains in a marginal role. Yet, the OSCE continues to have visibility in the Finnish discourse, but the meanings attached to it are not that homogeneous and positive as during the previous phase. In the parliamentary debates the OSCE is once even labelled a thing from the past, and being on the wane in the current international politics.<sup>186</sup> Concerning Finland’s take on NATO, NATO enlargement and NATO-membership there is no significant change compared to the first phase. When presenting the Government Report 1/1997 to the Parliament the Prime Minister refers to the continuity of the policy defined in the white book of 1995 (Government Report 1/1995).<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> MP Hassi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>184</sup> E.g. MP Hassi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>185</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>186</sup> MP Tarkka calls OSCE “the most incapable security organization in Europe”, favoured by Russia with the purpose of downplaying NATO’s significance as a security organization in Europe. MP Tarkka 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>187</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997. When the parliamentary debates touch upon NATO enlargement, a central issue appears to be Russia’s attitude towards it. E.g. MP Holopainen,

The Government puts much effort on highlighting the general continuity of the Finnish defence policy thinking. At the same time, it is argued that Finland has “successfully managed to *adapt* its foreign and security policy to the new integrating Europe and to the global challenges”.<sup>188</sup> This simultaneous emphasizing of “continuity” and “adaptation” is a typical feature in the Finnish discourse in this phase. What is also typical is that they are presented not as contradictory features, but as logically compatible with each other. In this light, a key purpose of the Government Report is to correspondingly adapt the defence policy to the altered European and global circumstances, while at the same time touting the continuity of the defence policy and showing that there is no break in the national defence policy. It is concluded that the previous “neutrality” and the current “military non-alliance” do not lead to different requirements for the national defence capability (such as showing credible defence, and a capability to repel violations of Finland’s territorial integrity).<sup>189</sup> This is seen to offer a major justification for using the concept of continuity as the central trademark describing the Finnish defence policy. Likewise, traditional territorial defence retains its significance in security policy. The Finnish defence solution based on a territorial defence system covering the entire area of the country and general conscription remains relevant (the durations of the national service periods are, however, revised). On the other hand, the Government Report also talks of the “change in the structure of defence” (*ibid.*, 84) and “restructuring the defence system” (*ibid.*, 86). It is seen that “the general development in Europe and the environs of Finland makes a reduction in the strength of wartime defence forces possible, provided the technical level of the remaining forces is raised.” Consequently, “the personnel strength of the Defence Forces will be reduced by in all 110 000 over the planning period [1998-2008]”. Additionally, three readiness brigades are to be created, which is seen a principal feature in the development of the wartime ground forces. Concerning Finland’s ability to participate in international crisis management it is stated that “International military cooperation is a growing part of the security policy pursued by Finland” and that “[P]articipation in demanding international crisis-management operations strengthens the Defence Force’s capacity for military cooperation and thus aids the development of Finland’s own defence preparedness.” (Government Report 1/1997, 95.)

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Jääteenmäki, Tulonen, Kekkonen, Tennilä, Tarkka 17.3.1997; MP Siimes 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>188</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>189</sup> “Finland’s policy of military non-alliance requires the country to maintain a defence capability that meets high demands. There must be an capability [*sic.*] to repel violations of her territorial integrity and in the final analysis attacks on the country.” (Government Report 1/1997, 52.) Also Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

### *National projection: Finland and Sweden's joint initiative in the IGC*

The rearranging of the relationship between the EU and WEU was on the agenda of the ICG leading to the Amsterdam Treaty (signed on 2 October 1997). France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy and Spain proposed a full merger of these organizations. This would have meant importing the security guarantee clause of WEU into the EU treaties. Moreover, it was proposed that the forthcoming treaty would include a more precise reference to the aim of common defence and that the crisis management tasks would be mentioned as the first stage in the development of a common defence. Great Britain, Denmark and the non-aligned countries opposed the proposal. Together with Sweden Finland proposed a compromise which consisted of the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks<sup>190</sup> in the Amsterdam treaty and into CFSP. This way, instead of merging WEU and the EU, WEU would become an instrument of the EU to carry through military crisis management operations. In Finland's and Sweden's initiative<sup>191</sup> it was proposed that humanitarian and crisis management tasks in which military organizations are used would be written into the EU's competence (Government Report 1/1997, 17). The memorandum was adopted, and the Petersberg tasks were transferred to the EU, but WEU's territorial defence mission fell outside the arrangement as Finland and Sweden had wished. Military crisis management tasks were included in the EU's competence in the Amsterdam Treaty. Crisis management became part of CFSP. (Sjursen 1998, 107; Tiilikainen 2007, 178; Graeger et al. 2002, 22; Ojanen et al. 2000, 128; Vesa 1998, 54-57.)

The initiative was presented to the other EU-members as a way to enhance cooperation in military crisis management and to clarify the cooperation between the EU and WEU (Foreign Minister Halonen 18.3.1997)<sup>192</sup>. However, for the non-aligned Finland and Sweden the main aims with the joint initiative lied elsewhere. Firstly, they found it important to sustain the line between security and defence in CFSP, and not to let it get blurred by linking WEU closer to the EU (Graeger et al. 2002, 22). In order not to compromise their status as militarily non-aligned countries they wanted to keep common defence out of the EU (Ojanen 2007, 36). To this purpose they tried to direct the European discussions on EU's defence policy towards crisis management instead of mutual security guarantees and other similar issues that were considered difficult to dovetail with their national policies and foreign and security policy traditions

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<sup>190</sup> The Petersberg tasks are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making. See chapter 3.1.

<sup>191</sup> *The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension: Towards an enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management*. Memorandum from Finland and Sweden, 25. April 1996.

<sup>192</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

(Tiilikainen 2007, 178). Secondly, Finland found it important that the non-aligned EU members do not become sidetracked in CFSP and that they can participate fully in the EU's crisis management activities. Therefore they must have a chance to participate on equal footing in planning and decision-making within WEU on the EU's crisis management operations (Government Report 1/1997, 17). Thirdly, the initiative was also presented as a proof of Finland's readiness to participate constructively in the EU's security cooperation (Prime Minister Lipponen)<sup>193</sup>. Finland wanted to avoid becoming a 'footnote country'; it wanted to show that a militarily non-aligned country does not hinder development in security affairs (Ojanen et al. 2000, 128). The need to safeguard the credibility of non-alignment came up often in the then domestic debate. Likewise, there were domestic concerns that a EU-WEU merger would threaten the foundations of Finnish non-alignment policy.<sup>194</sup> Also it was feared that the "positive security policy role of the non-aligned countries" would not be properly understood and appreciated in the EU.<sup>195</sup>

The Petersberg case is the first case during the Finnish EU-membership where Finland clearly tries to reduce the perceived misfit between Finnish policy and CFSP by not just adapting the national policy but by actively striving to adjust the EU policies. In other words, it is an example of *national projection*<sup>196</sup> in which the main motivation lies in the pursuit of nationally defined goals. The "uploading" of national goals was successful in the sense that a line between crisis management and defence was drawn, and the worst scenario for Finland – the merger of WEU and EU, incorporation of the WEU defence clause into the EU treaties – did not realize. Thus it was possible for Finland to argue that the development of the EU's defence dimension actually meant strengthening crisis management and peacekeeping activities. With defence taken out of the defence dimension, CFSP was more suitable to the Finnish self-image as a non-aligned country with a long tradition of peacekeeping. Additionally, it implied that Finland was able to participate fully in CFSP. Misfit between CFSP and Finnish non-alignment policy was effectively removed for the time being.<sup>197</sup>

However, Finland and Sweden did not achieve all their goals with their joint initiative. The EU's Petersberg task list was eventually formed on the basis of the WEU's Petersberg declaration, and thus included more far-reaching capacities than were

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<sup>193</sup> "Finland and Sweden's joint initiative proves our preparedness to participate in the Union's security cooperation." Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>194</sup> E.g. MP Vihriälä 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>195</sup> MP Hassi 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997.

<sup>196</sup> Building on Wong (2006) national projection was defined in chapter 2 as promoting and exporting nationally defined policy models, ideas, goals and interests into the other member states and to the EU level.

<sup>197</sup> Concerning Sweden it has been noted in similar vein that due to the joint initiative's success "Swedish participation in future CFSP military cooperation could be more easily rationalised to the domestic participation as compatible with non-participation in military alliances (Miles 2005, 266).

included in the Finnish-Swedish initiative. The Amsterdam Treaty refers to the "tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making" instead of "crisis management" as was proposed by Finland and Sweden (Tiilikainen 2007, 178-179.) Thus the initiative was only partially successful. It failed in limiting crisis management to something short of peace enforcement (Haukkala & Ojanen, forthcoming). There were also some unintended side-effects that were out of line with the original aims of the Finnish-Swedish initiative. At the EU level the initiative and the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks was followed by a surprisingly rapid development of the European security and defence policy. After the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty a common understanding between France and UK that was achieved in St.Malo in 1998, and this added momentum to ESDP development (see chapter 3.1). Therefore, while Finland's national projection was substantially successful (in that the stated aims were mostly achieved), it resulted, more or less directly, in further pressures to national adaptation.

Initially Finland tried, and succeeded, to prevent the proposed merger of WEU into the EU and, consequently, to draw a clear line between crisis management and defence in the EU. Yet, thanks to these repercussions of national projection Finland got inescapably entangled in deepening integration in the area of security and defence policy. What enhanced that effect was that many of the decisions on ESDP development coincided with Finnish EU Council presidency. It became a task for Finland to carry on the development of the EU military crisis management and ESDP according to decisions made in the Cologne Council. Finland was asked to "practice what you preach" during the presidency<sup>198</sup>, and was obliged to help in advancing further the defence dimension during the Finnish presidency, including *inter alia* the establishment of new institutions and a European military capacity to undertake the *full* range of the Petersberg tasks. The aim concerning the military capacities became to be known as the Helsinki Headline Goal. It implied that in terms of military capabilities the EU should be able, by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, a rapid reaction force of up to 60 000 persons (see chapter 3.1).

In the domestic debate the Government emphasized that this ESDP development was about the creation of crisis management capability and clearly tried to downplay the implications of the ongoing ESDP development on the EU's defence dimension. Foreign Minister Halonen noted that the concepts of "security" and "defence" give possibilities for wide-ranging discussions, but that the Finnish purpose has been to delimit the scope

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<sup>198</sup> As Ojanen has noted the two countries' active involvement in setting the scene led later on to the need also to be generous in terms of their own contributions to the EU's developing crisis management capabilities." (Ojanen 2007, 36.) Ojanen, Herolf and Lindahl have presented evidence that the rapid development of the defence dimension took the representatives of Finland by surprise (Ojanen et al. 2000; 130, 151).

of development into crisis management.<sup>199</sup> The Prime Minister stated that the ESDP development is not about “harmonization of our defence systems or defence expenses” and such will not happen during the Finnish [EU Council] presidency”.<sup>200</sup> The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee supported these definitions and statements.<sup>201</sup> However, in the domestic debate there were concerns that such difference between “crisis management and common security and defence policy dimension” is not properly acknowledged in the Finnish and international media.<sup>202</sup>

All in all, a consequence for Finland was that it became increasingly problematic to label ESDP domestically as “crisis management, not defence”. Secondly, internationally there was a need to clarify the non-alignment in the face of the developing ESDP in order to be able to credibly argue that Finland still was non-aligned despite the current ESDP development. The solution by the Government was to present to the domestic audience ESDP development merely as development of crisis management which had nothing to do with common defence: “The Cologne European Council clearly delimited the development of common security and defence policy into crisis management and the so-called Petersberg tasks. (...) It is not a question of common defence, and common defence is not discussed herein.” (Prime Minister Lipponen 25.11.1999). Tellingly, the Prime Minister’s announcement to the Parliament on ESDP during the Finnish presidency was titled “The EU’s security and defence policy: crisis management during the Finnish presidency” (Prime Minister Announcement 1/1999), more or less suggesting that ESDP equates to crisis management. Furthermore, the Prime Minister began the announcement by underlining issues that remain unchanged and thus cause no adaptational pressures for Finland. It is noted in the announcement, for instance, that each EU-member state independently makes the decision to participate in any crisis management operation decided by the EU, and that the participation is not compulsory. It is also highlighted that the EU’s actions to promote international peace and security are in line with the UN Charter and the principles of the OSCE, and are made in cooperation with these organizations. Additionally, the “peace-making” mentioned in the original WEU’s Petersberg declaration and consequently in the Amsterdam Treaty is translated as “rauhan palauttaminen” [peace restoring], thus using a slightly softer term.<sup>203</sup> The civilian aspects of crisis management (political, economic and humanitarian means) are also underlined. It appears to be important for many MP’s that there are no changes regarding Finland’s non-alignment policy and that Finland is not in a process of

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<sup>199</sup> Foreign Minister Halonen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management.

<sup>200</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management.

<sup>201</sup> Foreign Affairs Council Statement 3/2000.

<sup>202</sup> MP Kekkonen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management.

<sup>203</sup> Typically peace-making is in the Finnish debate defined as “restoring peace, by military force if necessary”. On the different domestic interpretations of “peace-making” see chapter 5.3 below.

building military forces for the EU.<sup>204</sup> Therefore also greater visibility of non-military means in ESDP is repeatedly called for.<sup>205</sup>

The voluntary character of ESDP and the EU's crisis management is emphasized in the debate. The voluntary character is contrasted to the "automatic" and "binding" nature of common defence and collective security guarantees that are seen typical for military alliances. The lack of any binding measures in ESDP is seen as a factor that differentiates ESDP from military alliances.<sup>206</sup> Yet, it is noted often that other member states might see that in a different way than Finland does: for them crisis management is an intermediate stage in a process leading to common defence, and many MP's see this as a likely source of problems for Finland and the Finnish non-alignment policy<sup>207</sup> – despite the reassurances coming from the Foreign Ministry and the President that common defence is highly unlikely.<sup>208</sup> Concerns that commitment to ESDP might in the near future come to compromise Finnish non-alignment policy are raised in the debate. The development towards deeper cooperation in security policy in the EU is seen likely to cause further national adaptational pressures. All in all, however, the Government's view is generally shared in that it is seen that with a CFSP focusing on crisis management "it has been possible to relatively well dovetail the needs of the non-aligned member states with the development of CFSP".<sup>209</sup> Nevertheless, the potential differences in how the concept of peace-making is interpreted by different EU-member states becomes a topic of discussion. It is seen that especially the big EU-member states that are NATO-members have a different view on what kind of tasks fall under the title of "crisis management".<sup>210</sup> It is also noted by some critics that by participating in international crisis management, such as the KFOR-operation the purpose of the Government is to direct Finnish security policy towards the common European defence policy and to secure Finland's place in the core of the EU in this policy area too.<sup>211</sup>

In the background of the debate there is the question of Finland's state identity inside the EU: is Finland similar to the other EU-members, or is there a distinction in Finland's foreign and security policy that sets Finland apart from the other members. On one hand

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<sup>204</sup> E.g. MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1999 (EU security and defence policy: crisis management during the Finnish EU Presidency).

<sup>205</sup> E.g. MP Vilén, MP Korkeaoja, MP Ojala 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1999.

<sup>206</sup> MP Kiljunen 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1999.

<sup>207</sup> E.g. MP Anttila, MP Rynnänen, MP Rauhala, MP Tennilä, MP Korkeaoja 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1999.

<sup>208</sup> "The European Union is not developing into a collective security organization." President Halonen 31.8.2000 (Halonen 2000). "The EU currently has a common security and defence policy, but that it would logically lead to a common defence – that is just an idea thrown in by some member states, an idea that really does not look very topical." Ambassador Inki, 11.10.2000 (Inki 2000).

<sup>209</sup> MP Korkeaoja 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1999.

<sup>210</sup> MP Korkeaoja 28.11.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 2/1999.

<sup>211</sup> MP Krohn 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999.

we can conclude that European integration has entered the state identity reproduction process that takes place via foreign policy. On the other hand, these perceived differences that relate to neutrality/alignment play a role in the Finnish state identity reproduction process. I will come back to this question in the conclusions of this chapter.



### 5.3 Reconstructing the relationship between crisis management and national defence

#### 5.3.1 *New peacekeeping legislation*

The Finnish peacekeeping legislation was again amended in 2000. In addition to the broader international development tendencies in the post-Cold War peacekeeping (as discussed in chapter 4.3) there were two topical policy issues that were in the domestic debate identified as the key driving forces behind the new legislation. Firstly, the preparations of Finland's participation in the KFOR-operation<sup>212</sup> were underway and the applicability of KFOR to the current peacekeeping legislation were questioned particularly in the parliamentary debate.<sup>213</sup> Secondly, the above-discussed CFSP development made it topical to rethink the relation and the potential misfit between Finnish peacekeeping legislation and the definitions written into the Amsterdam Treaty on the EU's crisis management. As will become apparent in the following analysis, the official government texts are careful not to mention any causal relation between CFSP development and the new national legislation, and the Ministers deny that the development of EU crisis management would have had any impact on the amendment. Yet, in the parliamentary debate on the new legislation the ESDP, EU crisis management development, Amsterdam Treaty and Petersberg tasks figure prominently. The significant role that peacekeeping continues to play in the Finnish state identity reproduction becomes apparent in the wide and heated domestic debate. Furthermore, changing interpretations of the vehicles of identity production that relate to neutrality and alignment are also observable in the debate.

The domestic debate on peacekeeping and crisis management started already in the context of the IFOR-operation and the peacekeeping act of 1995. As was the case with the IFOR, Finland's participation in the new crisis management operations in the Balkans impacts on the new peacekeeping legislation. In fact, the Government presents the problems that Finnish military commanders are having in the field in interpreting the

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<sup>212</sup> UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) with a peace treaty attached to it in June, authorised UN member states and concerned international organizations to form an international peace corps in Kosovo. Tasks include maintaining a threat in order to prevent hostilities from breaking out again and maintaining and where necessary enforcing a cease fire; securing the withdrawal of military troops, police forces and paramilitary organizations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army's troops and other armed groups representing Kosovo Albanians, and securing a safe environment where refugees can return safely and where international civilian operations and humanitarian organizations can operate. The KFOR operation was preceded by NATO's air raids which lacked a UN mandate. (UN Security Council Resolution 1244; Aro 2000, 56.)

<sup>213</sup> For a jurisprudential analysis on the Finnish participation in KFOR see Aro 2000.

1995 peacekeeping law's paragraphs on peace enforcement as the overriding reason for the amendment. The Government also argues that the proposed new law does not entail any major changes regarding the substance of the legislation, but is rather a technical adjustment aimed at removing ambiguities in the current legislation. At the same time, in the domestic discourse the new peacekeeping act of 2000 is portrayed as the second phase in a transformation process that started with the amendment that took place in 1995 (see chapter 4.3).<sup>214</sup> Finnish participation in military crisis management becomes a topic of intense debating in the domestic level as it is seen to have repercussions both on Finland's position as a militarily non-aligned state and on the relationship between national defence and international crisis management. (The new peacekeeping act implies, for instance, that the practical administration of peacekeeping forces passes from the Ministry of Defence to the Finnish Defence Forces; see below.) The following empirical analysis also shows that the reform of peacekeeping is linked in the domestic debate to the development of ESDP and Finland's position in it – even though the EU's crisis management operations are not yet in sight (they only start during the third phase of Finnish foreign and security policy Europeanization, see chapter 6).

#### *Government report on Finland's participation in KFOR and the new Peacekeeping Act*

Finland's participation in the KFOR operation was prepared in the Foreign Affairs and Defence administrations in spring 1999, based on the Rambouillet peace plan. As a reply to NATO's call for preliminary information about PfP countries possible participation in the operation Finland announced in 1.6.1999 its preliminary readiness to take part in the operation with a 700-800 man battalion. (Aro 2000, 57.) The Government Report (2/1999) titled "Finland's participation in the military crisis management operation (KFOR) in Kosovo" was presented to the parliament in 15.6.1999. The Report noted that Finland's participation in KFOR is in accordance with the regulations of the Peacekeeping Act firstly because the operation was authorised by the UN Security Council and it was seen not to differ significantly from the previous IFOR/SFOR operation. Secondly, the Government argued that it was not question of peace enforcement (which is not sanctioned by the 1995 peacekeeping act), since "the parties of the conflict are committed to the ceasefire and the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] is committed to disarmament" and because "initiative and unlimited use of force is not necessary in this operation" (Prime Minister Lipponen 16.6.1999).<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> As was noted earlier, from the Europeanization perspective the comparison between these two cases is most suitable, because a significant development in CFSP, that is the source of adaptational pressure, has taken place between 1995 and 2000.

<sup>215</sup> Prime Minister Lipponen 16.6.1999, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/1999. Peace enforcement was found unsuitable for Finland's (small) state identity (see chapter 4.3) and was not sanctioned by the effective peacekeeping legislation.

The Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee shared the Government's view that Finnish participation is in line with the Finnish peacekeeping legislation, and referred to the same justifications as presented by the Government. The Committee saw that Finnish participation in the KFOR operation is in line with the fundamental goals of Finland's foreign and security policy. (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 5/1999; Jaakonsaari 1999.<sup>216</sup>) The Committee added that it is not a question of traditional peacekeeping, but enhanced peacekeeping, meaning that there is a need for the readiness for reactive and restricted use of force. The Parliament's Defence Committee noted in its statement that the Finnish concepts of peacekeeping tasks are still inconsistent with the corresponding international concepts. The Committee stated that in other countries the KFOR operation clearly falls under the category of "peace enforcement" which does not have a matching counterpart in the Finnish legislation. Yet the Committee concludes that in the terminology of the Finnish legislation the KFOR operation does not meet the essential elements of peace enforcement. (Defence Council Statement 2/1999, 3.) Peace enforcement is seen to contain active and initiative use of military force, whereas the KFOR is about enhanced peacekeeping, that is reactive use of force, yet wider than self-defence.<sup>217</sup> In the parliamentary debate, however, the Government Report, and the definitions used in it, are faced with more critical response, as will be discussed below.<sup>218</sup>

In unison with the KFOR planning, the preparations for amending the Peacekeeping Act were ongoing.<sup>219</sup> In April 2000 the Government proposal was submitted to the Parliament, and the new Peacekeeping Act was approved in 21 June 2000. Compared to the previous peacekeeping legislation the main amendment was that the wording on peace enforcement, added by the Parliament in 1995, "or other operations that can be regarded as peace enforcement" was removed. When presenting the bill to the Parliament the Defence Minister referred to the problems that the current legislation had caused in the field during the SFOR and KFOR operations. The above-mentioned wording implied that the 1995 Peacekeeping act did not sanction Finnish participation in

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<sup>216</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 5/1999; MP Jaakonsaari 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999.

<sup>217</sup> MP Kiljunen 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999.

<sup>218</sup> The definitions of these concepts were topical in the jurisprudential discussion at that time, and particularly from the view point of national decision-making system: "The problem is caused by situations that remain in the "grey area" between war and traditional peacekeeping defined in section 33 [of the Constitution Act] conceptualised as "enhanced peacekeeping", "wider peacekeeping", "peace enforcement" or "conflict resolution" by legislators, researchers and legal officials. "Section 33 defines the handling of Finland's foreign relations. According to this section, "decisions concerning war and peace shall be made by the President with the consent of Parliament"". "Enforcement actions that are decided and approved by the UN are affected by section 33. However, peacekeeping as a concept is based on the desire to avoid military action. (...) [T]his restriction has been included in § 1 of the Peacekeeping Act". (Aro 2000, 53.)

<sup>219</sup> A working group left its report to the Defence Minister regarding amendments to the Peacekeeping Act in November 1999 (Aro 2000, 50).

peace enforcement or in other operations that can be regarded as peace enforcement. Therefore, the Finnish commander in the field might be faced with a situation in which he has to decide if a task given to the Finnish troops during the operation meets the Finnish definition of “peace enforcement” and consequently abstain from implementing the task. The Minister notes that such political responsibility should belong to the Parliament and Government, not to the field commander. This is presented by the Government as the main reason why the peacekeeping act must be amended.

Additionally, the Government aims to change the peacekeeping legislation so that Finnish troops can participate in a humanitarian operation on the official request of a UN agency, such as the UNCHR. The Government proposal mentions the Macedonia case as an example: Due to China’s veto in the UN Security Council the UNPREPED mission was not granted continuation in 1999. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees asked the Finnish peacekeepers to assist in the humanitarian operation in the area. Since the requested operation lacked UN mandate Finland declined the call for assistance. Therefore the Government proposes that “Finland could in the future consider participating in humanitarian operations with a military organization”.<sup>220</sup> When presenting the proposal to the Parliament the Defence Minister highlights that the purpose of the new legislation was *not* to enable Finnish participation in operations that would be more demanding or difficult than previously; the nature and scale of the country's peace-keeping work would not be altered by the changes. Instead, the amendment of the legislation is justified by referring, firstly, to the international development that has been ongoing in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. In adapting to this development Finnish peacekeepers’ tasks are to be enhanced to include humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians.<sup>221</sup>

The ongoing EU’s crisis management capacity development (see chapter 3) and its impact on the Finnish policies and legislation is not pondered upon in the Government proposal. The general preamble of the proposal contains only two brief passages on the EU and mentions the Petersberg tasks in passing. In fact, as was the case in phase I, the Government discourse does not establish any causality between CFSP and the changes in the Finnish legislation. Emphasis is put on the continuity of the Finnish foreign and security policy – and Finland’s membership in the EU is not constructed as a factor that would have caused disruptions in this continuity. Nor is the EU-membership seen as a source of external forcing that causes adaptational pressures on Finnish policies. The implicit argument is that the EU-membership does not play a role when the national legislation that concerns foreign and security policy is changed.

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<sup>220</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000.

<sup>221</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000.

It is simply noted in the preamble of the proposal that the WEU lacks the resources for military crisis management, and additionally that the EU's concept for military crisis management was accepted in the EU summit in 1999 and that the EU can *in principle* launch a peacekeeping mission (Government proposal 20/2000, 6). The preamble continues to state that the EU "acknowledges that the primary responsibility for international peace and security remains on the UN" (Government proposal 20/2000, 6). The only reference to EU crisis management is made when it is referred to the problems caused by the unclarity of the international concepts regarding peacekeeping: "In international parlance the concept of crisis management has become increasingly used along with peacekeeping. In the planning of the EU's crisis management forces the term military crisis management in practice means peacekeeping activities" (*ibid.*, 8). It is stated that the diversity of concepts can cause uncertainty on which type of operations Finland can participate in. When presenting the Government proposal to the Parliament the Defence Minister does not mention the EU at all.<sup>222</sup>

One could argue that there is a certain contradiction in that on one hand the Government declares that ESDP is not about common defence, but crisis management (see chapter 5.2) and on the other hand it states that despite this ESDP does not play a role when the national legislation on crisis management is amended. Indeed, in the parliamentary debate there is no shortage of views that draw a connection between ESDP and the new peacekeeping legislation. The impact of the EU's crisis management capacity build-up on Finnish foreign and security policy was debated extensively. The justifications of the amendment presented by the Government are questioned and the external pressures posed by the EU membership are seen to have contributed to the new legislation. Moreover, the new peacekeeping act is not regarded merely as a technical adjustment to the previous one, as the Government suggests, but often as a change that affects the whole Finnish foreign and security policy, and thus also has repercussions on Finland's identity as an actor in the international system. The broad range and diversity of views in the domestic discussion on peacekeeping/crisis management is reflected in the different stages of the parliamentary debate, and materializes, for instance, as an objection statement in the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee's Report and as dissenting opinions in the Defence Committee Statement.<sup>223</sup>

First of all, there appears to be significant disagreement as to why the current wording on peace enforcement ("...or other operations that can be regarded as peace

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<sup>222</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. The Minister follows the same line also outside the parliamentary debate: when giving a speech on the same day in a seminar that explicitly deals with European crisis management he treats the amendment of the peacekeeping act and EU's crisis management as separate and unconnected issues. (Enestam 2000.)

<sup>223</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000; Defence Committee Statement 3/2000.

enforcement”) is found so problematic that it is to be eliminated. There are also different interpretations concerning the consequences of this amendment on the scale and nature of operations in which the Finnish troops can now participate in. The opposition, supported by two MP’s from a government party argues that the Government proposal “in reality gives a possibility to participate in operations that require more extensive use of military force than currently”.<sup>224</sup> The EU crisis management development, Petersberg tasks and Amsterdam Treaty are repeatedly brought up in the debate, and it is seen that they cause increasing pressures towards standardization of national legislation in EU member states. There are different interpretations on what the reference to “tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making” in the Amsterdam Treaty actually means in relation to peace enforcement (see chapter 5.2 above). Therefore the Government’s reasoning that the amending of references to peace enforcement in Finnish legislation is only a technical one and does not change the nature of Finnish peacekeeping or Finland’s foreign and security policy is questioned. It is seen that Finland is responding to pressures caused by the EU-membership and the evolving EU crisis management and taking steps towards peace enforcement. Furthermore, it is argued that it is a logical and inevitable – if unwelcome – continuation to the change that was initiated by introducing “enhanced peacekeeping” earlier (in phase I). It is seen that this ongoing process is taking Finland away from traditional peacekeeping and eroding the identity of Finland as a credible and neutral peacekeeper. The most straightforward version of such a view finds this a clear case of the adaptation of national foreign and security policy as a response to a misfit between ESDP and Finnish legislation. According to this viewpoint, the crisis management capacity and institutions the EU is building require legislative changes in the EU member states, and one of these changes is that the Petersberg tasks are written into the national legislation.<sup>225</sup>

Similarly, the incorporation of crisis management as a concept into the Finnish legislation is seen in some of the critical views as a sign of the EU’s increasing impact on Finnish foreign and security policy. In their objection statement some of the members of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee highlight that the concept of “crisis management” brings with it problematic connotations regarding military enforcement and tasks of combat forces and peace-making. Consequently, they argue that due to the ambiguities in the Finnish interpretation the whole concept of “military crisis management” should stay away from the new peacekeeping act.<sup>226</sup> The actual Committee Report, however, takes military crisis management to equate with peacekeeping activities, in line with the Government proposal.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Objection in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report 4/2000 by MP Kääriäinen, Kallis, Tennilä and Korkeaoja.

<sup>225</sup> E.g. MP Ojala, MP Laakso, MP Tiisanen 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000.

<sup>226</sup> See note 219.

<sup>227</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000; Government proposal 20/2000, 14.

Despite the positive meanings already attached to the EU membership and its security policy significance to Finland (see phase I and the analysis of the Government Report 1/1997 above) in this debate Finnish adaptation to the EU's crisis management development is not promoted in a positive tone.<sup>228</sup> It is only those who oppose the proposed amendment of the peacekeeping act that draw the connection between the peacekeeping legislation and ESDP. This points to the persistence of the vehicles of identity production that relate to the traditional peacekeeping conception and connect both neutrality and peacekeeping. In the Government texts the related revisions in the foreign and security policy are discursively constructed in a way that aims to preserve a certain degree of resonance with the traditional state identity elements.

Since the new peacekeeping act stems from the context of *NATO*-led crisis management operations, and the practical problems that the commanders in the field might have or have had there, there are accusations in the parliamentary debate claiming that with the new legislation Finland is purposefully brought closer to *NATO*. This is seen to endanger the credibility Finland's non-alignment policy.<sup>229</sup> It is only when countering these accusations that the Government refers to ESDP: the Defence Minister replies that "the EU is in process of building its own potential to carry out operations without *NATO*, and there will still be operations that are purely UN-led."<sup>230</sup> Therefore it is not merely a question of *NATO*, the minister concludes. Thus, although the EU crisis management development is not stated as a reason for the amending of the legislation, in the political argumentation it is referred to when there is a need to prove that the new legislation is not motivated by *NATO*-oriented thinking or targeted at enhancing interoperability with *NATO*. The mere possibility of future autonomous EU-operations is presented as a factor that softens the implications of the new legislation on non-alignment. In a way the Government is able to utilize the EU dimension in the crisis management debate with the purpose of keeping the controversial *NATO*-issue at a safe distance.

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<sup>228</sup> The single exception is provided by a MP who draws a connection between the using of the crisis management concept in the proposal and the EU's crisis management system, and sees this as a positive development which helps Finland to adapt to the common European terminology and the ESDP. MP Kanerva 13.6.2000, debate on the Government proposal 20/2000 (first reading).

<sup>229</sup> E.g. MP Neittaanmäki 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999; MP Laakso, dissenting opinion in the Defence Committee Statement 3/2000.

<sup>230</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000.

### *The changing relation of national defence and crisis management*

In Phase I Finland's participation in crisis management was presented as an essential part of the process in which Finland adapted to the Post-Cold War security environment. The IFOR operation was promoted as a practical proof of this adaptation. The EU's role in peacekeeping and crisis management was at that stage considered rather modest and the evolution of the EU into a relevant actor in international security was found unlikely (see chapter 4.3). All in all, in phase I the justifications as to why Finland participates in crisis management – which in the then-debate was mainly tagged as enhanced peacekeeping – were not grounded on or connected to the EU or CFSP's goals. Quite the contrary, the Government explicitly wished to keep the parliamentary debate on the 1995 Peacekeeping Act separated from the debate on CFSP development (see chapter 4.3). In the first phase the Government also stressed that Finland's participation in international crisis management served the interests of Finnish national defence. Thus it was the nationally defined security interests, rather than any external expectations or international moral obligations that were presented to serve as the key justification for Finland's participation in the new forms of peacekeeping.

The debate on the relationship of crisis management and national defence continues during the second phase. The Government continues to promote the view that the enhancing of crisis management capability clearly supports Finland's defence capability. International military cooperation is seen to directly serve the Finnish security interests. The crisis management operations give valuable experiences to the military personnel and, additionally, increase Finland's capacity to receive external help if Finland becomes under an attack.<sup>231</sup> The Government proposes that all the practical preparation and implementation tasks of peacekeeping are incorporated in the tasks of the Defence Forces. (So far the administration of peacekeeping was organizationally placed under the Defence Ministry.) Now the peacekeeping organization would become part of the Defence Forces. The Government presents this as a technical change which helps to rationalize the using of resources.<sup>232</sup> In the objection statement attached to the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Report, however, it is seen that the organizational adjusting proposed by the Government might imply that peacekeeping is given an equal status as national defence. This is seen problematic since such an interpretation could cause confusion over the national defence as the primary task of the defence forces and as the primary target in resource allocation. Consequently, the signatories of the objection demand that the priority of national defence over

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<sup>231</sup> Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997, Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1997; Government Report 1/1997, 45.

<sup>232</sup> Government proposal 20/2000.



peacekeeping should be clearly indicated in the legislation on the Defence Forces.<sup>233</sup> They stress the difference between national defence and peacekeeping, and see that the difference between these two should not be blurred by any organizational changes. The task of the Defence Forces should be national defence only, and not peacekeeping, which should be based on a different organization.<sup>234</sup> In contrast to that the Government argues that the current system in which the international activities are kept separate and unconnected with national defence has caused problems. It has resulted in negative attitudes towards international activities in the Defence Forces and consequently caused difficulties in getting defence force personnel to apply for peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, it is seen that giving the Defence Forces the responsibility over the practical implementation of peacekeeping leads to increased synergy between national defence and international crisis management. It is thus seen that there is a need to highlight the benefit of the international activities to national defence by such a reorganization.<sup>235</sup>

Concerning the relationship of national defence and peacekeeping – and how it is constructed in the national foreign and security policy discourse – phase II thus represents a watershed: although peacekeeping activities had been traditionally seen as an essential part of Finland's state identity (via the self-image of a "peacekeeping superpower"), it was not manifested as a significant factor in national defence. Now a direct connection is constructed in the Government discourse between the defence of the motherland and peacekeeping activities abroad. It is stated that the national defence policy consists of a national and international dimension.<sup>236</sup> At the same time the EU enters the domestic argumentation on peacekeeping/crisis management, as the ESDP begins to cause more consistent external expectations and adaptation pressures, thanks to the institutional build-up that started after the St.Malo Declaration (see chapter 3). The question of political expectations and moral obligations coming from the EU figures more prominently in the domestic debate than in phase I. As crisis management is seen to have more direct benefit for the national defence, the relationship between national defence and crisis management is reconstructed in a way that allows for growing prominence of ESDP in the Finnish foreign and security policy. Thus, although ESDP is in the Finnish interpretation constructed as crisis management rather than common defence, thanks to the new national take on the relationship between national defence

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<sup>233</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000, 9.

<sup>234</sup> MP Korkeaoja 16.6.1999, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/1999.

<sup>235</sup> Government proposal 20/2000, 11. Defence Minister Enestam 30.1.2001 in the National Defence Course (Enestam 2001). It is not argued here that this organizational change is a direct result of European integration. Nevertheless, it can be noted that the increasing prominence of national defence forces' international crisis management capacity is in line with the mainstream development in the European states defence policies. The ESDP development can be seen to reflect the same trend (Howorth 2007, see chapter 3). Theoretical and methodological analysis on the problems of measuring Europeanization from a rationalist institutionalist perspective was presented in chapter 2.3.

<sup>236</sup> Defence Minister Enestam, 30.1.2001 (Enestam 2001).

and crisis management, in the phase II the ground is prepared for ESDP – even when labelled as crisis management – to become more significant in Finnish foreign and security policy.

In phase I with the help of the term “enhanced peacekeeping” Finland placed itself somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and full-fledged crisis management (which was seen to include peace enforcement). It became possible for Finland to participate in operations executed by other international organizations than the UN and the OSCE too, given that the operation has a mandate of either organization. Having national reservations was also seen as a significant factor contributing to the state identity reproduction. There were only very few notions that Finland should act similarly as the other EU members in this respect, and no significant Europeanization pressures stemmed from CFSP at that stage. This made it easier to cherish the idea of continuity in the national foreign and security policy, and enhanced peacekeeping was constructed as a logical continuation to the Finnish peacekeeping tradition and thus matching with the Finnish state identity. What serves the same purpose in phase II is the conceptually constructed difference between “peace enforcement” and “military enforcement” (or “military coercion”), the latter being something that Finland does not participate in and is simply unsuitable with Finnish foreign and security policy.<sup>237</sup> This difference makes possible the perception that the new policy does not contradict with the still so prominent elements in Finland’s state identity, i.e. non-alignment and traditional peacekeeping. When these two are intertwined with each other, as in this case, they appear to constitute a particularly strong conservative dynamic.

The persistence of the traditional peacekeeping as an identity element becomes clearly apparent in the domestic debate on the new peacekeeping act. The neutrality element is frequently connected to this, for instance by noting that it is a factor that gives special added value to Finnish peacekeeping compared to other countries: Finland’s activities are characterized by confidence building and conflict dissolution among the parties, whereas other countries put more emphasis on military force.<sup>238</sup> Similarly, in the context of the Balkan operations the Finnish non-alignment is typically presented as a positive feature that enabled the work of President Ahtisaari as an arbitrator in the crisis and gave a good grounding for Finland’s participation in the crisis management

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<sup>237</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000. Defence Committee Statement 3/2000.

<sup>238</sup> E.g. MP Ojala, MP Oinonen, MP. E.Lahtela, 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. Similarly, in Phase I it was perceived that non-alignment is not a problem but rather brings added-value to international crisis management operations such as IFOR. Participation in crisis management operation led by an defence organization, NATO was constructed compatible with military non-alignment with the help of /by introducing the category of enhanced peacekeeping. To some extent this construction was challenged in the domestic debate, but eventually gained the dominant position in the discourse.

operation.<sup>239</sup> The role of President Ahtisaari in the international negotiations on Kosovo is often perceived in the domestic debate as a model example of the significance and benefits of military non-alignment.<sup>240</sup> It is also used as a justification for the claim that Finland should not shy away from its nation-state oriented security thinking and must keep its national reservations even in the face of the developing CFSP. In the parliamentary debates many MP's see that as a non-aligned country Finland can give a more significant contribution to the building of a more secure and peaceful Europe than many other countries. Therefore it is concluded that CFSP and "the eventual framing of common defence" must not jeopardize the status of the non-aligned EU-members.<sup>241</sup>

This combination of traditional state identity elements does not easily match with the concept of military crisis management that is seen to have a more robust approach on the use of force. This view is well described by an address of a MP during the parliamentary debate: "Finland is a peacekeeping superpower, but only when it comes to traditional peacekeeping."<sup>242</sup> Therefore it was also possible to locate in the Government argumentation various attempts to show that crisis management implies no deviation from the highly appreciated Finnish peacekeeping tradition. This was supported by underlining the difference between Finland's and other countries approach on peace enforcement. Additional justifications for the revisions in peacekeeping policy were sought for by emphasizing more strongly than before the benefits of international crisis management to the national defence and national security interest.

During the first phase (1994-1996) there was a widely shared understanding that Finland differs from the other EU-member states in its foreign and security policy premises. Regarding that there are now indications of an emerging change. The distinctive features of Finnish foreign and security policy (compared to the other EU-members and CFSP) are acknowledged but their role in the state identity reconstruction process is declining. Alongside the talk on the legitimate security interest of a small state and national reservations there is a growing current in the domestic discourse that underlines and calls for similarity between the security policy approaches of Finland and other EU-

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<sup>239</sup> MP S.Lahtela 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999.

<sup>240</sup> The advantages of non-alignment are promoted to the international audience too: Finnish policy of non-alignment and 'restrain' in questions of NATO membership are frequently presented as part of Finland's contribution to world stability and peace (Browning 2002, 62; Archer 1999, 57; President Ahtisaari quoted in Austin 1999, 81). Browning sees this as an indication of "a re-inscription of the Cold War identity of Finland as a physician and bridge-builder in world politics" (Browning 2002, 62).

<sup>241</sup> MP Kallis, MP Aho 17.6.1999, debate on the Prime Minister's Announcement 1/1999.

<sup>242</sup> MP Seivästö 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000.

members – it is seen that Finland should be able to act equally with its partners in crisis management <sup>243</sup>

### 5.3.2 European crisis management in the Finnish defence policy

*“The importance of the European Union in relation to Finland's security interests and goals has continued to increase. A strong Union based on solidarity will enhance security, prevent crises from emerging and improve Finland's ability to cope with such situations should they arise. An improvement in the EU's ability to take action will remain a fundamental principle of Finland's policy on Europe.”* (Government Report 2/2001, 4)

According to the Government Report 2/2001 the three basic components of Finland's security and defence policy are: maintenance and development of a credible defence capability, remaining militarily non-allied under the prevailing conditions, and participation in international cooperation to strengthen security and stability (Government Report 2/2001, 4). Just like the previous defence policy white book – Government Report 1/1997 “European security development and Finnish defence” – the Government Report 2/2001 focuses strongly on Europe (even though the title of the report “Finnish security and defence policy” this time contains no reference to European security).<sup>244</sup> The Government states that in the face of intensifying European integration the “EU is increasing its influence not only as an economic actor but in the sphere of foreign and security policy too, by acquiring new means for crisis management. The Union is also improving its capability to prevent security problems and to strengthen comprehensive security.” (Government Report 2/2001, 11.) There appears to be a widely shared understanding that the significance of the EU in carrying out Finland's security policy interests and goals has increased.<sup>245</sup> The Government's argument that “By

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<sup>243</sup> MP Korhonen 9.9.1999, question time: the development of EU crisis management; MP Kanerva 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000; MP Kuosmanen 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999.

<sup>244</sup> In addition to the European security issues, the Government Report and the related parliamentary debate focuses on structural changes to be implemented in the Defence Forces. Particularly the programme to reduce the strength of Defence Forces wartime troops cause discussion, as well as the plans to revise the territorial defence system.

<sup>245</sup> Government Report 2/2001, 33; Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 8; e.g. MP Ranta-Muotio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. However, all the views on ESDP-development and its significance to Finland are not positive: the leader of the main opposition party states that “after the Laeken summit there are no high expectations. The Union did not show great ability to make decisions, nor appreciation of historical realities, but instead appeared to relapse into internal struggles and games which will not strengthen the Union in the eyes of citizens or as an international actor.” MP Aho 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

actively seeking to develop the European Union's common foreign and security policy, Finland is able to strengthen its influence in international affairs and to further its own security objectives" is supported by the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee (Government Report 2/2001, 33; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 13).<sup>246</sup>

The Government sees that "Finland's membership in the European Union raises the threshold to exert pressure against Finland. It also offers Finland a means to resolve conflicts and increases the options available to receive assistance to repel threats." (Government Report 2/2001, 36). Thus, it is seen that even without any specific military security guarantees the EU has a strong positive security policy significance to Finland. The EU-membership is seen to create protection and security through political joint responsibility. Additionally, it is seen that participation in EU crisis management strengthens Finland's position in a crisis situation. This is because crisis management operations are seen to enhance mutual solidarity and military interoperability between the EU members. The Defence Minister concludes that Finland seeks for security in political alignment and cooperation instead of neutrality that would lead to isolation under the prevailing conditions.<sup>247</sup> Therefore the Finnish Defence Forces are to have a capability for managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland's borders. Consequently, regional crises with only an indirect effect on Finland become significant for Finnish security. (Government Report 2/2001, 43-44).

The government presents the report merely as a recheck of the previous defence policy report from 1997, but in the domestic debate there are differing interpretations, some seeing the report representing a new policy.<sup>248</sup> The Parliament's Defence Committee notes that the concepts describing Finland's security and defence policy have changed since to the previous defence white book. The Committee pays attention firstly to the following conceptual change: whereas the 1997 Report underlined credible *national* defence, the 2001 Report talks of "maintenance and development of a credible defence capability" – without a specific reference to the national or independent character of defence. Secondly, a conceptual change is seen in that the Government Report mentions that Finland remains militarily non-allied *under the prevailing conditions*. (Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8)

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<sup>246</sup> On the other hand the Committee also finds the European focus of the as a shortcoming in the report, because security policy impacts of globalisation would require more extensive analysis of the international development. Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 6. See also Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 4.

<sup>247</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 30.1.2001 (Enestam 2001).

<sup>248</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001, MP Kanerva 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001; Justice Minister Koskinen 4.12.2001 (Koskinen 2001),.

### *Adapting to military crisis management, projecting civilian crisis management*

The Government Report states that “the international activities of the Finnish Defence Forces have been more extensive and have grown more rapidly than anticipated” (Government Report 2/2001, 6). The creation of the EU’s crisis management capability impacts heavily on how Finnish crisis management is developed. A Finnish rapid deployment force is offered to the EU for purposes of international crisis management. (The original total strength of the force offered was 1500 soldiers, and was increased to 2000 soldiers in the EU’s capabilities improvement conference.) (Government Report 2/2001, Parliament’s Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 13-14.) The Government Report refers to the decisions taken on the EU’s military crisis management capability at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, and notes that the required readiness will demand additional resources, and that Finland is involved in the development of the EU Member States’ collective capabilities. The Government affirms that Finland is taking an active part in the creation of the EU’s military crisis management capability and also supports the set up of related operational politico-military structures. (Government Report 2/2001, 8, 59.)

“Interoperability commensurate with European crisis management goals” is listed among the main objectives in developing Finland’s defence and its military crisis management (Government Report 2/2001, 46). The purpose is to make “personnel system and materiel, training and procedures internationally compatible as necessary” (Government Report 2/2001, 47-48). The Report states that “[t]he ability to make preparations, take decisions and implement actions rapidly, essential for crisis management, will be further enhanced. Decision-making procedures will be further developed, particularly with a view to the EU’s crisis management activities”, and that the “[d]evelopment of Finland’s rapid deployment force aims to maintain the readiness and capability to participate in EU-led crisis management operations.” (Government Report 2/2001, 34) These passages indicate that the needs of ESDP are a central baseline in developing the Finnish military crisis management. In contrast to the previous phases, EU’s crisis management activities – EU-led operations are mentioned now, too – are now considered relevant as guidelines for the Finnish approach to post-Cold War peacekeeping. The EU crisis management is perceived as a factor that sets the conditions and expectations for the future directions of Finnish peacekeeping. The difference is considerable not only in comparison to the phase I, but it is noteworthy that a year ago the Government discourse implied no causality between ESDP and the changes made in the Finnish peacekeeping legislation in the Peacekeeping Act of 2000 (see chapter 5.3.1 above).

Concerning civilian crisis management capacity there are yet not that many EU guidelines and common plans in existence, but Finland announces preparedness to follow and adapt to those as soon as such are established: “Finland is developing its civilian crisis management capacity on the basis of its national approach and is prepared to establish the capacity required particularly for developing the EU’s civilian crisis management capability.” (Government Report 2/2001, 8). Indeed, together with Sweden Finland continues to lobby for civilian means and non-military aspects of EU crisis management.<sup>249</sup> During the Swedish EU Council presidency Sweden put forward a programme for crisis prevention, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was established (Ojanen 2002, 170). The Gothenburg European Council decided that the EU must improve its ability to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, making use of military and civilian means. Targets were set for civilian aspects of crisis management which should be achieved by 2003 through member states’ voluntary contributions (European Council 2001, 11). The Government Report states that “Finland is playing an active role in developing the civilian crisis management capacity of the EU. Finland is also developing its national capability in line with the EU’s objectives, especially in four priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law, and civil administration and civil protection.” This promotion of EU civilian crisis management capacity receives wide backing in the domestic debate. The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, for instance, sees that civil and military crisis management complement each other and supports the utilization of the broad range of EU crisis management tools, including civilian crisis management, and other political and economic means – and military crisis management when necessary.<sup>250</sup> The Defence Committee shares this view and notes that the EU should create a crisis management system in which it is possible to simultaneously mobilize both civilian and military resources, and see that they contribute to the same goals (Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 14).

However, there is criticism in the domestic debate that finds that civilian crisis management is not taken seriously enough by the Government. According to the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, funds should be allocated to civilian crisis management in the state budget in the same way as in military crisis management. The Committee criticizes the lack of concrete estimations on the costs of the development of civilian crisis management. (Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 7). In the parliamentary debate this is seen as an indication of a greater deficiency and bias in the Government’s approach on crisis management: other than the military aspects of

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<sup>249</sup> See the joint newspaper article by Swedish and Finnish Foreign Ministers Lindh and Tuomioja in *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Dagens Nyheter* 30.4.2000.

<sup>250</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 8-9

security policy often remain as phrases with no meaning.<sup>251</sup> Similarly, there are doubts that civilian crisis management might not proceed in the EU as swiftly as expected and risks lagging behind the military dimension.<sup>252</sup>

Yet, the meanings attached to the civil crisis management as a general concept in the domestic debate are positive. A dominant perception in the domestic discourse is that civilian crisis management bears significant resemblance to the "Finnish" way of doing peacekeeping – in which for instance confidence building between the parties and the so-called CIMIC-cooperation between military and civilian actors are seen as distinctive features. It is generally conceived that via civil crisis management it is possible to conserve and pay forward the heritage and know-how of Finnish peacekeeping.<sup>253</sup> Consequently, civilian crisis management is constructed as a way to preserve a certain resonance between the national collective understandings that relate to the traditional peacekeeping as a state identity element and the new more military-oriented features of international crisis management. The civilian dimension of crisis management helps to construct ESDP as being compatible with Finnish peacekeeping traditions. By putting emphasis on the civilian aspects of crisis management it is possible to bridge the gap between the domestic understandings that stem from the traditional state identity elements and the norms, expectations and adaptation pressures coming from the European level. In other words, underlining the civilian aspects of EU crisis management effectively reduces the perceived institutional misfit between European and domestic level. National projection in the form of promotion and supporting of the civilian crisis management in the EU-level also serves the same purpose. This process is enhanced by the fact that broad/comprehensive security is seen to be more embedded in the Finnish security and defence policy than before. The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that compared to the 1997 defence white book the current Government Report takes better notice on comprehensive security in its discussion of the defence system. The Committee also sees that the concept of broad security is presented as a foundation of Finnish security policy in a more consistent way than previously.<sup>254</sup>

The domestic debate on the relationship between crisis management and national defence and on the possible benefits that crisis management capability gives to national defence (see chapter 5.3.1 above) continues in the context of the defence policy white book. The Government argues that developing Finland's military crisis management capacity to accord with the objectives of crisis management will only benefit Finland's

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<sup>251</sup> E.g. MP Ojala 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>252</sup> MP Jaakonsaari, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>253</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 10. Also e.g. MP Ojala 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>254</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 5. See also Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8.



national defence. (Government Report 2/2001, 46-47). It is seen that both the international compatibility and experiences accumulated in international crisis management reinforces the credibility of Finland's national defence capability and strengthens Finland's national defence resources (ibid., 57).<sup>255</sup>

The main critical views in the debate stress that the development of the Finnish defence forces must be based on national values and on the "needs of defending the motherland", and not on those of the European crisis management tasks. Participation in international crisis management should be subordinate to this basic function and should support it. It is argued that the Government Report fails to enunciate this adequately. The Government Report is seen to treat Finland's defence and military crisis management equally important topics of development.<sup>256</sup> It is also suspected that crisis management is built at the expense of national defence.<sup>257</sup> The Government response to such criticism is to repeat that participation in international crisis management serves national defence and that there is no contradiction between these two issues.<sup>258</sup> However, the respective roles of crisis management and national defence in the Government Report cause debate on whether the Report should be referred to the Parliament's Defence Committee or Foreign Affairs Committee after the preliminary debate. Some argue that since the majority of the Report deals with "general security policy, the changing environ of it, Finland's general definition of security policy and the principles of defence" and "international crisis military and crisis management" it falls under the competence of the Foreign Affairs Committee (to which CFSP belongs according to the Constitution, as an MP notes).<sup>259</sup> The opposite views argue that the Report is mainly about the development of defence administration and the defence system and thus belongs to the Defence Committee.<sup>260</sup> Eventually, the Report is referred to the Defence Committee.

### *On crisis management and non-alignment*

The increasing visibility and role of international activities in the official national defence policy causes debate on what is the impact of the changing security policy role of the EU and EU crisis management on Finnish non-alignment. Even neutrality, the old

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<sup>255</sup> Also MP Kekkonen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>256</sup> MP Korkeaoja, MP Ryyänen, MP Nousiainen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. Ministers' statements on the issue of helicopter procurement are presented as a concrete example case in which there is uncertainty on whether the plans are based on the needs of Finland's defence or on the needs to improve the capacity to participate in international crisis management.

<sup>257</sup> MP Ranta-Muotio, MP Vistbacka 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001. This issue was visibly present in the domestic debate also during the phase I (see chapter 4.3).

<sup>258</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>259</sup> MP Jaakonsaari, MP Kiljunen, MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>260</sup> MP Laitinen, MP Kummola 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

key concept of Finnish foreign and security policy and state identity, occasionally resurfaces in the debate, as the following excerpt from the parliamentary debate indicates:

Defence Minister Enestam: *"Finland is no longer a neutral country, but politically allied and militarily non-aligned."*

(Interception by a MP Korkea-aho: *"That is somewhat semantics!"*)

Interception by MP Elo: *"That is semantics!"*)

Minister: *"That is not semantics, that is a fact."*

(5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.)

All in all, the neutrality question is nevertheless dominantly considered a case closed: the common understanding remains that due to the EU membership Finland is no longer a neutral state in the traditional sense (see chapter 4.2).<sup>261</sup> What causes active debating, however, are the varying interpretations on whether the EU-membership has enhanced Finland's military non-alignment or made it more ambiguous. Some see that Finnish non-alignment has served as a balancing factor in the transformations that the European security structures have been going through and that the Finnish model is widely appreciated in Europe.<sup>262</sup> Others argue that the ESDP development undermines military non-alignment, and that the forthcoming EU military operations will present a dilemma for Finland: Finland will have to choose between military non-alignment and its active role in the EU.<sup>263</sup> Contradicting views and contrasting ways to perceive CFSP and its significance and consequences for Finland are clearly present in the debate. Broader common ground is found, however, in the domestic debate on the benefits of non-alignment, both for Finland and the EU: the Parliament Committees refer to the Finnish arbitrators work in Kosovo and North-Ireland, and to Finland's activism in developing crisis management capacities in the contexts of the EU and NATO's PfP-programme.<sup>264</sup> The nomination of Chief of Defence of Finland, General Hägglund as chairman of the EU's Military Committee in March 2001<sup>265</sup> is also mentioned as a proof of the fact that the benefits of Finland's non-alignment status are appreciated in the EU.<sup>266</sup> In the

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<sup>261</sup> Illustrative examples of this in the, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001 are MP Anttila, MP Kanerva 5.9.2001; also MP Karpio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>262</sup> MP Kanerva 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>263</sup> MP Kuosmanen 19.12.2001, also MP Vilkkunen, MP Jaakonaho 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001

<sup>264</sup> Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 12. Also MP Anttila, MP Lax, MP Korkea-aho 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001; MP Kallio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>265</sup> "The Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, represented in Brussels by their military representatives. The Military Committee gives advice and makes recommendations on military matters to the Political and Security Committee and provides military direction to the Military Staff. Duties of the Military Staff include early warning in relation to EU crisis management, situation assessment and strategic planning." (Government Report 2/2001, 18.)

<sup>266</sup> MP Sinnemäki 5.9.2001, MP Kuosmanen 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

parliamentary debate Finland's national border control is added to this list. A frequently emphasized view in the debate is that by safeguarding the longest external border of the EU Finland directly contributes to the EU's security policy goals defined in the Amsterdam Treaty, namely "safeguarding the integrity of the Union's territory and peace and security in the Union's outer borders".<sup>267</sup> A conclusion is that therefore Finland cannot be labelled a free-rider even if it did not participate in all EU crisis management tasks. Finland does its duty as an EU member and contributes to the EU's security no matter what its status regarding military alliances is.<sup>268</sup> The Government Report also refers to this connection between Finland's border control and EU borders: "To maintain internal security, Finland must be able to carry out credible border control in a manner that fulfils the EU requirements." (Government Report 2/2001, 10).

All in all, debate on ESDP and its impacts on Finland concentrates chiefly on EU crisis management. In this respect the Government's aim to construct ESDP as crisis management appears to have succeeded. The defence dimension of ESDP is largely cast aside in the parliamentary debate on the Government Report. The Defence Committee merely states that an evaluation on "how the binding of the EU's defence dimension is and what are its implications on Finland" could have been included in the Government Report" (Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8).

The procedures in the domestic preparation of the Government Report 2/2001 are heavily criticized in the parliamentary debate.<sup>269</sup> It is seen that the Report was prepared in a too exclusive manner, particularly compared to the wide consensus that has traditionally characterized Finnish foreign and security policy-making. The Defence Committee proposes that the next defence policy report be prepared in a more parliamentary way, and that the Parliament's committees, civil society and research institutes would be better involved. (Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 17). Many MP's call for respect towards the tradition of strong consensus in Finnish foreign and security policy<sup>270</sup> and the opposition demand better access to information and more inclusive parliamentary preparation in defence policy.<sup>271</sup> To a certain degree the Government acknowledges the problems, though it finds that the "normal parliamentarism" applied did work and that the final output was "not too bad".<sup>272</sup> After

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<sup>267</sup> MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>268</sup> MP Korkeaoja, MP Rynnänen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>269</sup> The Defence Council was abolished in March 2000 and its duties were reallocated to the Government Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the Ministry of Defence. A new Security and Defence Committee was set up, and was given the task of coordinating the preparation of the 2001 report. (Government Report 2/2001, 3.)

<sup>270</sup> MP Seivästö 19.12.2001. MP Katainen 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. MP Pekkarinen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>271</sup> MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2009, MP Isohookana-Asunmaa 6.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>272</sup> Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

the Committee handlings of the Government Report the Defence Committee proposes a new model for future preparations of defence policy.<sup>273</sup>

Compared to the previous defence policy white book the general view of the international environment remains basically unchanged. The Government states that “[t]he changes in European security put in motion after the end of the Cold War are both profound and lasting. The threat of a large-scale military conflict in Europe will remain low.” (Government Report 2/2001, 3). Thus, it is the potential local and regional conflicts that are seen to influence the European defence policies and guide the structural changes of armed forces in many European countries. International cooperation, crisis prevention and crisis management are understood as the key means to respond to such conflict scenarios. Additionally, the ”new security challenges” (such as international crime, environmental security, health issues, disasters) attached to the broad security concept used in the Report are seen to pose increasing requirements for the defence policy (Defence Minister Enestam 5.9.2001). Consequently, even though continuity is highlighted, the changes in nature of international security environment will have implications that touch upon Finnish territorial defence system too. The Government states that “the changes in the security policy environment and the crisis and threat scenarios” require the revision of the territorial defence system, and consequently a “reformed territorial defence system will be presented in the security and defence policy report to be submitted in 2004.” (Government Report 2/2001, 47).

Another adjustment derived from the perceived changes in the international environment is that military non-alignment is no longer presented as an eternal truth, but only a solution that is found most suitable under the prevailing circumstances, and thus may be subject to change. This is to say that Finland has entered an era of constant re-assessment of its military non-alignment. The Government Report connects this issue with the developments in the EU: “Finland is constantly re-assessing its military non-alliance and the functioning of crisis management and security cooperation in Europe, taking into consideration changes in the regional security environment and developments in the European Union.” (Government Report 2/2001, 32)<sup>274</sup> This change is also acknowledged in the parliamentary debate, for instance by noting that citizens (parliamentarians included) should understand that “due to the changes in the security policy environment Finland’s non-alignment or alignment is no longer as critical and fateful a decision as it used to be.”<sup>275</sup> However, some comment in a critical tone that the security and defence policy concepts used in the Government Report are basically

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<sup>273</sup> MP Kanerva, Chairman of the Parliament’s Defence Committee 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>274</sup> See also MP Kanerva, MP Karpio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>275</sup> MP Kalliomäki 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

familiar and accepted by all, but their meanings are stretched so that it is possible to implement new definitions of defence policy if so wished.<sup>276</sup> Nonetheless, the perceived contradiction between continuity and change/adaptation is not as poignantly visible in the parliamentary discussion as before. The Government policy is not criticised from this perspective as vigorously as was done in the context of the Government Report 1/1997 (see chapter 5.3.1 above).

Concerning phase I (1994-1996) it was concluded that despite the emerging interplay between international and domestic norms and expectations, the dominating feature was the nationally-oriented perspective rather than an adoption of and commitment to international values. Furthermore, it was concluded that instead of CFSP, Europe or European values were overrun by “the international community” or “cohesive security” as reference objects. Similarly, although “European solidarity” was sometimes referred to, in phase I references to EU membership and CFSP’s significance were sparse. (See chapter 4.7.) Phase II presents a change in this respect, and particularly in the context of the second defence policy white book “a common European value base” is frequently referred to in the domestic debate. The defence policy report notes that European countries are “increasingly driven by a common value base and have similar social and economic frameworks.” (Government Report 2/2001, 10). Some MP’s even see direct congruence between the EU’s common values and Finland’s values, and underline that Finland is committed to defend the Union’s common values.<sup>277</sup> All in all, compared to the previous phase, Finland is now constructed as being more similar to the other EU-members than before.

Yet, in the face of this, foreign and security policy is seen contain factors that differentiate Finland from the other EU-members. It is felt that the geographical location of Finland unavoidably sets its mark upon the way how Finland can relate to ESDP. In the background of this understanding is that Finland is different than European countries with a favourable geostrategic position. The Government Report contributes to the reproduction of this state identity element by arguing that “Changes in the military threat will have an impact on the resources and mechanisms for national defence, which will differ from one area to the next. In particular, in those European countries with a favourable geostrategic position, the defence policy has emphasized the development of mobile forces with a rapid reaction capability and other crisis management capabilities.” (Government Report 2/2001, 21). In the parliamentary debates the main opposition conclusions concerning Finland and ESDP (the latter perceived explicitly as crisis management) tend to build on this difference and argue that Finland should not participate in the all the activities of ESDP. This is because international crisis

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<sup>276</sup> MP Kääriäinen 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

<sup>277</sup> E.g. MP Kanerva 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

management is not as applicable to Finland as it is to the other EU-member states. It is concluded that international crisis management may increase the security of the other EU-members, but not Finnish security. Thus it is not question of “shared security”, and Finland must have its own divergent national policy. In this light it is seen that the Government’s view on Finnish defence policy and the way it aims to develop the defence system (revising the territorial defence system, purchasing helicopters, prevention of a strategic strike, participation in EU crisis management and plans on reducing the number of garrisons) is found problematic.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001.

## 5.4 Conclusions on phase II

During the period of the time analysed in this chapter the interplay between international and domestic expectations intensifies, and CFSP as the source of top-down Europeanization is more influential than before. Nevertheless, in the official Government discourse Finland's participation in CFSP and ESDP continues to be presented as a logical part of the continuity of Finnish policy, thus having caused no radical alteration in the grand Finnish foreign and security policy line. In light of the above-presented analysis of the broader domestic discourse, the construction of continuity is challenged in many ways. Numerous cases were located where significantly contradicting political argumentation on the Finnish approach to and interpretation of CFSP could be seen. In the official discourse much emphasis is, for instance, put on what ESDP is *not* – and how it consequently does not require changes in Finnish foreign and security policy (a telling example in this respect was the Prime Minister's Announcement 1/1999). This points to an intention to preserve, amid the changes, a certain degree of resonance with the traditional state identity elements. Nevertheless, the analysis of the domestic debate revealed a growing inconsistency between the emphasis put on continuity in the official discourse and the simultaneous reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts. Indeed, in phase II it was no longer possible to construct CFSP in the domestic discourse as simply being fully compatible with the Finnish national foreign and security policy; the misfit between these two became so apparent, that a certain reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts and the meanings attached to them was inevitable.

During phase II the EU is increasingly perceived in the Finnish discourse as an actor that is relevant in the sphere of foreign and security policy and has started to play a role in the international security policy environment. Contrast to what was the case in phase I, concepts like "European values" and "the common European value base" are put forward as factors from which the goals of Finnish foreign and security policy can be derived. The more integral embedding of the broad security concept in to the Finnish security policy (particularly in Government Report 2/2001) makes it also easier to stress the security policy significance of the EU. At the same time there is a considerable change in how CFSP's meaning for Finland is constructed. Whereas previously CFSP, and the EU-membership in general, was mainly seen as an instrument for Finland, with which to prove the European state identity and the direction that Finland has taken in the post-Cold War environment to the other international actors (see 4.7), in phase II CFSP becomes a more internalised element of the national discourse. Consequently, CFSP begins to effectively play a role in the Finnish state identity production process that

takes place through foreign and security policy. Thus European integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy now represents both a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment and a new means of self-identification. Whilst the CFSP development is given more relevance in the Finnish foreign and security policy thinking, the view on the international security environment and threat pictures remains basically unchanged (Government Reports 1/1997 and 2/2001 and Government proposal 20/2000 are similar to the key documents of phase I in this respect).<sup>279</sup> This permanency of the national assessment of the international situation increases the relevance of Europeanization in explaining the changes in the Finnish foreign and security policy in phase II. The inapplicability of neutrality has gained a dominant position in the domestic discourse, and the official policy states more directly and unequivocally than before that this is because of the EU membership. Neutrality is now more widely in the domestic debate perceived as an inapt way to promote national interest. The implications of Finland's political commitment to CFSP are more openly recognized and discussed in the national political debate. (This was evident, for instance, in the reactions to the rejection of the label "independent" when referring to the national defence in the Government Report 2/2001.) The traditional vehicles of identity production, that is the foreign and security policy concepts, are challenged by new perceptions – which, in turn, are more and more generated in the increasing interaction at the European level. In light of these findings the constructivist IR-theory's argument that international interaction influences the way national interest and state identity are reconstructed (see chapter 2.4) seems to hold water.

In phase I the expressed causes for changes in the Finnish approach on peacekeeping – and more specifically for amending peacekeeping legislation – were not primarily connected to European integration. Rather the change was constructed as a reaction and adaptation to the changed international environment. In Phase II the impact of European integration is visible when peacekeeping is reconstructed as crisis management. The definitions used in ESDP have a significant impact on how the new forms of peacekeeping, and the division into civilian crisis management and military crisis management, are perceived nationally. It can be concluded that the conceptual shift from peacekeeping towards crisis management, and the related changes in the meanings attached to peacekeeping as a central state identity element, represent a case of top-down, "thick" Europeanization. Thanks to EU-membership Finland has become exposed to new practices and structures of meaning that originate in ESDP. Furthermore, both a "supportive domestic discourse" and a "significant domestic policy change towards the

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<sup>279</sup> Similarly, the view concerning NATO-membership remains the same. OSCE's role, however, is on the wane in the domestic discourse. In addition to the routine references to "UN or OSCE mandate" when discussing crisis management the references to OSCE have become sporadic at best.



European policies”<sup>280</sup> were located in the analysis presented in this chapter. It was also shown that the issue of peacekeeping is unavoidably intertwined with the question of the character of Finland’s non-alignment. In the ongoing renegotiation of the Finnish post-Cold War state identity the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy comprise an institution that have started to provide Finland with new understandings of what Finnish interests are and what the appropriate means may be to pursue these interests.<sup>281</sup>

Yet, the analysis also pointed out persistent tendencies in the conceptual vehicles of identity production – but to a lesser extent than in the previous phase – particularly when they concern simultaneously both the issues of peacekeeping and alignment, as was often the case in phase II. When it comes to the different forms of military crisis management, a limit which can not be passed due to *national* reasons is still raised up. Non-participation in military enforcement is constructed as a legitimate and justified national restriction that stems from the traditional state identity element of Finland as a neutral and credible superpower of conventional peacekeeping. Thus ESDP, which is mostly perceived as crisis management in the Finnish discourse, can potentially contain issues that may produce difference between Finland and the other EU member states. All in all, however, in light of the analysis of phase I and phase II it can be concluded that there appears to be a clear tendency towards more Europeanized foreign and security policy in which national preconditions and constraints for participation in CFSP are fading.

Unlike in phase I, both directions of Europeanization, national adaptation and national projection were located in phase II. Together with Sweden Finland proposed the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks of WEU in the Amsterdam treaty and into CFSP. As a result crisis management became an important part of CFSP. On one hand the purpose with the initiative was to clarify the relationship between the EU and WEU and start developing the EU’s capacity and instruments to act independently in conflict prevention and crisis management. On the other hand, Finland and Sweden wanted to prevent the merger of WEU and the EU and keep common defence out of the EU and highlight crisis management in CFSP instead of the defence dimension. It was presented in the analysis that this was a clear case of national adaptation: Finland tried to reduce the perceived misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy by exporting nationally defined interests and goals into the EU level, instead of being reactive and making adjustments in its policy in compliance with the requirements of the EU. The ideational export in the case was successful in that the uploading led to the emergence of new policies and structures at the EU level. However, it was also unsuccessful in that eventually the Amsterdam Treaty came to refer to the ”tasks of combat forces in crisis

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<sup>280</sup> Schmidt 2002, 900. See chapter 2.2 on the facilitating factors of Europeanization.

<sup>281</sup> See chapter 2.2 on sociological institutionalisms. DiMaggio&Powell 1991, 11; Aspinwall&Schneider 2000, 9.

management including peace-making” instead of “crisis management” as was proposed by Finland and Sweden. Additionally, it was observed that despite its partial success the national projection resulted in unintended side-effects that were not in line with Finland’s original goals. The Amsterdam Treaty and the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks was followed by a rapid development of the European security and defence policy which eventually led to further pressures towards national adaptation. Especially during its EU Council Presidency Finland got entangled in deepening integration in the area of security and defence policy. In the domestic level this led to a situation in which the ESDP was open to redefinitions and to competing political argumentation on what ESDP is and what it is not, what are its impacts on Finland’s foreign and security policy, how it changes Finnish approach on peacekeeping and the new forms of crisis management (including peace-making), and to which extent it is compatible with the Finnish non-alignment policy.

The national projection clearly stemmed from the traditional state identity elements that relate both to the categories of peacekeeping and alignment. In this context military non-alignment served as the motivation for trying to change the assumed direction of CFSP development. But at the same time non-alignment was also constructed as a feature that brings added value to Finnish crisis management. In similar vein a Nordic element was still connected to the Finnish crisis management activities and is presented as a sign and an assurance of continuity. In addition to the joint initiative with Sweden, references to the successful Nordic cooperation in UN peacekeeping over the years<sup>282</sup> in the official foreign and security policy served the purpose of preserving resonance with the traditional state identity elements.

### *Towards the third phase*

In many ways the misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy and CFSP becomes more obvious in the third phase of the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy (2003-2007) to be analysed in the next chapter. For instance, national foreign and security policy, and the related legislation, is changed in order to enable the participation in the EU’s battle groups. Phase II witnessed changes in the relationship between national defence and international crisis management. The domestic discussion on the security and defence policy significance of the EU continues and becomes more intense in phase III, as issues like ESDP operations, European Security Strategy and the debate on ESDP’s defence dimension and EU security guarantees enter the stage.

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<sup>282</sup> For instance: “Well-established Nordic cooperation in peacekeeping” and “experience of Nordic crisis management cooperation in conjunction with UN peacekeeping tasks” (Government Report 1/1997, 34).

As a part of the evolving self-identification as a fully politically committed and aligned EU-member state, the meaning of "small stateness" is reconstructed more clearly in phase III than previously. Earlier the concept was chiefly used in referring to the legitimate security interest of a small state, which implied that Finland is something different from the others, and thus legitimately remains outside of some aspects of CFSP. In phase III small stateness begins to be increasingly defined in relation to EU integration, and small stateness as a state identity element is increasingly understood as a small EU member state identity. Instead of national preconditions and constraints this implies supporting issues like the external capacity of the EU, intergovernmentalism, equal right of participation, regulation of flexible integration in the second pillar, and jointly decided goals and timetables. It is seen that it is in the foreign and security policy interests of a small member state to promote the EU as a strong international actor and this way to use the EU to increase national influence in the world.

## 6. Third phase (2003-2007): “Neither neutral nor non-aligned”

*“As a member of the European Union, Finland is neither neutral nor non-aligned; rather Finland is committed to the Union’s objectives and activities.”* (Prime Minister Vanhanen 4.4.2004)<sup>283</sup>

### 6.1 Introduction

During the previous phase, between 1997 and 2002, a build-up of treaties, political agreements and institutions regarding CFSP took place, and ESDP was declared functional in 2001. In the third phase ESDP proceeds on a very practical level as the EU crisis management operations begin. European troops are deployed for the first time under ESDP in Macedonia in 2003, and Finland participates in this first EU military crisis management operation (Concordia) with a small contingent staff of nine officers. The rapid reaction force – EU battle groups – are set to be in call by 2007, and Finland decides to participate in two units. Moreover, common defence policy becomes more visible in the EU agenda: European Convention’s proposal for the Constitutional Treaty includes among other things a mutual defence article and solidarity clause. Thus, compared to the previous phases significant novel features now emerge in CFSP which impact its character as the source of Europeanization pressure. The analysis presented in this chapter shows how ESDP challenges the national policy instruments used to achieve policy goals, and the compatibility of Finnish military non-alignment with the developed ESDP becomes an increasingly questioned issue in the domestic debate. Different views surface as to the way how national interest is to be defined and promoted as a (small) EU member state. Moreover, a growing misfit is perceived between EU crisis management and Finnish peacekeeping legislation. Invoking non-alignment identity amidst the rapid ESDP development appears in the form of a national projection as Finnish groups together with the neutral and non-aligned member states (Ireland, Austria, Sweden) during the IGC of 2003-2004 and opposes any provisions containing formal binding security guarantees as they are seen to be inconsistent with Finnish security policy. Soon after that, however, the Government Report on Finnish security and defence policy implies that Finnish policy is adapted to the new features of ESDP. Full commitment to ESDP is reconstructed as being in the security interests of Finland.

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<sup>283</sup> Prime Minister’s Review of Foreign and Security Policy (Vanhanen 2004).

The following empirical analysis shows how military crisis management turns into an established and less contested concept in the Finnish foreign and security policy vocabulary, and eventually appears in the title of the new peacekeeping legislation. In contrast to the previous phases, it is clearly manifested that it is the ESDP and Finnish participation in EU civil and military crisis management operations and battle groups that necessitate the amending of the Finnish peacekeeping policy and legislation. At the same time, other indications of Europeanization are also observed in phase III, as the perceived importance of CFSP and ESDP for national foreign and security policy increase.

Such features of thin Europeanization and national adaptation as “bureaucratic reorganization”, “constitutional change”, and “differential empowerment” (see the theoretical discussion in chapter 2.3) are also observable in phase III. It will be described in the following, for instance, how the nascent issue regarding CFSP’s impact on the national division of power turns into an open political dispute – a “constitutional crisis”, as it is labelled in the domestic debate – between those supporting the President’s power and those more in favour of handing all ESDP decisions to the Prime Minister and the Government. This dispute becomes topical due to a “Europeanization automation”: as European integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy deepens, issues that traditionally belonged to the President are turning into “internal” EU affairs that according to the constitution belong to the Prime Minister and the Government. Consequently, conserving the President’s standing in foreign and security policy would require changes in the national political interpretations. However, there are different views in the domestic debate as to whom CFSP issues and decisions on EU crisis management actually belong to, and whether it is a question of foreign policy or EU policy.

All in all, there are plenty of signs of a transitional stage taking place concerning the way in which ESDP is perceived and used in political argumentation in the domestic level. As an MP summarizes in the parliamentary debate, the Finnish security and defence white book (Government Report 6/2004) “represents a turning point or transitional phase in the Finnish foreign and security policy. We are no longer making foreign and security policy alone but together with the EU. This is a particularly difficult change for Finland, which is reflected in the conceptual uncertainty [of the report].”<sup>284</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> MP Cronberg 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

### *Notes on the main material*

The material analysed in the third phase centres around three key themes in the domestic debate. The first bulk of material relates to the national parliamentary debate on the EU Convention and the Constitutional Treaty's aspects regarding EU defence policy. The Convention's proposals were discussed in conjunction with the national preparations for the following IGC. The related main documents include the Government Report 2/2003 (Government Report to Parliament on the outcome of the work of the European Convention and on preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference) as well as the Foreign Affairs Committee's Report 4/2003 and Defence Committee Statement 2/2003. The *ad hoc* cooperation among the neutral and non-aligned countries takes form as a letter by the Foreign Ministers of Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden to the Italian European Council Presidency, on the subject of "IGC 2003 and European Security and Defence Policy, 5 December 2003. Additional material on the topic is provided by the related speeches by the Finnish Foreign Minister.

Secondly, there are the documents and discussions that relate to the Finnish security and defence white book, that is the Government Report titled Finnish Security and Defence Policy (Government Report 6/2004). A central theme of the related parliamentary debates and Committee reports and statements (Defence Committee Report 1/2004, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004) is the ESDP development's impact on Finnish military non-alignment. Thirdly, Finland's participation in the EU's crisis management operations and in the EU battle groups is handled in various Government Reports (3/2003, 5/2004, 8/2006 and 2/2007) and the related Committee reports and statements as well as parliamentary debates.

Finally, the process of amending the crisis management legislation provides interesting material which touches upon the so-called constitutional crisis in Finland – an event in which the Government was prepared to amend the Constitution after the Parliament's Constitutional Law Committee's critical statement (54/2005) regarding its first proposal for the crisis management law (Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis Management). Eventually the Government decided to use other means and the new law is passed as a so-called exceptive act of permanent nature (Government proposal 5/2006). From the Europeanization perspective it is highly interesting to note that the EU's perceived impact on the national foreign and security policy is in the very heart of this issue: a key question and the source political disputes was the domestic division of power in issues relating to ESDP (see chapter 6.3.2). Additional material in the third phase relate for instance to the law on civil crisis management, delineation of threat modes, and Finnish positions on the European Security Strategy (2003) (Government

proposal 206/2004, Government Decision 27.11.2003, Council of State's Account 15/2003, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 2/2003).

## 6.2 Reconstructing non-alignment and committing to ESDP

### 6.2.1 National projection: *The misfit between security guarantees and non-alignment*

The European Convention on the future of the European Union drew up a proposal for a European Constitution that served as a starting point for the Intergovernmental Conference of 2003-2004.<sup>285</sup> The proposal contained issues that related to the development of a common security and defence policy, including a solidarity clause and an article of mutual defence. The mutual defence article was rewritten during the IGC so that it would introduce within the sphere of Union an obligation to provide mutual military assistance. For Finland this meant that regarding ESDP merely as crisis management became more difficult, and Finland was forced to formulate and speak out its approach on common defence policy on a more concrete level than previously. Indeed, the Finnish Government stated that security and defence policy was an essential issue in the Convention's proposal and the consequent ICG.<sup>286</sup> The Prime Minister noted that there were three key issues in the proposal from the Finnish perspective: establishment of European Defence Agency, new common defence formulations, and structural cooperation. Additionally, the Government Report 2/2003 and the Foreign Affairs Committee's Report 4/2003 draw attention for instance to the solidarity clause.<sup>287</sup> Eventually, the two most visible issues in the domestic debate on the European Convention's work on ESDP were the structural cooperation and mutual defence clause.<sup>288</sup> On both Finland adopted a negative stance and set the national goal that both

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<sup>285</sup> According to the Laeken Declaration (2001) the aim of this Convention was to examine four key questions on the future of the Union: the division of powers, the simplification of the treaties, the role of the national parliaments and the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The inaugural meeting of the Convention was held on 28 February 2002, and it concluded its work on 10 July 2003 after reaching agreement on a proposal for a European Constitution. The proposal served as the starting point for IGC of 2003/2004. The Constitution was signed on 29 October 2004. France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in 2005, and a new Reform Treaty was drawn up by ICG of 2007. The Heads of State and Government of the 27 Member States of the European Union signed the Treaty of Lisbon on the 13th of December 2007. (Government Information Unit 2002.)

<sup>286</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 2.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>287</sup> Article 42 (Solidarity clause) of the Convention's draft treaty stated that: "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster." (European Convention 2003.)

<sup>288</sup> Convention's proposal on the establishment of European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency is largely accepted, but it is added that the increasing of military capabilities should not be included in the treaty as it is "not

structural cooperation and mutual defence clause should be removed from the Constitutional Treaty draft during the IGC, since they are not in the Finnish interest.<sup>289</sup>

To this purpose Finland convened the other non-aligned countries, Austria, Ireland and Sweden, to formulate a common stand on the issue. They objected structural cooperation and a mutual defence clause within the EU and proposed a less automatic and more voluntary wording for the common defence clause: “If a member state is victim of armed aggression, *it may request* that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter” (Letter by Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden to the IGC, 5 December 2003, emphasis added). Justifications that the neutral and non-aligned countries presented in support for their proposal centred on the issue of unity and openness of CFSP. They argued that a division of members into different categories – those not able to participate in all defence cooperation (i.e. non-aligned countries) versus others – should be avoided. Otherwise there is a risk that the mutual defence clause results in splitting the Union and weakening the CFSP.<sup>290</sup> However, the wording proposed by the non-aligned countries was not accepted in the IGC. Instead the Treaty text came to state that the member states had an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, and adding a reference that can be seen to point to the neutral and non-aligned countries: “this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States” (Article I-41, paragraph 7).<sup>291</sup> (van Eekelen 2006, 170; Ojanen 2007 37-38.)

Compared to the previous phases this case is exceptional in the sense that Finland openly invoked to its non-alignment and presented CFSP potentially contradictory with it. The four foreign ministers straightforwardly stated that “provisions containing formal binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our security policy or with our constitutional requirements”.<sup>292</sup> This ad hoc-cooperation among the neutral and non-aligned countries represents an interesting case of bottom-up Europeanization, that is to say national projection in foreign and security policy. The attempt to solve the misfit

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appropriate for the nature of a constitutional treaty” (Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003, Defence Committee Statement 2/2003, Government Report 2/2003).

<sup>289</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 2.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003; Government Report 2/2003; Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee Chair notes that it may well be that Finland will fail in this (MP Jaakonsaari, Foreign Affairs Committee chair, 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003).

<sup>290</sup> See also Foreign Minister Tuomioja in the Financial Times 28.10.2003: “Europe needs to work as a whole on defence”. Tuomioja and the Swedish Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds in Dagens Nyheter 11.11.2003. Tuomioja’s speech in Paris 2.12.2003: “For a genuinely European defence.”

<sup>291</sup> The referenda in France and the Netherlands delayed and complicated the Constitutional Treaty process. However, in Finland the process proceeded on the basis of the IGC results towards the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. Government Report on the Treaty was presented to the Parliament in 25.11.2005 and the Finnish Parliament eventually ratified the Treaty in 5.12.2006.

<sup>292</sup> Letter by Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden to the IGC of 5 December.



between CFSP and national foreign and security policy is not done by reactively adapting to the demands of the evolving CFSP. Instead, Finland is trying hard to influence the EU-level and promote nationally defined goals and ideas that better resonate with the domestic norms and collective understandings that stem from the non-alignment element in the Finnish state identity. This was the first time such a group of neutral and non-aligned EU countries acted together. By identifying itself to such group Finland underlined the different character of its state identity compared to the other EU member states. Thus it is not a surprise that despite the official stated reasons for the national projection (openness and unity of CFSP) the domestic debate in Finland focused on the question of Finnish military non-alignment and ESDP's impact on it. This shows that it is the question of compatibility between military non-alignment and mutual defence plans where the actual misfit pressure stems from.

The Prime Minister explained to the parliament that the key problem in structural cooperation is that participation in it would not be open to all, but those already participating in it would be able to decide if any latecomers are accepted. The Prime Minister concluded that this goes against the principles of the Union that stress unity.<sup>293</sup> The government's official objective was that ESDP is developed so that it enhances the unity of the Union.<sup>294</sup> Therefore, it is found unwanted that a smaller group of member states could decide on the mutual defence clause to be included in the Constitutional Treaty. Additionally, it is argued that the mutual defence clause would be problematic since it created partially overlapping commitments with NATO's articles.<sup>295</sup> Although the Government's argument on openness and EU unity touched a chord in the Finnish parliamentary debate,<sup>296</sup> the domestic debate centres around the relationship between Finnish non-alignment and the defence clause. The Prime Minister also refers to the problems in combining a traditional conception of non-alignment with all the aspects of the solidarity clause (including using military resources in natural catastrophes and antiterrorism).<sup>297</sup> Yet, the Prime Minister concludes that Finland will hold on to non-alignment and seeks for a solution in the IGC that suits the non-alignment countries too.<sup>298</sup> At this stage non-alignment determines the way Finland approaches the developing of ESDP.

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<sup>293</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 2.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>295</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 3.9.2003 preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003 and 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>296</sup> E.g. MP Kiviniemi, MP Hautala 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003; MP Takkula, MP Kiljunen 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>297</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>298</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 27.11.2003

From the early stages in the Constitutional Treaty process Finland had a negative stance on the common defence dimension of the ESDP.<sup>299</sup> The government Report on the outcome of the work of the European Convention and on preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference (Government Report 2/2003) found that writing the common defence clause into the Constitutional Treaty is not in the Finnish interest. This view was supported by the Foreign Affairs Committee which noted that the mutual defence clause would mean incorporating an element that is typical for defence alliances into the EU.<sup>300</sup> This argument is also brought forward in the parliamentary debate.<sup>301</sup> A number of MP's point to the perceived incompatibility of mutual defence and military non-alignment. According to them Finland's response should build on Finland's non-alignment identity and Finland should act together with Sweden and the other non-aligned member states.<sup>302</sup> They find that Finnish military non-alignment would be invalidated if a mutual defence clause was included in the Constitution Treaty. This theme was highlighted also by an objection statement in the Foreign Affairs Committee Report as well as by a dissenting opinion in the Defence Committee Statement.<sup>303</sup> On the other hand, the usefulness of non-alignment in securing Finland's position in the changing Europe is also questioned in the parliamentary debate (mainly by the main opposition party). As the threat pictures have changed, the argument goes, it might well be that non-alignment is outdated and thus no longer the best tool for Finnish interests.<sup>304</sup> Consequently, it is concluded that Finland should find its way to the EU's core in defence and security policy too.<sup>305</sup> Nevertheless, the Defence Minister states that military non-alignment means not that Finland would be passive or isolating itself, but rather that Finland is willing to cooperate in the EU and actively looks for cooperation in the EU. He finds that military non-alignment fits in the picture since the EU is not becoming a military power of military alliance.<sup>306</sup> However, the Defence Minister adds that a reflection and debate on the pros and cons of non-alignment and alignment will take place in the context of the forthcoming Government Report on Finnish security and defence policy next year.<sup>307</sup>

As was the case with the national projection that related to the Petersberg tasks (see chapter 5.2), the Government's declared reasons in this case are substantially different

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<sup>299</sup> Council of State's EU Secretariat 20.12.2002.

<sup>300</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003.

<sup>301</sup> MP Siimes 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003, Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003.

<sup>302</sup> E.g. MP Kauppila 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>303</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003, Defence Committee Statement 2/2003, MP Siimes, MP Ojala 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>304</sup> MP Vilén, MP Katainen (National Coalition Party) 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003; MP Sasi (National Coalition Party) 27.11.2003, question time: EU's common defence.

<sup>305</sup> MP Kuosmanen, MP Vilén 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>306</sup> Defence Minister Kääriäinen 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*

than those on which the domestic debate focuses. The actual reasons initiating the national projection point to the persistence of the non-alignment element in the Finnish state identity. The key reason why the national projection attempt took place clearly relates to the perceived misfit between the Finnish military non-alignment and the direction ESDP appeared to be heading in light of the IGC negotiations. The dominant domestic discourse constructs momentarily almost an existential mismatch between the Finnish policy of military non-alignment and the EU mutual defence clause: both cannot exist at the same time. However, this construction proves out to be rather short-lived. As will be discussed below, as the national projection fails, Finland is forced to rethink and reconstruct the meaning of (military) non-alignment. In the official interpretation military non-alignment is reconstructed as a more technical and less political qualifier that refers mostly to the way in which national defence is organized and implemented in practice. This reconstruction enables a stronger commitment to all dimensions of ESDP.

### 6.2.2 Adapting military non-alignment to ESDP

The unsuccessful bottom-up Europeanization attempt of the neutral and non-aligned countries resulted in a situation where a misfit between non-alignment and ESDP was highlighted and produced to the EU's political agenda but was not solved the way these countries proposed. Thus the question of how to tackle this misfit remained on the Finnish domestic agenda after the ICG too.<sup>308</sup> There was a need to find other ways to remove the perceived misfit in the relationship of Finnish military non-alignment and the developing ESDP. Consequently, further Europeanization via national adaptation followed, and military non-alignment and ESDP remained a visible topic in the domestic debate when the Finnish security and defence policy white book (Government Report 6/2004) was prepared and discussed. The Finnish non-alignment was further reconstructed to comply with the EU-level norms and expectations and a new interpretation of Finland's non-alignment concept and policy was introduced: military non-alignment was reconstructed as a less political and more technical concept which referred to the way how national defence was organized (meaning simply that Finland is not a member of a military alliance) and which did "not describe Finnish foreign policy in any broader sense than that".<sup>309</sup> Calls for casting off the whole concept of military non-alignment were also presented in the parliamentary debate.

In light of the Government Report 6/2004 and the related parliamentary debate the EU's overall security policy significance for Finland is domestically considered significantly greater than in the previous phases. This perception appears to be based on two factors. Firstly, many addresses concur that the deepening of integration within the EU has increased the stability of Finland's near environs. A view that has gained ground is that the EU forms a "security community" and the most important security and defence policy framework for Finland.<sup>310</sup> The Defence Committee states that significant progress has taken place in the EU's security and defence policy since 2001 and the previous Finnish defence policy report. The Committee refers to Headline Goal 2010, the crisis management operations executed in Macedonia (FYROM) and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the establishing of the European

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<sup>308</sup> Another topic in the debate causing contradicting political argumentation was the question what actually was the Government's policy during the IGC and how the Government's policy had changed afterwards. Different views were presented as to did Finland really try to prevent the binding EU security clause (e.g. MP Katainen, MP Tiura 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004) or was it question of negotiation tactics which helped to formulate the articles into a more specific and better form (Foreign Minister Tuomioja 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004).

<sup>309</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 29.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004, Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>310</sup> Government Report 6/2004, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, MP Jaakonsaari 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

Defence Agency.<sup>311</sup> Secondly, there is now a widely shared and increasingly visible view that in the changing global environment, security threats extend beyond national borders and Finland is more vulnerable to the “new” security threats than before. The EU is regarded capable of tackling such threats and this consequently increases the significance of the EU and its capacity for action for Finland’s security.<sup>312</sup> The Defence Committee draws a connection between the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Finnish defence policy and regards “the Finnish threat and crisis scenarios as a justified application, on the regional level, of the threat scenarios defined in the strategy concerning all of Europe”.<sup>313</sup> Indeed, many of the “new” security threats described in ESS – such as terrorism, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, as well as global and cross-border security problems – have been included in the Finnish white books since the Government Report 1/1995 (Security in the Changing World, see chapter 4). Therefore the ESS in itself is not felt to cause any particular misfit pressures towards Finnish policy, but is rather perceived compatible with the Finnish foreign and security policy. The references to civil crisis management in ESS are highlighted and found coherent with Finnish views.<sup>314</sup> Furthermore, for instance the Foreign Affairs Committee had found the nature of the Strategy to be general and non-binding, and concluded that the Strategy can thus only serve as general basis for the preparation of the Finnish security and defence policy white book.<sup>315</sup>

Yet, despite the growing consensus on the EU’s security policy significance for Finland, there are different views as to how deeply Finland should be committed to ESDP, particularly when it comes to practical issues. The debate centres on issues such as EU battle groups and mutual defence guarantees and military crisis management operations, and their implications on military non-alignment. The ESDP development included in the Constitutional Treaty is now found welcome by the Government, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee. This is because they now find that the solidarity clause, the agreement on the provision of assistance, the structural cooperation and the European Defence Agency strengthen the EU as an international actor and belong to the logical progress for strengthening the Union’s capability to function. Similarly, the European Security Strategy is supported on the basis that it strengthens the EU as a security community and an international actor.<sup>316</sup> In this respect a key message of the

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<sup>311</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004.

<sup>312</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 3, 6; also MP Jaakonsaari 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004, Defence Committee Report 1/2004.

<sup>313</sup> On the other hand the Committee also feels that “the differences of the European Security Strategy threat scenarios compared to Finland’s national crisis and threat scenarios should also have been evaluated in the report.” (Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 13)

<sup>314</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 27.11.2003, question time: EU’s common defence, Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 2/2003.

<sup>315</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 2/2003.

<sup>316</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 3, 10. Defence Committee Report 1/2004.

Report appears to be that Finland is fully committed to ESDP, including those issues that were during the IGC and Convention perceived inconsistent with Finnish non-alignment. It is now stated that Finland "participates fully in developing and implementing the common security and defence policy. Finland is developing its capability and readiness to participate in the EU's civilian crisis management activities and military crisis management operations, including rapid response forces. (...) Finland contributes to the forming of permanent structured cooperation and takes part in the Union's capabilities cooperation and the activities of the European Defence Agency."<sup>317</sup>

It is also stated that the EU now has impact on the way Finnish defence is developed: "Military defence will be developed so that Finland will be able to serve as an active member within the security community formed by the European Union and allocate the necessary military resources for actions required under Union obligations. (...) Finland is developing adequately trained and equipped troops who can be dispatched rapidly to a crisis area and are capable of undertaking demanding action."<sup>318</sup> The Report also states that "the preparedness to support other authorities as required by the European Union solidarity clause will be taken into account in defence planning."<sup>319</sup> Yet, at the same time the Government Report states that Finland develops its defence capability as a militarily non-allied country.<sup>320</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee actually notes that the report is "partly structurally inconsistent. For instance, the relationship between the description of the security environment and the lines of action is inadequately portrayed."<sup>321</sup>

The way the Finnish approach on ESDP is presented in the Government Report 6/2004 indicates that the purpose of the Government is now to reduce the misfit between the future ESDP and Finnish foreign and security policy by national adaptation rather than by national projection. Issues for which changes were sought in the context of IGC together with the other neutral and non-aligned countries are no longer constructed by the Government as inconsistent with Finnish non-alignment. This is done firstly by emphasizing in the domestic debate that the EU is not a military alliance but rather "an unique international actor" possessing a wide range of tools for tackling the current new security threats.<sup>322</sup> The Defence Committee shares the Government's view in that it sees that the European Union cannot be regarded as a military alliance, since no decision has

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<sup>317</sup> Government Report 6/2004, 6.

<sup>318</sup> Government Report 6/2004, 7.

<sup>319</sup> Government Report 6/2004, 102.

<sup>320</sup> Government Report 6/2004, 5.

<sup>321</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 6.

<sup>322</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

been made that the EU member states will enter into common defence.<sup>323</sup> Furthermore, it is argued that the build-up of EU capacity for more demanding tasks and rapid response is a continuity to military crisis management, and thus in line with the kind of ESDP development that Finland has always supported. It is underlined that the development is also based on EU policies, and treaties that already exist and have been agreed upon previously, and thus cause no problems for Finnish involvement.<sup>324</sup> Concerning the Constitutional Treaty's solidarity clause (Article I-43) and provisions relating to common security and defence policy (Article I-41) it is argued that they both contribute to the political solidarity of the EU and consequently strengthen Finnish security. They make the EU a political solidarity community that will not leave a single member state alone in a state of emergency.<sup>325</sup>

Yet, in the parliamentary debate it is questioned what the agreement of assistance in the event of an attack actually means in practice. It is asked for instance how the security guarantees would apply to militarily non-aligned member states, and how the solidarity clause and the mutual defence clause affect Finland's security policy situation.<sup>326</sup> A "conceptual battle" on these questions as well as on the quality of Finnish non-alignment takes place in the context of Government Report 6/2004. A conclusion gaining ground in the domestic debate is that the increasing commitment to ESDP implies that Finland is inescapably Europeanized to such a degree that the credibility of the concept of military non-alignment begins to falter. The main opposition party (National Coalition Party) sees that non-alignment as a concept is no longer applicable since Finland takes part in the EU security policy, including the military security clause:

"The EU can be characterised not only as a security community but as a defence community, too. We have received security guarantees from the other member states and we are committed to assist others in a case of an emergency. (...) Therefore Finland can no longer be considered a militarily non-aligned country in the traditional sense."<sup>327</sup>

This view is supported by MP's from other parties too.<sup>328</sup> In the end, the Parliament votes on the interpretation of Finnish non-alignment: contrast to the Government Report the main opposition party proposed that since Finland is committed to the EU and the solidarity clause and security guarantees, Finland can not be considered a militarily non-

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<sup>323</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 20; also e.g. MP Lankia 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>324</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>325</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004, MP Backman 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>326</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 11; MP Katainen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004, Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 20.

<sup>327</sup> MP Katainen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>328</sup> E.g. MP Gestrin 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

aligned country in a traditional sense. Those arguing that Finnish commitment to ESDP development renders the non-alignment concept inapplicable pointed to the military assistance included in the EU's mutual security guarantees. They also state that it is obvious that EU members shall not remain neutral in conflicts that involve another EU member. Additionally "the EU's rapid action battle groups" are referred to and labelled as a national defence issue (see more on this topic in chapter 6.3 below).<sup>329</sup> Consequently, it is argued that the term should be removed, also because it only causes unnecessary confusion and disagreement in the domestic debate on the political, economical and military dimensions of non-alignment.<sup>330</sup> It is also highlighted that the majority of the other EU members consider non-alignment as a relic from the Cold War.<sup>331</sup> All in all, although the justifications presented in the debate vary, a repeated conclusion is that Finland should cast aside the outdated concept of military non-alignment.<sup>332</sup> Moreover, the main reason for this originates from the European integration: Finland's foreign and security policy is considered to have been Europeanized beyond military non-alignment.

Eventually 42 MPs supported the proposal, 149 voted against it and thus supported the Government Report and its interpretation of non-alignment.<sup>333</sup> However, compared to the previous phases, the Government's interpretation also implies a reconstructed non-alignment concept. The Government states that Finland maintains and develops its defence capability as a militarily non-allied country and monitors the changes in its security environment.<sup>334</sup> The Government admits that the definition of non-alignment has become narrower – the term now refers only to the way how Finland organizes its defence: "Finland is not a member of any military alliance, and thus develops its own national defence as a non-aligned country."<sup>335</sup> The Prime Minister emphasizes that military non-alignment does not describe Finnish foreign policy in any broader sense than that.<sup>336</sup> The Foreign Minister adds that military non-alignment is "merely a technical statement, not a manifesto".<sup>337</sup> As an MP summarizes in the parliamentary debate, the view is that since Finland is not a member of NATO, this makes Finland militarily non-aligned, whereas EU membership implies that Finland is politically and

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<sup>329</sup> E.g. MP Katainen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>330</sup> MP Kallis 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>331</sup> MP Nurmi 29.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>332</sup> E.g. MP Hautala 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2003, 29.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004, MP Anttila 20.12.2004, MP Lahti 20.12.2004, MP Häkämies 20.12.2004, MP Vilén 20.12.2004, MP Gestrin 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>333</sup> Parliament's plenary session 21.12.2004.

<sup>334</sup> Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>335</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>336</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>337</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 29.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004



economically aligned.<sup>338</sup> As to the EU battle groups' implications on Finnish military non-alignment the Government's reply at this stage is that they concern merely crisis management and are not valid for territorial national defence and do not relate to common defence at all.<sup>339</sup>

It is worth noting that despite this debate and the vote on the status and relevance of the military non-alignment concept, the Prime Minister calls for consensus in foreign and security policy and finds it an essential principle for a small country like Finland.<sup>340</sup> The view supported by the MPs who still find that unanimity not only should, but still does reign when it comes to the fundamentals of Finnish security and defence.<sup>341</sup> This highlights the persistence of the consensus thinking in Finnish foreign and security policy – it is referred to even amongst visible disagreements on the quality of Finnish non-alignment. The main opposition party, though, notes bluntly that the option to disagree on foreign and security policy is part of the present-day modern democracy.<sup>342</sup> The politicization of national security policy that initially started in the first phase (1994-1996, see chapter 4.5) has continued and reached a point in which consensus is no longer found that essential and necessary an element of a small state's foreign and security policy. An additional factor that also affects the diversification of the domestic debate is the parliamentarization of foreign and security policy. When the Government Report 6/2004 is discussed many MPs note that the Parliament's influence on foreign and security policy has increased.<sup>343</sup> Post-consensus and parliamentarization seem to go hand in hand.

New views as to the implications of small state identity for Finnish EU policy become evident in the debate in other ways too. A trend that was observed already in phase II gains strength: an effective EU in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy is constructed as an advantage for a small state like Finland. The ESDP is seen as the most effective means for a small state to influence its own security. Consequently, an increasing number of the MPs see that it is in the Finnish interest to fully commit itself to ESDP and support its goals.<sup>344</sup> Together with this perception a new meaning for small stateness is emerging in the domestic discourse. In this reading small state as an element of Finnish state identity increasingly refers to a "small EU member state identity" and is less characterised by qualities such as "marginal" or "border state" or "small

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<sup>338</sup> MP Ranta-Muotio 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>339</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004 and 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>340</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>341</sup> E.g. MP Kallis, MP Rautakangas 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>342</sup> MP Katainen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>343</sup> This is noted by many MPs in the debate on the Government Report 6/2004, e.g. MP Ranta-Muotio, MP Jaakonsaari 29.8.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>344</sup> E.g. MP Vilén 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

population”. Consequently, this type of new small state identity should now also form the basis for national foreign and security policy thinking. This is to say that solely national thinking should be replaced by activism inside the EU: Finland should formulate and promote security policy goals for the EU. The reconstructed small state identity entails that as a small state Finland should be active in supporting further integration in the sphere of CFSP. Furthermore, mere technical adaptation in the domestic level is not sufficient but the small state should profile itself as a dynamic initiator. The small state can be an active and competent member of the security community EU, and can also ”upload” its national policies and use the EU in achieving national foreign and security policy goals.<sup>345</sup> This is to say that despite military non-alignment national security policy is not to be carried out by national tools only, but also by the common European instruments. Although more traditional conclusions on small state interests are far from being extinct in the debate,<sup>346</sup> a reconstruction process has clearly started in which ”small state identity” is increasingly interpreted as ”small member state identity”.

However, a significant factor contributing to the persistence of the traditional small state identity ensues from geographical considerations. A difference between Finland and other EU members is still often reproduced by emphasizing that Finland possess the longest eastern border of all the EU members<sup>347</sup> and thus Finnish threat pictures are different than those of the rest of the Europe. Finland’s geographical position is also seen to differ from those of the other Nordic countries, and when Finland’s unique geographical position is highlighted this way, the conclusion typically is that Finland cannot focus on international crisis management operations and implement major structural changes in its defence system in the similar way the other EU members – as well as the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Denmark – do.<sup>348</sup> Therefore, despite the continuing strengthening of broad security and reinterpreted small state identity in the domestic discourse, the geographically oriented threat pictures remain significant and are used in the domestic debate when such aspects of Finnish defence policy as the territorial defence system and general conscription are discussed.<sup>349</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> E.g. MP Siimes 20.12.2004, MP Lindén 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004, MP Lindén 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2003.

<sup>346</sup> E.g. MP Karjula 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004: ”For a small nation this non-alignment – military non-alignment – may well be a wiser solution than we consider it to be in this rather superficial debate.”

<sup>347</sup> E.g. MP Satonen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004: ”We must remember that we have the longest Eastern border in the EU. Although it is currently peaceful, and will likely remain so in the near future, history has sorrowfully taught us that it has not always been the case.”

<sup>348</sup> E.g. MP Lahti 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>349</sup> ”Compared to other European countries, territorial defence, which is aimed at being renewed as described in the report and the common practice of general conscription continue to be the unique in Finland’s defence. The Committee considers both of them justified in the case of Finland in the future, as well.” (Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 21.)

Yet, this construction of difference and related traditional self-identification is increasingly challenged by the increasing emphasis on broad security conception. The “new” threat perceptions stemming from broad security are not that directly linked to geography, and thus do not contribute to the reproduction of difference between Finland and the other EU members the way the traditional threat pictures do. The Government Report is in fact criticized for containing a mixture of traditional and new threat perceptions: while the international environment has changed, the starting points of Finnish defence presented in the Government Report have remained unchanged.<sup>350</sup> It is noted in the parliamentary debate that the Government Report does not take broad security into consideration in its conclusions or practical recommendations. The Foreign Affairs Committee finds that the new security threats, international interdependence and the rapid development of the EU call for a more strategic thinking and reporting where the Finnish priorities regarding these issues are manifested.<sup>351</sup> Additionally, it is noted in the parliamentary debate that besides national defence, attention should be drawn to development issues, human rights, environmental cooperation, cooperation in education issues, public health, and civil crisis management.<sup>352</sup> Many addresses concur that in the current-day world the boundary between internal and external security is no longer that clear, and many new threats in the Finnish security environment, such as international crime and terrorism, actually concern internal security.<sup>353</sup> The Government replies by stating that internal security is present in the Report better than in any of the previous ones, and that the topic is likely to become more visible in the future reports.<sup>354</sup> The Foreign Trade and Development Minister mentions that crisis prevention, crisis management, humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation are interconnected issues, and should thus be better coordinated together.<sup>355</sup> A related topic that comes up in the debate is the division of labour between civil and military crisis management as well as between internal and foreign affairs. The Foreign Minister states that these two can be successfully combined in the Finnish approach.<sup>356</sup> The Defence Minister finds that more ministries ought to participate in the cooperation in crisis management, not just Defence Ministry and Foreign Affairs.<sup>357</sup> The former Interior Minister’s response is that despite the introduction of broad security conception the

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<sup>350</sup> E.g. MP Rajala 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>351</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee chair MP Jaakonsaari 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>352</sup> E.g. MP U. Anttila, MP Sirnö 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>353</sup> E.g. MP Väistö 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>354</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>355</sup> Foreign Trade and Development Minister Lehtomäki 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>356</sup> Foreign Minister Kanerva 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>357</sup> Government Report 6/2004, Defence Minister Häkämies 13.11.2007, also MP Haavisto 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

position of the Defence Ministry has become over-emphasized lately at the cost of the Ministry of the Interior in foreign and security policy-making.<sup>358</sup>

All in all, in phase III the connection between Finnish defence and international military cooperation in the EU is more clearly manifested. The Prime Minister states that crisis management increases national security, creates the capacity for international cooperation and makes it easier to receive assistance in a state of emergency.<sup>359</sup> The Government notes that international military cooperation is an essential part of Finland's security and defence policy, and it supports Finland's own defence.<sup>360</sup> Developing Finnish crisis management capability is justified more visibly than before as part of Finnish defence policy. The Government presents this as a change that is necessary because of the "changes in the operating environment" which requires the adoption of new modes of operation. Finland's military capability will be developed in line with changes in the operating environment, which will require the adoption of new modes of operation.<sup>361</sup> In practical terms this means that Finland's international crisis management capacity will be developed by taking into account the EU troops requirements, the performance requirements in NATO's Partnership for Peace planning and assessment process, and Nordic crisis management cooperation.<sup>362</sup> The Report states that Finland is making a full contribution to the development and implementation of the EU resource and materiel cooperation, and to the creation of new troops with greater capabilities.<sup>363</sup> This also implies that Finland will participate in more versatile and more demanding crisis management which requires "greater flexibility faster response and continuous adjustment to the changing security situation".<sup>364</sup> This materialized eventually in the Finnish participation in the EU battle groups, a topic analysed in the following.

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<sup>358</sup> MP Rajamäki 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>359</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>360</sup> Defence Minister Häkämies 12.12.2007, MP Haavisto 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>361</sup> Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>362</sup> Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>363</sup> Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>364</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 28.

### 6.3 From peacekeeping to military crisis management.

#### *6.3.1 The impact of ESDP operations and battle groups on Finnish peacekeeping legislation*

Pressure for change on Finnish peacekeeping legislation was not directly issued in the context of the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy (6/2004), but the Government had decided to present the amendment of the law as a separate process which takes place alongside the preparation of the white book.<sup>365</sup> The EU crisis management operations and EU battle groups heavily influenced the amending of the peacekeeping act. The EU military crisis management operations started with the Concordia operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2003 and Finland participated also in the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004.<sup>366</sup> After hearing the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee the Government presented the issue to the President who made the decision to participate in the Concordia operation. Because the operations included more demanding rules of engagement than in traditional peacekeeping<sup>367</sup> a handling at the parliament's plenary session was required according to peacekeeping legislation (see chapter 5.3.1).<sup>368</sup> The Government saw Concordia as the first practical test for the EU's military crisis management and a positive example for future operations. At the same time the Government presented Finnish participation in it as a natural continuation to the Finnish commitment to the stabilisation of the West-Balkans.<sup>369</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee briefly noted that participation supports the goals of Finnish foreign and security policy.<sup>370</sup> In the parliamentary debate the operation in Macedonia is conceived as a sign and example of new, deeper cooperation in CFSP to which the EU is committed. In contrast to the Government's perception, the operation is seen to represent a significant change and is connected to the European Convention and the debate on the EU's constitution, as well as to the potential implications of ESDP-operations on Finnish peacekeeping legislation.<sup>371</sup> The Foreign Minister, however, replies that participation in

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<sup>365</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, MP Katainen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>366</sup> Finnish troop contribution in Concordia was 9 participants and in Althea c.200 participants.

<sup>367</sup> Government Report 3/2003, Foreign Minister Tuomioja 14.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 5/2004.

<sup>368</sup> However, since the Parliament was on recess, it was not possible to organize a plenary handling on Concordia operation, and the issue was handled in the parliament later on.

<sup>369</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 10.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/2003; MP Lindqvist 14.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 5/2004.

<sup>370</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 3/2003.

<sup>371</sup> E.g. MP Brax, MP Nepponen 10.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/2003.

Concordia will not pose problems under the current peacekeeping legislation.<sup>372</sup> Nevertheless, as is it understood that Concordia will be followed by other EU crisis management operations, a view gaining ground is that amending the national peacekeeping legislation is inevitable. Additional pressure to that direction is caused by the plans concerning the EU battle groups, as it is decided that Finland will take part in two battle groups (Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian and German-Dutch-Finnish units).<sup>373</sup>

Both the EU crisis management operations and the battle groups are a significant source of top-down Europeanization in phase III. It was widely perceived in the domestic level that particularly the Finnish participation in the EU's rapid response force require re-evaluating the Finnish Act on Peace Support Operations. Compared to the previous phases (peacekeeping legislation was previously amended in 1995 and 2000, see chapters 4.3 and 5.3.1) it is more openly stated that it is the EU that causes pressure for change in Finnish foreign and security policy in this respect. A purpose of the new law on crisis management is to renew the legislation so that Finland can participate in the EU battle groups. In phase II the Government carefully avoided linking CFSP and changes in the national legislation (see chapter 5.3.1), but this time the Prime Minister draws a clear connection between EU crisis management and battle groups and the need to amend Finnish peacekeeping legislation.<sup>374</sup> This argumentation is widely used in different official documentation related to the legislation process<sup>375</sup> and EU crisis management is also frequently presented in the parliamentary debate as the main reason for the amending of the peacekeeping legislation.<sup>376</sup> It is also seen that since "military crisis management" as a term describes the EU's crisis management tasks better than the term "peacekeeping", it makes sense to change the title of the Finnish law so that instead of peacekeeping it refers to military crisis management (the official title being Act on

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<sup>372</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 10.9.2003, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/2003.

<sup>373</sup> In May 2004, the [rapid response] force was adopted as a part of the new overall target of the EU's headline goal, which forms the basis for developing crisis management (Headline Goal 2010)." (Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 29). Finnish contribution to the German-Dutch-Finnish battle group contained i.a. 120-160 military police, medical company, electronic reconnaissance. In the Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian battle group i.a. 180-220 combat support, staff officers, protection, renaissance, military police. Contributions to the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 consisted of a rapid reaction capability: 2000 mechanized infantry battalion, a headquarters and signal company, and engineering battalion, units specialized in CIMIC, a medium truck (transport) company, a minelayer, staff officers, military observers. Government Report 8/2006; Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>374</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>375</sup> See Rauhanurvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän mietintö 2005 [memorandum by the working group on the amending of the peacekeeping legislation], Defence Committee Report 1/2004, Government proposal 110/2005, Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>376</sup> E.g. MP Lehti 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004; MP Siimes, MP Jaakonsaari, 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005; MP Kekkonen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

Military Crisis Management).<sup>377</sup> Furthermore, it is argued that as military crisis management is an established concept internationally, it should be incorporated in the Finnish legislation.<sup>378</sup> Thus, a characteristic feature in phase III military is that military crisis management is turning into a less contested concept in the domestic discourse, and replaces peacekeeping in the title of the law. Consequently, although generally seen as a continuation to the previous debates on enhanced peacekeeping, peace enforcement and military coercion, it appears not to cause as strong and controversial political disagreement in the domestic level as was the case in the previous phases when the peacekeeping concept was redefined and enhanced.<sup>379</sup> The way the concept is defined rests strongly on the definitions of the EU. The Defence Committee, for instance, finds that the EU possesses unique civil and military capabilities for intervening in crises.<sup>380</sup> The way peacekeeping – one of the key elements in the Finnish state identity – is reconceptualised is clearly influenced by European integration and ESDP.

In the background of this reconceptualisation lies two types of misfits between the European and Finnish level. On one hand it is felt in that the national procedures and decision-making structures must be revised so that the mobilisation of a rapid response force for the needs of the EU operations and battle groups becomes possible.<sup>381</sup> There is a common understanding in the domestic debate that the EU battle group concept required a new kind of preparedness from the Defence Forces as well as more lubricant national decision-making.<sup>382</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee saw that since the troops should be deployable in the area of operations within ten days of the Council decision to launch the operation, the Finnish Parliament must be engaged considerably earlier than before when forming Finland's position prior to the Council's decision on an EU operation.<sup>383</sup> On the other hand, it is felt that in addition to the decision-making system and military capacity, the Finnish approach on peacekeeping is to be adapted so that it is in harmony with that of the EU.<sup>384</sup> Comparisons are also made to the other EU member states and their approaches on military crisis management and

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<sup>377</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30; Rauhanturvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän mietintö 2005 [memorandum by the working group on the amending of the peacekeeping legislation].

<sup>378</sup> E.g. MP Pentti 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; Defence Committee Statement 8/2005.

<sup>379</sup> However, there is a dissenting opinion in the Defence Committee Statement, according to which the term military crisis management is unclear, and military crisis management might also include acts of war. Defence Committee Statement 1/2006, MP Laakso.

<sup>380</sup> Defence Committee Statement 8/2005.

<sup>381</sup> See e.g. Government proposal 5/2006, 20.

<sup>382</sup> Government Report 8/2006. Defence Minister Kääriäinen 24.11.2006, preliminary debate on the Government Report 8/2006; MP Jaakonsaari 22.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 5/2004; MP Katainen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>383</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30.

<sup>384</sup> E.g. MP Kettunen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005.

rapid reaction forces.<sup>385</sup> A typical conclusion is that the Finnish approach on crisis management must be compatible with those of the other EU members, so that Finland can equally participate in preparations and the implementation of forthcoming tasks and missions.<sup>386</sup> In that sense an additional “horizontal” Europeanization pressure seems to prevail.

As was the case in the previous phases when peacekeeping legislation was amended there is direct time pressure for changes, in this case caused by the need to have the EU battle groups ready for deployment and for being on call in the beginning of the year 2007. Time was also needed for the national recruitment and agreeing on the conditions of employment. The Prime Minister told the parliament that “our political system has the responsibility for arranging the national decision-making procedures so that it will be in order by that time.”<sup>387</sup> These external time pressures dictated the schedule of the whole legislative process from preparatory work to parliament and committee handling.<sup>388</sup> The eventual outcome is an exceptionally multi-phased political process in which the Government decides to withdraw its first proposal for the new peacekeeping legislation (Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis Management) after the Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee Statement (54/2005), and plans to amend the Constitution instead. Eventually the new law is passed as a so called exceptive act of permanent nature in the spring 2006, based on Government proposal 5/2006 (see chapter 6.3.2 below). Hence crisis management is debated repeatedly and in many different occasions in the parliament and the committees.

National adaptation to ESDP and EU crisis management appears particularly in the form of casting aside the previous national preconditions and constraints for participation in international crisis management operation. A common conclusion in the domestic debate is that when Finland operates in EU battle groups, as well as in other multinational crisis management constellations, the Finnish troops must possess similar rules of use of force as the other participating nations do. The Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee note that differences in national rules of engagement are harmful for the credibility, functioning and security of the troops.<sup>389</sup> As it is the EU battle groups that dominate the domestic discussion on crisis management, the misfit is seen to exist specifically between the EU and Finland’s crisis management practices. In contrast to the previous phases national restrictions are now seen as a hindrance and problem rather

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<sup>385</sup> E.g. MP Pentti 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>386</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; see also Government proposal 5/2006, 19-20 on the crisis management legislation of some other EU member states.

<sup>387</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution.

<sup>388</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>389</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 1/2006, 13; Defence Committee Statement 1/2006. Also e.g. MP Nepponen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005.



than distinctive character of the Finnish peacekeeping traditions that secures and reproduces Finnish state identity (cf. chapter 5.3.1 and 4.3).

However, while military crisis management is incorporated into the Finnish peacekeeping approach, the civil crisis management dimension of ESDP is at the same time highlighted. The Defence Minister, for instance, refers to the improving of EU civil crisis management capability as a strengthening factor. He also states that linking civilian and military elements together in EU crisis management ensures that it is not a question of “war politics, but something completely different”.<sup>390</sup> The Foreign Minister presents the coupling of military and civilian actions as an unique feature in EU crisis management, making the EU a responsible crisis management organization instead of “a warring military alliance”.<sup>391</sup> The EU’s significance for Finland as the central international actor in the development of civil crisis management was also emphasized when the new law on civil crisis management was handled in the parliament.<sup>392</sup> Even though there is a widely shared concern in the domestic debate that the development of civil crisis management is too slow<sup>393</sup> much emphasis is put on the civilian dimension of EU crisis management in the discussions. Civil crisis management is a welcomed theme that is seen somehow naturally particularly suitable for Finland.<sup>394</sup> It is used to soften the overall picture of EU crisis management. By frequent references to the EU’s plans to develop and improve the civilian dimension of crisis management it can be argued that Finnish participation in EU crisis management does not imply a drastic departure from the traditional Finnish peacekeeping approach and the related state identity element.

Another question widely discussed in the parliamentary debates on the peacekeeping legislation concerned the issue of UN mandate, as the EU’s guidelines do not require an absolute UN Security Council mandate for its operations. Of the 25 EU member states only Finland and Ireland have a special mention in their legislation on a UN mandate that prevents participation in operations implemented without UN Security Council’s authorisation.<sup>395</sup> The necessity of a UN mandate is now questioned in the domestic debate. Those arguing that there is no need for a UN mandate note that the political climate prevailing in the UN Security Council varies and refer to the Macedonia operation back in 1999 and China’s veto in the UN Security Council (see chapter

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<sup>390</sup> Defence Minister Kääriäinen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005.

<sup>391</sup> Defence Minister Kääriäinen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>392</sup> Law on civil crisis management, Government proposal 206/2004. Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 5/2004.

<sup>393</sup> E.g. MP U.Anttila 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005; MP Lapintie 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading); MP Kankaanniemi 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (second reading); MP Salolainen (Foreign Affairs Committee chair) 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>394</sup> E.g. MP Räsänen 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (second reading).

<sup>395</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 31; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 7.

5.3.1).<sup>396</sup> This is opposed by views according to which a UN mandate should be obtained for all EU operations<sup>397</sup> because otherwise the UN's prestige and ability to function in the future is undermined. Furthermore, it is argued that without the UN mandate the EU's crisis management operations will erode international justice and undermine the EU's status as a promoter of justice. It is also seen that EU operations without a UN mandate might lead to a situation where resources are removed from UN operations into EU operations.<sup>398</sup>

The Defence Committee saw that it might be impossible to always obtain the UN Security Council's mandate for the employment of the EU's rapid response force, for instance due to an operation's urgency or a conflict of interest between permanent members in the Security Council. Yet, it finds impossible that the EU will use force contrary to the principles of the UN Charter.<sup>399</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee points out that the European Security Strategy and TEU both refer to the UN Charter. Therefore it is also seen that the EU rapid response forces support UN crisis management.<sup>400</sup> Indeed, the "principles of the UN Charter" becomes a phrase frequently referred to in the parliamentary debates. The phrase is used in order to position Finland somewhere between yes and no in the question of UN mandate and EU operations. A consequent issue then is how this position is to be written into the military crisis management act.<sup>401</sup>

A new feature in the peacekeeping debate is that the need to become part of the European mainstream is used in the argumentation of those who are critical towards the Government's proposal to amend the peacekeeping legislation. It is argued that the wording of the Finnish legislation should be similar to those of the other EU member states in that it follows the phrasing of ESS regarding the UN Charter and UN principles in military crisis management<sup>402</sup> and does not include specific reference to the possibility of dismissing the UN.<sup>403</sup> This implies that compared to the previous phases, ESDP is more embedded in the national discourse and is used in political argumentation in a variety of ways. Referring to EU norms and policy goals is no longer the habit or exclusive right of those generally supportive to the EU. Instead it is more freely and

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<sup>396</sup> MP Katainen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.

<sup>397</sup> E.g. MP Siimes 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. Initially the President too supported keeping UN mandate.

<sup>398</sup> Objection statement in Defence Committee Report 1/2004, MP Laakso.

<sup>399</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30.

<sup>400</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 8.

<sup>401</sup> MP Siimes 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>402</sup> MP Siimes 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>403</sup> MP Siimes and MP U. Anttila, dissenting opinion in the Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006; MP Siimes 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; MP Siimes, MP U. Anttila 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading).

diversely used in domestic political argumentation. This is a sign of growing general prominence of the EU security arrangements on the national level, and shows that ESDP has become more internalised in the national political thinking and the political interpretations attached to it have become more diverse. Therefore, although the Government proposals for the new crisis management act refer to operations implemented by the UN and other international organizations or group of countries, the EU now dominates the debate on peacekeeping.

All in all, it can be concluded that the EU crisis management has become a key reason when the national restrictions in participating in international crisis management (UN mandate and limitations as to the use of force) are given up. The aim is to rid of any national preconditions that would hinder Finnish participation in the EU rapid action operations and crisis management. The government directly refers to the UN Charter 42 Article and how it can be problematic for Finnish “participation in the EU rapid action forces and the full scale of the Petersberg tasks”.<sup>404</sup> Finnish legislation is now regarded by the Government exceptionally restrictive compared to the other EU member states, and seen that this is a problem that needs to be solved by amending the national legislation.<sup>405</sup> The Foreign Minister warns that being an exception among EU members would have negative impacts on the Finnish position and overall influence in the EU.<sup>406</sup> Thus, whereas the UN-orientation and national restrictions in use of force were previously seen as a positive factor that resonates with the peacekeeping, neutrality and small state elements of Finnish state identity, it is now to a lessening degree understood to provide material for Finnish state identity reproduction. Instead it is now seen as a policy misfit that should be removed so that Finland can be similar to the other EU members when it comes to crisis management.<sup>407</sup>

The dominant conceptualisations of peacekeeping traditions, a small state’s role in peacekeeping and the self-perception of a peacekeeping superpower are now open to reinterpretation. The meanings attached to them are no longer that fixed, but all these issues can be, and are, utilized in different ways in the domestic political argumentation. They are, for instance, used both in supporting and opposing Finnish participation in EU military crisis management. Similarly, military crisis management can be presented on one hand as a logical continuation to Finnish peacekeeping traditions, and as a break with the traditions in the other. The Defence Minister sees the new legislation on both civil and military crisis management as a continuation to the five decades of Finnish

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<sup>404</sup> Government proposal 5/2006, 23.

<sup>405</sup> Government proposal 5/2006, 23.

<sup>406</sup> Foreign Minister Tuomioja 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading).

<sup>407</sup> E.g. MP Nepponen 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading), 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005.

peacekeeping – traditional missions continue while civil and military crisis management offer new tools to respond to more demanding crises.<sup>408</sup> Consequently, participation in the development of crisis management, rapid response and the EU battle groups included, is seen to suit Finnish peacekeeping traditions.<sup>409</sup> Yet, the Defence Committee admits that “participation in the rapid response force is a significant change in the practical implementation of Finland’s international crisis management.”<sup>410</sup> In some cases, Nordicism is also used as an argument to highlight the continuity in the Finnish peacekeeping and crisis management policy.<sup>411</sup> The Government Report on the Swedish-Finnish-Estonian-Irish-Norwegian battle group and the related Foreign Committee Report, however, do not seize on the Nordic element, but rather approach the topic in the same way as the German-Dutch-Finnish unit.<sup>412</sup> Compared to the previous phases, drawing a link between peacekeeping traditions and participation in military crisis management has become less contested.

At the same time it is possible to draw totally different conclusions and argue that the battle groups and the discarding of the requirement of a UN mandate constitute a critical break with the Finnish peacekeeping tradition. Many MPs refer to the Finnish state identity of a “peacekeeping superpower” as well as the good reputation and international appreciation that is built on the neutral status of Finland and of the Finnish peacekeepers and on UN mandated operations. Therefore military crisis management is bound to have negative consequences to Finland’s “peacekeeping image”.<sup>413</sup> It is seen that the departure from the traditional Finnish approach on peacekeeping is taking place due to the pressure coming from the EU.<sup>414</sup> Thus some MPs see that a requirement for a UN mandate would act as a counterforce to the Europeanization pressure.<sup>415</sup> In the domestic debate traditional Finnish peacekeeping is thus presented as contradicting with the expectations and norms originating in the EU level. The debate touches upon the two vehicles of identity production – peacekeeping/crisis management and neutrality/alignment – and the EU is incorporated in the state identity reconstruction process.

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<sup>408</sup> Defence Minister Kääriäinen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005.

<sup>409</sup> MP Lankia 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004, MP Ollila 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007; MP Kekkonen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>410</sup> Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 29.

<sup>411</sup> Defence Minister Kääriäinen 24.11.2006, preliminary debate on the Government Report 8/2006; MP Laukkanen 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>412</sup> Government Report 2/2007, Foreign Affairs Committee Report 11/2007.

<sup>413</sup> MP Kuoppa 14.9.2005, MP Sirnö 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005; MP Kankaanniemi 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006; MP Lapintie 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading).

<sup>414</sup> MP Räsänen, MP Kallis 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading); MP Tennilä 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (second reading).

<sup>415</sup> MP Tennilä 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading).

In the previous phases the relationship between national defence and international crisis management raised heated debate (see chapters 4.3 and 5.3). Now this issue remains less confrontational. It is generally seen that crisis management supports Finnish defence and security<sup>416</sup> and this conclusion is challenged to a lesser degree than previously. In the previous phases the Government used to justify Finnish support to EU crisis management with references to national defence. In phase III this kind of reasoning plays a significantly smaller role, partly because ESDP has been reconstructed as an unquestionable security interest for Finland. The contribution of military crisis management to Finnish security is perceived more significant than previously, as illustrated by the following extract from the parliamentary debate on the new crisis management legislation:

“However, EU crisis management and the participation in EU crisis management operations may become significant for Finland. (...) In the future military crisis management may have a greater impact on the safety of citizens than has been previously estimated.”<sup>417</sup>

This also implies that the broad security concept is better embedded in the national security policy thinking, and the foreign and security policy discourse has changed so that it is possible to convincingly link issues like geographically remote conflicts, political and economic instability abroad with the defence and security of Finland.<sup>418</sup>

Although the Government does not justify the participation in the EU battle groups with direct references to national defence – the Prime Minister underlines that the battle groups are unsuitable and irrelevant for territorial defence<sup>419</sup> – the Defence Committee Statement, for instance, notices the benefit of the battle group concept to the development of national defence. Especially the cooperation within the German-Dutch-Finnish battle group was considered valuable in this respect.<sup>420</sup> This means that despite the hesitancy to openly link the EU battle groups with national defence, an argument gaining more credibility in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse is that Finnish security can be increased by actions that take place geographically far from the national borders.<sup>421</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> MP Laukkanen, MP Ollila, Defence Minister Häkämies 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>417</sup> E.g. MP Pentti 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>418</sup> E.g. MP Jaakonsaari 7.12.2006, follow-up debate on the Government Report 8/2006.

<sup>419</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on the Government Report 6/2004, also MP Kuosmanen 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (second reading). The debate on EU security guarantees remains largely unconnected to the EU battle groups issue, too.

<sup>420</sup> Defence Committee Statement 5/2007.

<sup>421</sup> MP Jaakonsaari 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading).

Consequently, the issue of using military assets to international operations instead of focusing only on national defence (i.e. territorial surveillance by Air Force Hornet fighters, starting in 2008, transport helicopters to be used in international operations) is also discussed.<sup>422</sup> However, when it comes to such practical issues and the defence budget, crisis management and national defence often become constructed as competing elements. Typically it is seen that a proper balance between them is that credible international action is to be based on credible national defence,<sup>423</sup> or as the Foreign Minister puts it, national defence comes first, then crisis management.<sup>424</sup> There is also some criticism that the battle groups inevitably slim the funding of national defence.<sup>425</sup> The Foreign Affairs Committee's view, however, is that military crisis management and national defence use mainly the same resources and support each other as tasks of the Defence Forces.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>422</sup> E.g. MP U.Anttila 24.11.2006, preliminary debate on the Government Report 8/2006; MP U.Anttila 7.12.2006, follow-up debate on the Government Report 8/2006. She asks if Finland could allocate more resources from the defence budget into the crisis management. The responses mainly note that it would endanger the defence budget.

<sup>423</sup> E.g. MP Kerola 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>424</sup> Foreign Minister Kanerva 13.11.2007, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2007.

<sup>425</sup> E.g. MP Soini 7.12.2006, MP S.Lahtela 7.12.2006, follow-up debate on the Government Report 8/2006.

<sup>426</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee Report 11/2007.

### 6.3.2 ESDP and the “Constitutional crisis”

As was discussed in chapter 3.2, the main purpose of this study is to see beyond structural changes such as bureaucratic reorganization and constitutional change, adaptation of domestic structures, and focus on thick Europeanization instead. However, the rationalist institutionalist view that Europeanization leads to domestic change for instance through differential empowerment of actors describes the so-called constitutional crisis that is brought to a head during the third phase. The questions of the division of power between the Prime Minister and President in CFSP affairs have since remained sensitive issue in Finnish domestic politics.

The EU crisis management became a source political disputes regarding the domestic division of power in foreign and security policy. A key question was how the national decision to send out EU crisis management troops and battle groups is to be made. As was discussed in chapter 3, according the Constitution the starting point in the Finnish decision-making system is that foreign policy is directed by the president “in cooperation with” the Government. However, all EU matters belong to the Government. Yet, there was room for interpretation as to who decides on the participation in ESDP operations, since it was not fully clear if they were to be considered “foreign policy” or “EU affairs”.<sup>427</sup> This resulted in a situation that was labelled a “constitutional crisis”, in which the parliament was divided between those supporting the President’s power and those more in favour of handing all ESDP decisions to the Prime Minister and Government.<sup>428</sup> The deepening of European integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy was effectively moving issues that traditionally belonged to the President into “internal” EU affairs and thus into the domain of the Prime Minister and Government. This demonstrates how Europeanization might result in a conflict of authority and change the power relationship between the key foreign and security policy decision-makers. Consequently, conserving the President’s standing in foreign and security policy against this “Europeanization automation”<sup>429</sup> requires changes in the national interpretations. The Prime Minister argued for ensuring the President’s powers in military crisis management and underlined that when sending Finnish troops abroad the President must be included in the decision-making, as has been done since the first peacekeeping operation 50 years ago.<sup>430</sup> The Government’s aim is to repeat and

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<sup>427</sup> MP Sasi, Chair of the Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee 15.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading).

<sup>428</sup> E.g. MP Siimes, MP Räsänen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. On the jurisprudential aspects of the issue see Niskanen 2006.

<sup>429</sup> MP Sasi 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006.

<sup>430</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution. The majority of expert opinions submitted to the Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee also support this view (Niskanen 2006, 256).

regularize the decision-making method that was used in the first two EU operations in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see chapter 6.3.1 above): the Government prepares, the Parliament handles and the President makes the final decision.<sup>431</sup>

The Government's view is widely contested in the domestic debate, and it is argued that preserving the President's role in the issue is unnecessary.<sup>432</sup> It is also seen that the current "constitutional crisis" offers as a good chance to further parliamentarize foreign and security policy-making.<sup>433</sup> Particularly the Parliament's Constitutional Law Committee (which interprets the constitution) advocated the view that ESDP operations should be decided by the government and not by the President. The Committee's Chair argues that the Government's interpretation results in a situation where "for the first time the powers of the Council of State are limited in EU matters"<sup>434</sup>. The Committee highlights that the sphere of authority extends to all EU matters, CFSP included. This means that since i.a. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and battle groups' tasks in crisis management belong to CFSP according to the Treaty on European Union, they are EU matters and fall into the domain of the Government.

The Government decides to withdraw its first proposal for the new peacekeeping legislation (Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis Management) after the Parliament's Constitutional Law Committee Statement, and plans to amend the Constitution instead.<sup>435</sup> This surprises many of the MPs (as well as Finnish constitutional law experts<sup>436</sup>). The new law is passed as a so-called exceptive act of permanent nature, based on Government proposal 5/2006, which states that the President will decide on Finnish participation in operations on the basis of the Government's proposal, and the Government will hear the Parliament before making the proposal. Similarly, the President also makes the decision on setting the EU battle groups into high readiness status and sending the troops on a mission.

The ESDP issue is loaded with many politically contentious questions in the domestic debate such as the preferred roles of UN and EU in crisis management, interpretation of the constitution, division of power, parliamentarization of foreign and security policy, party politics, the President's traditional position as the Commander-in-chief of the Defence Forces, as well as the nearing presidential elections. Different interpretations as to whom the EU affairs and CFSP belongs to have appeared during the whole Finnish

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<sup>431</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, Finance Minister Heinäluoma 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister's position on the Constitution.

<sup>432</sup> E.g. MP Hautala 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005.

<sup>433</sup> MP Zyskiewicz 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister's position on the Constitution.

<sup>434</sup> MP Sasi, Constitutional Committee's chair, 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister's position on the Constitution.

<sup>435</sup> Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question time: Prime Minister's position on the Constitution.

<sup>436</sup> Edilex 2.12.2005.



EU-membership era, and largely due to the difficulties in drawing the line between foreign policy and EU affairs.<sup>437</sup> This ambiguity has materialized as a co-called two-plate policy, or dual presentation in EU summits, which means that Finland often sends both the President and Prime Minister to European Council meetings. Though the constitution states that the Prime Minister is in charge of EU policy it leaves room for interpretation on who will represent Finland in EU summits as it states that the president leads the foreign policy in cooperation with the Government.<sup>438</sup>

All in all, the constitutional crisis clearly shows that although European integration causes pressures for domestic structural change (as rationalist institutionalism suggests), it is not in a given form but there is national variation – and in the Finnish case an obvious national political struggle on how the Europeanization impact is to be nationally digested and implemented. In the Finnish case this becomes particularly visible because of contesting political and juridical views on the interpretation of the national constitution in the face of the developing CFSP. Additionally, a number of domestic conditions (such as the President's traditional role in foreign policy, demarcation between foreign policy and EU affairs in the new constitution, nearing presidential elections, certain features of party politics<sup>439</sup>) affect the impact of European integration thus causing national variation in the way the EU-membership structurally impacts national foreign policies. As was noted in chapter 3, these have been well documented in the previous studies and are in this study considered to be only of limited relevance from the viewpoint of SI-oriented thick Europeanization.

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<sup>437</sup> E.g. MP Kankaanniemi, MP Sasi, MP Kiljunen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. Some saw this coming already in the first year of EU membership when the Government Report 1/1995 is handled in the parliament and the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia are discussed. MP Ojala 20.12.1995, MP Wahlström 31.10.1995.

<sup>438</sup> "The battle of plates" has resurfaced from time to time, especially after the Lisbon Treaty entered force in 2009. New amendments to the constitution have also been under drafting.

<sup>439</sup> "During the broad coalition governments of Prime Minister Lipponen, the parties in opposition – the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats – were critical [about the ESDP] but since 2003 the Centre Party has in government been more positive to security political developments, and the opposition, the National Coalition Party [in opposition until 19.4.2007], has been very positive towards the Europeanization of Finnish defence policy (Tiilikainen 2006, 213)." (Ojanen 2008, 72.) See chapter 3 for further references.

## 6.4 Conclusions

The role given to the EU security arrangements in Finnish foreign and security policy became significantly more prominent during the time period analysed in this chapter. The EU was now clearly regarded as the most important security and defence policy framework for Finland. The EU was perceived as being capable of tackling the new security threats in the changing global environment, to which Finland, and states in general, have become more vulnerable than before. The European Security Strategy and the threat scenarios defined therein were widely regarded as being in line with the Finnish ones. Additionally, the EU operations and battle groups now dominate the crisis management debate. The impact of the EU extends to the sphere of defence policy: the Government openly stated that the EU influences the way in which the Finnish military defence is developed. The purpose was to develop Finnish military defence so that “Finland will be able to serve as an active member within the security community formed by the EU and allocate the necessary resources for actions required under Union obligations.” (Government Report 6/2004, 7)

Since 2003 there were significant changes in the nature of the sources for Europeanization, as the EU crisis management operations, battle groups and the solidarity clause and mutual defence article entered the CFSP agenda. The general misfit pressure towards Finnish foreign and security policy is greater than in the previous phases. Top-down Europeanization, that is to say continuing national adaptation characterises the Finnish foreign and security policy in the third phase. Full commitment to ESDP is announced, including the defence plans, solidarity clause, civil and military crisis management and the battle groups. Yet, while it is officially declared that Finland participates fully in the executing of the EU’s security policy, a strong perception dominating in the domestic discourse is that the EU is not a military alliance, but rather contributes to Finnish security by other means, such as political solidarity and by providing a “security community”. All in all, a comprehensive reassessment and eventual redefinition of the nature of Finnish non-alignment due to the deepening European integration was to be observed. A typical feature for phase III was also that it is more openly stated and more widely perceived in the domestic debate that changes taking place in Finnish foreign and security policy are caused by the ESDP.

In phase II there were heated domestic political disputes on the compatibility of non-alignment policy with ESDP. As in the two earlier phases, in the first years of the third phase there was a widely-shared will to go against the EU mainstream and to prevent the development of the defence dimension of the CFSP. In the context of the ICG 2003-

2004 this tendency manifested itself in an attempt for bottom-up Europeanization, that is to say national projection that clearly stemmed from a traditional reading of Finnish non-alignment identity. When ESDP appeared to take a turn that was perceived too defence oriented, Finland convened with the other non-aligned and neutral EU member states in order to counter that development. However, all in all phase III represents a change in this respect, since after the national projection proved unsuccessful, the institutional misfit between the Finnish approach and ESDP was tackled by defining anew the military non-alignment concept. This can be taken as a clear indicator of Europeanization, as it is a question of the relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of the EU policy and institutions. The Finnish interpretation of non-alignment was made compatible with ESDP's evolving defence dimension, including the solidarity clause and the mutual defence article that the Convention and the consequent IGC brought along. This was done by redefining military non-alignment as a technical concept that refers to the way in which the national defence is organized, instead of a concept that would describe Finnish foreign and security policy in any broader sense. Despite this official redefinition, ambiguity concerning the exact meaning of non-alignment remained in the domestic discourse. It was possible to challenge the feasibility and credibility of the concept of military non-alignment and argue that Finland can no longer be considered militarily non-aligned in a traditional sense due to the commitment to ESDP. This debate culminated with the parliament voting on the interpretation of Finnish non-alignment.

Concerning the relationship between Finnish peacekeeping and EU crisis management it was now perceived and stated more openly than before that it is necessary to amend Finnish legislation in order to rid of the misfit between the Finnish and EU approaches. In the domestic debate the battle groups are widely understood and explicitly articulated as the reason why the changing of peace-keeping legislation takes place. Concerning the national preconditions and constraints for participation in CFSP it was concluded in the previous chapter that during 1997-2002 a tendency towards more Europeanized foreign and security policy in this respect had begun. Yet, a tendency to highlight "neutral" conventional peacekeeping and the non-participation in military enforcement that stem from traditional state identity elements was then still observed. In phase III military crisis management is turning into a less contested concept in the domestic discourse, and has even replaced "peacekeeping" in the title of the law. The dominant discourse indicates that an understanding gaining ground is that Finland should participate equally in ESDP and the same rules should apply to Finland as to other EU members. It has become a more widely accepted argument that Finland must try to avoid being an exception among EU members. This concerns also the issue of the UN mandate. Previously the UN-orientation and national restrictions in use of force were seen as a positive factor that resonates with the peacekeeping, neutrality and small state elements

of Finnish state identity. In 2003-2007 such difference between Finland and other EU members in this respect is no longer constructed to the purposes of identity production. Rather, some of the traditional features in the Finnish approach were now regarded as a policy misfit that should be removed so that Finland can be similar to the other EU members when it comes to crisis management.

The new meanings attached to peacekeeping have implications on the Finnish state identity reproduction. For instance, it became possible to more credibly link peacekeeping traditions with participation in military crisis management domestic discourse. When debating peacekeeping in the two previous phases, peace enforcement, for instance, was deemed unsuitable to Finland, because it was perceived somehow alien to Finland's state identity. In the previous phases abstaining from peace enforcement or from military coercion against a state and other such unsuitable forms of peacekeeping also served as a factor that contributed to the reproduction of Finnish state identity. In phase III there is growing domestic support for casting aside the national preconditions and constraints for participation in international crisis management. It was typically highlighted that it is necessary to eliminate differences in the national rules of engagement for the sake of the credibility and security of Finnish troops in military crisis management operations and EU battle groups. In the previous phases the domestic discourse was not supportive of this type of argumentation.

Also the meanings attached to small stateness have changed and a new meaning is emerging in the domestic discourse. An effective and unified EU in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy is constructed as an advantage for Finland, specifically since Finland is a small state. In the parliamentary debate the new "small EU member state identity" is pitted against the traditional small state identity that is still observable in the debates. The traditional small state self-identification is also challenged by the growing significance of the broad security conception in the domestic discourse. The "new" threat perceptions make CFSP more suitable for the needs of Finnish security. Furthermore, they enable the construction of a more European state identity where the issues like remote geographical location, small population or borders with the neighbouring countries do not serve as the key elements in state identity reproduction.

Compared to the previous phases, consensus and its perceived value in Finnish foreign and security policy-making have decreased in importance. Where it used to be understood as the lifeline of a small state and an essential factor for small states in the previous phases, now it is far less often referred to in the domestic debate. It has become more difficult to credibly maintain such a construction of continuity that was observed in the discourse in the previous phases in all the three main categories of identity

production. For instance, the view that the military non-alignment concept brings rationality and predictability to the Finnish policy in the eyes of the other international actors was questioned in the domestic debate, and is no longer the dominating view in the domestic discourse. Politicization of foreign and security policy continued. As the ESDP advances it contains more and more potential for causing domestic political disputes, thus rendering impossible to maintain the perception of pragmatic and consensual national foreign and security policy that rests on the analytical identification of the sole correct solution for each given policy issue.

Particularly concerning the first phase it was concluded that it is the post-Cold War deeper international transformation processes that are the primary causes for the changes in Finnish foreign and security policy – and that CFSP played only an instrumental role in that change (see chapter 4.7). Where EU membership and supportive stance on CFSP were then used as proofs of the reorientation of Finnish foreign and security policy, the EU membership now serves as an important element in the state identity reconstruction process, which impacts the way the central state identity elements are understood. Consequently, new issues emerge from the domestic discourse: minimalist reading of military non-alignment, alignment to the EU, peacekeeping increasingly understood as active participation in crisis management as defined by the EU, small stateness determined by EU-membership and recast more and more as “small member stateness”. The ESDP has become an internalized element of the domestic discourse and increasingly serves as a means of self-identification.

In phase III the domestic discourse was observed to be more supportive than before towards the introduction of practices and structures of meaning that originate in ESDP. An increasing interplay between domestic and external expectations and understandings typical for Europeanization processes were observed taking place in phase III. This has resulted in the redefinition of some of the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy and a strengthening understanding in the domestic discourse was that the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy serves the national interest. These findings regarding thick Europeanization further support the conclusion drawn in the analysis of the phase II (see chapter 5.4) that in the ongoing renegotiation of Finnish state identity CFSP comprises an institution that provides Finland with new understandings of what Finnish interests are and what the appropriate means may be to pursue these interests.

## **7. Conclusions: Europeanization of Finnish state identity**

This study set out to examine how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, and whether this change has been profound enough to have impact on the key concepts of national foreign policy – and thus alter the Finnish state identity. The main findings concerning each phase (1994-1996, 1997-2002, 2003-2007) were presented in the conclusions of the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6. The empirical analysis revealed that the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy have undergone a considerable change. New meanings have been attached in the domestic discourse to non-alignment, peacekeeping and small stateness. Moreover, it was shown that the redefinition of concepts was heavily influenced by the European level processes, that is to say the development of EU crisis management and the EU's defence policy. This chapter aggregates the main findings and discusses their implications on the Finnish state identity. It is concluded that European integration has had increasing impact on the Finnish state identity reproduction by bringing in more Europeanized interpretations of the key foreign and security policy concepts.

A key theoretical argument in the background of the study was that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This meant that Europeanization was principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study built on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory. The “constructivist turn” in IR was identified as one of the three major theoretical turns in the background of the Europeanization approach, the other two being the relaunch of Comparative Political Science in EU Studies and the institutionalist turn. With the help of constructivism foreign and security policy was defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts were seen as the vehicles of identity production. It was shown that the mechanisms of change to which the Europeanization literature refers to in the case of foreign and security policy are reminiscent of those that constructivism discusses: interaction, learning and socialization. The rationalist and sociological institutionalist roots of different Europeanization approaches were examined closer and a reconceptualization of Europeanization was presented. It was argued that identity reconstruction should not be seen as a separate category from national adaptation and national projection. Rather, there are two interconnected dimensions in this process:

rationalist institutionalist “thin” Europeanization and sociological institutionalist “thick” Europeanization. Adaptation and projection, then, were defined as the directions in which both rationalist institutionalist and sociological institutionalist Europeanization can happen.

In light of the Finnish case the reconstruction of directions and dimensions of Europeanization appeared useful. Both national adaptation and projection, and thin and thick Europeanization were observed in the empirical analysis. Concerning the question of rationalist versus sociological institutionalism, it can be concluded that the sociological variant proved to be more suitable for studying the Europeanization of national foreign and security policy. The conclusion on the basis of the analysis of the Finnish case is that the rationalist approach is capable of providing a general picture of the structural changes in the politico-administrative system, but risks missing deeper changes in the national foreign and security policy thinking. The origin of such changes is clearly outside the grasp of the rationalist approach: they emerge because European integration has the potential to change the way interests and identities are constructed.

The introduction of constructivist state identity theory was also presented as a way to solve the problems found in the Europeanization literature’s view on the too straightforward connection between individual level identity change and national level foreign and security policy change. The constructivist views on state identity were used in moving attention from the identity reconstruction at the individual level to the level of state identity reconstruction that can be approached by analyzing the national foreign and security policy discourse. State identity was defined as a collective level social construction that is produced by the domestic foreign and security policy-making process and in interaction with the international environment. On the other hand, it was found welcome that the Europeanization approach adds a more empirically oriented approach to the more ontological constructivist social theory. On the basis of this study it can be concluded that the framework in which Europeanization was conceptualized as state identity reconstruction has been fruitful in being able to identify relevant changes in the Finnish case.

The methodological implications of the theoretical framework were explained in chapter 2. The parliamentary debates were considered to provide particularly useful primary research material for the purposes of this study. In light of the empirical analysis it can be concluded that while the official foreign and security policy often emphasized continuity over change, the closer analysis of the parliamentary debate indeed managed to uncover certain heterogeneity and room for manoeuvre in the dominant discourse. By looking closer into the parliamentary debates divergent interpretations and understandings of the EU’s security policy significance for Finland were located. Had

the analysis concentrated solely on the official outcome of the foreign and security policy-making process, the “post-consensus” trend or the problematic relationship between traditional peacekeeping and military crisis management, for instance, would have most likely remained uncovered. The analysis showed that the Government texts often constructed an image of continuity of national foreign and security policy and presented the changes that have taken place often as being minor or technical in nature. Moreover, the Government texts seldom referred directly to the EU’s impact whereas in the domestic debate this was a constant and highly visible theme. For instance, concerning ESDP’s impact on the new peacekeeping legislation of 2000 the analysis revealed a considerable unbalance between the Government’s official discourse and the parliamentary debate. The Government declared that ESDP played no role when the national legislation on crisis management was amended. In the parliamentary debate, however, the impact of the EU’s crisis management capacity build-up on Finnish foreign and security policy was debated extensively, and the justifications of the amendment presented by the Government were questioned. The external pressures posed by the EU membership were seen to have contributed significantly to the new legislation. Moreover, the new peacekeeping act was not regarded merely as a technical adjustment to the previous one, as the Government suggests, but as a change that affects the whole Finnish foreign and security policy, and thus also has repercussions on Finland’s identity as an actor in the international system.

Similarly, it was shown that the Government presented the security and defence report of 2001 merely as a recheck of the previous defence policy report from 1997, but in the domestic debate there were differing interpretations, some seeing the report representing a totally new policy. This indicates that the domestic discursive structures were under change. In light of the theoretical framework it is important to recognize the different tendencies in the domestic discourse and the meaning structures attached to them because they form the context in which certain policies become possible. By including the parliamentary debates in the research material it was possible to see better how the domestic foreign and security policy discourse is influenced by the meanings and understandings at the European level.

By building on secondary sources it was shown in chapter 3 how CFSP constitutes adaptational pressures towards the member states. Furthermore, it was also shown how the adaptational pressure caused by CFSP has increased during the Finnish EU membership era because of the deepening of European integration in security and defence policies. This was argued to have resulted in a growing interplay and *misfit* between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. Misfit proved to be a practical conceptual tool when doing the empirical analysis. It made possible to grasp the



differences between the domestic and European level, and shed light on those issues that set the Europeanization process in motion. Certain cultural understandings and structural conditions were identified as the mediating factors that increase the proneness of Finnish foreign and security policy to Europeanization. These included the *Musterknabe* attitude, lack of NATO membership, cultural understanding of the centrality of security policy, and small stateness. These were seen as factors that made Europeanization proceed more smoothly in the Finnish case, even when there certain persistent traditional identity elements were at play. A main finding concerning the domestic structural conditions that affect the impact of European integration in this study has been that in the Finnish case the cultural understandings serve as the main mediating factors. This is to say that the cultural understandings, rather than any particular group of norm entrepreneurs, influenced the degree to which misfit between the European and Finnish level and the need for national adaptation are felt (cf. Börzel & Risse 2007, 492). Rather than singling out particular norm entrepreneurs, the analysis showed that each consecutive Government generally advanced the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy.

Chapter 3 also looked at the findings of the previous studies from the viewpoint of thin and thick Europeanization and it was concluded that the studies have often concentrated on what can be classified as thin Europeanization, such as structural consequences concerning the division of power and competence of foreign policy actors. In the few cases when the previous studies apply a more sociological institutionalist approach, the conclusions concerning the Finnish case tend to have been that no significant Europeanization has taken place. In light of the present work, it can be concluded that they have underestimated or failed to acknowledge the role played by CFSP in redefinition of the key foreign and security policy concepts.

### *Assessing the main findings and their implications on Finnish state identity*

Before Finland joined the EU, the European Commission pointed at the potential problematic effects of Finnish policy of military non-alignment and credible, independent defence. Firstly, the Finnish policy “might stand in the way of a full acceptance of the Union’s external policies” (European Commission 1992, 22). Secondly, it was asked if Finland “can fully share some of its objectives, such as the safeguarding of the independence and security of the Union” despite the great emphasis Finland lays on “the capability of defending the national territory” (*ibid.*, 22) On the basis of this study it can be concluded that military non-alignment has not stood in the way of full acceptance of the Union’s external policies and its objectives. Since the 1990s the EU has aimed at creating “a European we” in the sphere of foreign and

security policy, with the goal of being able to speak with one voice at the international level (see chapter 3). The analysis indicated that this development has been reflected in the Finnish discourse to a growing degree. The EU has played an increasing role in the post-Cold War reconstitution of “Finland”. The main conclusion of this study in this respect points to a transformation process. In the first years of the EU membership foreign and security policy and CFSP are domestically seen to provide elements that separate Finland from the EU mainstream and from the other member states. Later on, however, CFSP turns into a positive identity element: European integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy begins to represent both a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment and a new means of self-identification. CFSP offers Finland shared values, threat pictures and gives meaning to the positions, interests and interactions of the self and the other in the international system (cf. Doty 1993). Yet, the Finnish case shows that while adapting to CFSP it is still possible to maintain distinctive national interpretations of CFSP and its implications at the domestic level. This way it is possible to preserve certain resonance with the traditional state identity elements while adapting to new European policies and the meaning structures they carry. This latter finding gives further credence to the Europeanization literature’s views on national variation in the impacts of Europeanization. The national interpretations on CFSP and the changes it requires on the domestic level can vary from member state to member state.

The empirical analysis suggested that ESDP and deepening European integration in the sphere of security policy have played a significant, albeit in some cases indirect, role in a number of transformations in the Finnish security policy that have taken place since 1995. These include changes for instance in the national position on the use of military force abroad (the rules of peace-keeping/military crisis management), in the interpretation of non-alignment, the relationship of national defence and crisis management and their profiles as the tasks of the National Defence Forces; and the division of power among the primary national foreign policy decision-makers, that is to say President and the Prime Minister/Council of State, and also the Parliament.

As to the second dimension of Europeanization, that is the attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it was concluded that they mainly relate to the issue of military non-alignment and to the compatibility of the potential development of ESDP’s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. It was shown that the cases of national projection have their roots in the Finnish tradition of neutrality. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy discourse when Finland joined the EU, the analysis showed that its impact continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers.

This also goes to show that some conceptual vehicles of identity production are more persistent to change than others.

The first years of Finnish EU-membership were characterized by a constant monitoring and assessment of national foreign and security policy and the changes in the international security environment. In phase I the role of the EU as a security policy actor on a practical level was regarded rather limited and the significance given to the CFSP and its instruments was modest. The EU-membership was mainly associated with “cooperational security”, and the role of the EU as an international organization was seen to build on its broad economic assistance programmes. The dominant interpretation in the domestic discourse was that the EU’s security policy significance to Finland depended on Finland’s own activity and contribution, particularly since the EU is not a military alliance or an independent actor in the field of defence. Concerning military security the view was that it remains Finland’s own responsibility but the EU membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure.

The analysis of the years 1994-1996 revealed a significant tension in the domestic debate on how national security interest should be defined, and what is the relationship between European and national goals and values in it. The analysis showed a collective understanding in the domestic discourse that a new international and European security order was under construction and the new suitable means for the international community’s purpose were sought for. Two competing main lines were observed in the domestic discourse as to what kind of threat pictures Finnish foreign and security policy should be based on. The traditional approach highlighted that the main threat picture is military and territorial by nature, and the security policy tools must be maintained, developed and prioritised accordingly. The underlined factors that define Finland’s state identity were according to this view the geographical location, smallness, history and the permanency of geopolitics. This view was challenged by an approach that emphasized a more value-based broad security concept and the interests of the post-Cold War international and European value community. The corresponding threat picture was based on a combination of political, societal, economic, environmental and military problems that might escalate and cause regional and international instability. Consequently, it was underlined that international conflict prevention and crisis management are essential for the new Finnish foreign and security policy and more commitment to the emerging European security system is required. The debate culminated with the question of the compatibility of international crisis management with the “legitimate security interest of a small state”. In light of the theoretical framework it was concluded that the two simultaneously prevailing trends in the domestic discourse implied that certain vehicles of state identity production had opened

for re-definition in the political process in phase I. It was also noted that the end of the Cold War had provided a "situation of strong uncertainty" where the previous foundations of Finnish foreign and security policy had to be rethought (cf. Marcussen et al. 2001, 102; Checkel 2001).

Concerning phase I it was concluded that the changes in the Finnish foreign and security policy were not caused primarily by the European integration process. A view that emerged from the discourse was that the participation in and commitment to CFSP were merely an instrument by which the adaptation to the new international security environment could take place. The conclusion drawn concerning the years 1994-1996 thus comes close to Rieker's thesis on instrumental adaptation, according to which no "learning" or "socialisation" has taken place in the Finnish case.<sup>440</sup> However, the analysis showed that an interplay of international and domestic expectations that is typical for a Europeanization process had already started, and there was a discursive battle on how national interest and security should be constructed, and what should be the roles of "European" and purely nationally defined security interests in it. Moreover, the analysis of the years 1997-2007 indicated deeper Europeanization than many of the previous studies suggest.

The analysis of the second phase (1997-2002) pointed to a greater visibility of the EU in the national foreign and security policy discourse than in the previous phase. A widely shared understanding in the domestic discourse was observed that the significance of the EU in carrying out Finland's security policy interests and goals has increased. Finland had arrived at a crossroads and had to choose whether it will follow the European mainstream in security policy or opt out partially or fully from the European security policy cooperation. A main finding in this respect was that less emphasis was put in the domestic discourse on the conception of Finland as a "different" state in Europe that has legitimate national reservations on security cooperation as well as security interests that are out of line with the other EU-members. Additionally, it was concluded that new elements were taking root in the state identity reproduction process. Typical feature located in phase II was the simultaneous emphasizing of "continuity" and "adaptation to the new circumstances" in the official foreign policy discourse.

The analysis showed that there were different domestic interpretations prevailing on what kind of changes in Finnish foreign and security policy the EU-membership and CFSP actually require and how strong the adaptation pressure is. Yet, a widely shared view was observed in the discourse that the development towards deeper cooperation in security policy in the EU is seen likely to cause further national adaptational pressures in

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<sup>440</sup> Rieker's conclusion also means that there has been no identity change and no (social) institutionalisation of the change into a part of national thinking. See chapter 3.2.

the future. Concerning phase II it was concluded that it was no longer possible to construct CFSP in the domestic discourse as simply being fully compatible with the Finnish national foreign and security policy. As the misfit between these two became so apparent a certain reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts and the meanings attached to them was inevitable. The analysis of the domestic debate revealed a growing inconsistency between the emphasis put on continuity in the official discourse and the simultaneous reconstruction of national foreign and security policy concepts. Nevertheless, the intention to preserve, amid the changes, a certain degree of resonance with the traditional state identity elements was also observed. In phase I CFSP, and the EU-membership in general, were mainly seen as an instrument for Finland, with which to prove its European state identity and the direction that Finland has taken in the post-Cold War environment to the other international actors. Contrast to that in phase II it was observed that CFSP became a more internalised element of the national discourse. Concepts like “European values” and “the common European value base” were put forward in the domestic debate as factors from which the goals of Finnish foreign and security policy can be derived. It was concluded that CFSP had started to evolve into a new means of self-identification for Finland.

This development continued in phase III (2003-2007). The analysis pointed to a transitional stage concerning the way in which ESDP was perceived and used in political argumentation in the domestic level. The EU’s overall security policy significance for Finland was identified to be significantly greater than in the previous phases. A strengthening view emerged in the domestic discourse according to which, firstly, the deepening of integration within the EU has increased the stability of Finland’s near environs, and secondly, that in the changing global environment, security threats extend beyond national borders and Finland has become more vulnerable to the “new” security threats than before. The EU was regarded capable of tackling such threats better than any other international organization. The analysis also showed that an understanding gaining ground was that Finland should participate equally in ESDP and the same rules should apply to Finland as to the other EU members. It had become a more widely accepted argument that Finland must try to avoid being an exception among the EU members when it comes to foreign, security and defence policy.

To structure the empirical analysis three key categories of vehicles of identity production were defined in chapter 3. In the following the main findings of each category are discussed from the viewpoint of Finnish state identity reconstruction.

Due to the nature of ESDP as the source of Europeanization pressure, a topic dominating much of the empirical analysis was “crisis management” (whether in the form of military, civilian or “military-civilian” operations). Although a relatively broad national

support on Finnish participation in EU's crisis management had eventually been achieved, the issue appears to have opened the Pandora's box in the national political debate: the analysis pointed out numerous questions and disagreements that had a direct or indirect link to military crisis management as an instrument of ESDP. These include *inter alia* the division of power between the President, Government (and Parliament), question of UN-mandate of peace keeping/crisis management operations, traditional model of peace-keeping versus peacemaking and military enforcement; the relationship of traditional national defence and crisis management as the tasks of National Defence Forces; neutrality/military non-alignment, and even Finnish Constitution and its interpretation and revising.

The original impulse for widening the scope of peacekeeping can be located in the nationally widely shared perception that the post-Cold War environment calls for new types of international activities to secure peace and stability. The introduction of enhanced peacekeeping was domestically justified as being a response to the changes in the international environment. In the later phases, however, a clear shift of focus appears and in the political argumentation the EU and the developing CFSP appear as the factors that necessitate the changes in peacekeeping. The change of national peacekeeping legislation has had impact also on the role of peacekeeping and crisis management in the national defence. In addition to the organizational rearrangements, changes were observed in how the relationship of peacekeeping/crisis management and national defence is understood.

The analysis of the domestic discourse indicated that in phase I the EU's role in peacekeeping and crisis management was considered to be rather modest. The analysis pointed out attempts to draw a clear line between crisis management and peacekeeping. Crisis management was often understood as unsuitable for Finland since it is was compatible with Finland's traditional state identity and role in international politics as a small state. This can be taken as a reason why the Government introduced the concept enhanced peacekeeping as a sort of a middle ground between traditional peacekeeping and military crisis management. Enhanced peacekeeping was constructed as a logical continuation to the Finnish peacekeeping tradition and thus matching with the Finnish state identity. The analysis pointed out a general hesitancy towards over-enhancing the means of peacekeeping too far beyond the traditional form. In the domestic debate it was questioned whether the participation in new international crisis management abolishes the credibility of Finland as a trustworthy traditional peacekeeper or not. A variety of diverse meanings were at this phase attached to crisis management in the domestic discourse. In phase I abstaining from peace enforcement became a factor which contributed to the reproduction of Finnish identity. It supported and revitalized the traditional state identity elements related to peacekeeping, which have their roots firstly

in an understanding of Finland as a neutral party, a conventional peacekeeper. Additionally, it was observed that non-participation in peace enforcement was justified with references to small state identity. Peace enforcement and military coercion against a state was considered a task for great powers and military alliances, not small states. Additionally, the civilian crisis management was constructed as a way to preserve a certain resonance between the national collective understandings that relate to the traditional peacekeeping as a state identity element and the new more military-oriented features of international crisis management. By putting emphasis on the civilian aspects of crisis management it was possible to some extent to try to bridge the gap between the domestic understandings that stemmed from the traditional state identity elements and the norms, expectations and adaptation pressures coming from the European level.

Although military coercion was excluded, a step towards enhanced peacekeeping was taken, broadening the scope of Finnish peacekeeping beyond the traditional limits. In retrospect, the introduction of enhanced peacekeeping paved the way for an emerging interplay between the domestic pressures to safeguard the heritage of Finnish peacekeeping traditions and external pressures emanating from the international level. In the domestic discourse the new peacekeeping act of 2000 was portrayed as the second phase in a transformation process that started with the amendment that took place in 1995. Also in phase II the analysis showed a persistence of the vehicles of identity production that relate to the traditional peacekeeping conception and connect both neutrality and peacekeeping. In the Government texts the related revisions in the foreign and security policy were constructed in a way that aims to preserve a certain degree of resonance with the traditional state identity elements. The analysis pointed out a conceptually constructed difference between “peace enforcement” and “military enforcement”, the latter being defined alien feature to Finnish foreign and security policy and state identity.” This difference made possible the perception that the new policy does not contradict with the still so prominent elements in Finland’s state identity, i.e. non-alignment and traditional peacekeeping.” Regarding phase II a key finding in this respect was that when the neutrality element is intertwined with conventional peacekeeping element they constitute a strong conservative dynamic against external pressures.

Concerning phase I it was concluded that although peacekeeping activities had been traditionally seen as an essential part of Finland’s state identity (via the self-image of a “peacekeeping superpower”), it was not manifested as a significant factor in national defence. Contrast to that, in phase II a direct connection was constructed in the Government discourse between the defence of the motherland and peacekeeping activities abroad. A finding in this respect was that Finnish participation in military crisis management is domestically perceived to have repercussions both on Finland’s

position as a militarily non-aligned state and on the relationship between national defence and international crisis management. The analysis also showed that the question of political expectations and moral obligations coming from the EU figured more prominently in the domestic debate than in phase I. The EU crisis management had become to be perceived as a factor that sets the conditions and expectations for the future directions of Finnish peacekeeping. Furthermore, it was concluded that the role of perceived differences between Finland and other EU-members and CFSP in state identity reconstruction process was declining. In phase II the impact of European integration was particularly visible when peacekeeping was reconstructed as crisis management. The definitions used in ESDP appeared to have had a significant impact on how the new forms of peacekeeping, and the division into civilian crisis management and military crisis management, were perceived nationally. It was concluded that the conceptual shift from peacekeeping towards crisis management, and the related changes in the meanings attached to peacekeeping as a central state identity element, represent an exemplar of top-down, “thick” Europeanization.

In phase III the connection between Finnish defence and international military cooperation in the EU was more clearly manifested. The Prime Minister, for instance, stated that crisis management increases national security, creates the capacity for international cooperation and makes it easier to receive assistance in a state of emergency. Developing Finnish crisis management capability began to be justified more visibly than before as part of Finnish defence policy. An understanding gaining ground in the domestic discourse was that crisis management supports Finnish defence and security. This is partly explained by the fact that the broad security concept had become more embedded in the national security policy thinking. The analysis showed that the foreign and security policy discourse had become more supportive towards linking issues like geographically remote conflicts, political and economic instability abroad with the defence and security of Finland. Consequently, despite the hesitancy to openly link the EU battle groups with national defence, an argument gaining more credibility in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse was that Finnish security can be increased by actions that take place geographically far from the national borders.

Furthermore, the analysis showed that military crisis management had turned into an established and less contested concept in the domestic discourse, and the meanings attached to it had become less diverse. It was widely recognized that ESDP and Finnish participation in EU civil and military crisis management operations and battle groups necessitate the amending of the Finnish peacekeeping policy and legislation. At the same time, non-alignment was no longer dominantly perceived as a feature that brings added value to Finnish crisis management.



Summing up it can be concluded that the peacekeeping and crisis management operations served as mobilisers of concrete Europeanization impacts in the domestic decision-making structures. The operations also gave exact timetables for the changes and caused time pressure on the domestic decision-making. National adaptation to ESDP and EU crisis management appeared particularly in the form of casting aside the previous national preconditions and constraints for participation in international crisis management operation. Gradually the national restrictions became to be seen as a hindrance and problem rather than distinctive character of the Finnish peacekeeping traditions that secures and reproduces Finnish state identity. At first the UN-orientation and national restrictions in use of force were seen as a positive factor that resonates with the peacekeeping, neutrality and small state elements of Finnish state identity. Later on, they were to a lessening degree understood to provide material for Finnish state identity reproduction. Instead they were seen as a policy misfit that should be removed so that Finland can be similar to the other EU members when it comes to crisis management.

During the first years of the EU membership, “military non-alignment” and “credible independent defence” were widely perceived as a logical continuation to the Finnish foreign and security tradition. In the Government speech the participation in CFSP was presented as having caused no radical alteration in the grand Finnish foreign and security policy line. Similarly, the EU-membership was presented as something that naturally befits Finland’s “western” and “European” state identity. These findings concerning phase I support the conclusions presented in some of the other existing work on the theme. For instance, Browning’s argument on the intentional political construction of “a European narrative” for Finland (Browning 2002, 2008; see chapter 3.2) points to the same direction. However, in light of the present work the EU soon turns from being an instrument in making identity politics into a source of adaptational pressure.

A key finding in phase II was a growing inconsistency between the emphasis put on continuity in the official discourse and the simultaneous reconstruction of national foreign and security concepts. Eventually, Finland had to take a more consistent and committed stance on how it regards CFSP/ESDP and by what means it participates in its development. Consequently, Finland was impelled to define more clearly than before the meaning and limits of its non-alignment. The inapplicability of neutrality was in phase II more directly and openly connected to the EU-membership in the domestic discourse. Additionally, “a common European value base” was more often referred to in the domestic debates on non-alignment. The analysis showed that inapplicability of neutrality had gained a dominant position in the domestic discourse, and this was identified as a clear indication of thick Europeanization. Furthermore, it was noted that Finland had entered an era of constant re-assessment of its military non-alignment. This

implied that new meanings were attached to military non-alignment, and it was no longer perceived as an immutable factor, but only as a solution that is found most suitable under the prevailing circumstances, and thus may be subject to change.

In phase III the compatibility of Finnish military non-alignment with the developed ESDP became an increasingly questioned issue in the domestic debate. A conclusion gaining ground in the domestic debate was that the increasing commitment to ESDP implies that Finland is inescapably Europeanized to such a degree that the credibility of the concept of military non-alignment had begun to falter. The previous construction that the military non-alignment concept brings rationality and predictability to the Finnish policy in the eyes of the other international actors had lost credibility in the domestic debate. In the official interpretation military non-alignment was reconstructed as a more technical and less political qualifier that refers mostly to the way in which national defence is organized and implemented in practice. Full commitment to ESDP was announced, including the defence plans, solidarity clause, civil and military crisis management and the battle groups. Yet, while it was officially declared that Finland participates fully in the executing of the EU's security policy, a strong perception dominating in the domestic discourse is that the EU is not a military alliance, despite the ESDP development. The analysis indicated that certain ambiguity concerning the exact meaning of non-alignment remained in the domestic discourse.

It can be concluded that a comprehensive reassessment and eventual redefinition of the nature of Finnish non-alignment due to the deepening European integration was taking place in phase III. The Finnish interpretation of non-alignment was made compatible with ESDP's evolving defence dimension. However, the adaptational pressure caused by the defence dimension of CFSP was far from being unambiguous. The unclear status of EU defence policy left room for national interpretation. This made it possible for Finland to stick to the concept of military non-alignment, although only in the most limited form. The observed cases of national projection also related to the issue of EU defence policy and Finnish non-alignment. In both cases Finland invoked its non-alignment, joined forces with other neutral or non-aligned EU member states, and in order not to compromise its status as militarily non-aligned country made an attempt to keep common defence out of the EU. Finland tried to influence the EU-level and promote nationally defined goals and ideas that better resonate with the domestic norms and collective understandings that stemmed from the non-alignment element in the Finnish state identity. In the end, the outcomes of both of the national projections show that national projection is not fully steerable and might result in unexpected and even unwanted results. This might be a feature that concerns only the small member states, but what perhaps speaks in favour of the generalization of this finding is that in both cases Finland worked together with a group of member states. All in all, and despite the

national projections, it can be concluded that the state identity element of non-alignment has been significantly Europeanized. The institutional misfit between the Finnish approach and ESDP was tackled by defining anew the military non-alignment concept, and the Finnish interpretation of non-alignment was made compatible with ESDP's evolving defence dimension, including the solidarity clause and the mutual defence article that the Convention and the consequent IGC brought along. As a consequence of this, Finnish state identity has been effectively Europeanized. Finland finds itself not impartial, but part of the European "we".

The third and last category of conceptual vehicles of identity production, small stateness, was defined to consist of three components: consensus in national foreign and security policy-making, understanding of a "legitimate security interest of small state", and perceptions on role of geography.

The main finding concerning consensus was that there is an ongoing trend of "post-consensus", caused by simultaneous parliamentarization and Europeanization of foreign and security policy. This is to say that foreign and security policy issues are more openly discussed in the parliament and the parliament has more say in the decision-making. Furthermore, the EU membership has brought along a diversified policy agenda and new levels of decision-making. This has made the preconditions of national consensus more complicated and has resulted in the diversification in the domestic discourse and a gradual fracturing of consensus. However, the analysis revealed that the small state identity appeared quite persistent when it comes to consensus: both the government and the opposition in many occasions considered national consensus and moving security and foreign policy beyond normal domestic politics imperative for a small state. Consequently, the analysis indicated a general bafflement and mutual accusations between government and parliament on the wearing away of national consensus. In the domestic discourse an emerging understanding was observed, according to which the possibilities for a "pragmatic" foreign and security policy have decreased. A related finding was that the politicization of national security policy has reached a point in which consensus is no longer perceived that essential element of a small state's foreign and security policy. Consensus used to be understood as the lifeline of a small state but is now far less often referred to in the domestic debate.

In phase II a reconstruction process was identified in which "small state identity" has begun to be increasingly interpreted as "small member state identity". The analysis showed that a growing perception in the domestic discourse was that it is in the foreign and security policy interests of a small member state to promote the EU as a strong international actor. This pointed to a construction of more European state identity where the issues like remote geographical location, small population or borders with the

neighbouring countries do not serve as the dominant elements in state identity reproduction. At the same time, the understanding of a “legitimate security interest of small state” that rests on purely nationally defined security interests was challenged by a view that saw foreign and security policy interests as common interests and defined in common European processes. In the domestic discourse small stateness was no longer connected to national preconditions and constraints for participation in CFSP, but was perceived to imply supporting issues like the external capacity of the EU, intergovernmentalism, equal right of participation, regulation of flexible integration in the second pillar, and jointly decided goals and timetables.

Nevertheless, more traditional conclusions on small state interests were also observed in the debate, particularly when such aspects of Finnish defence policy as the territorial defence system and general conscription were discussed. Yet, in the framework of this study this was not taken as an indication of superficiality or instrumentality of Finnish foreign and security policy Europeanization. Rather, it told us more about the source of Europeanization pressure: CFSP does not produce an unambiguous Europeanization pressure on issues like territorial defence or general conscription.<sup>441</sup>

On the basis of this study it can be concluded that the EU membership now serves as an important element in the Finnish state identity reconstruction process, and impacts the way the central state identity elements are understood. Consequently, new issues emerge from the domestic discourse: minimalist reading of military non-alignment, alignment to the EU, peacekeeping increasingly understood as active participation in military and civil crisis management as defined by the EU, small stateness determined by EU-membership and recast more and more as “small member stateness”. In the ongoing renegotiation of Finnish state identity CFSP clearly comprises an institution that provides Finland with new understandings of what Finnish interests are and what the appropriate means may be to pursue these interests. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union has become an internalized element of the domestic discourse and increasingly serves as a means of self-identification for Finland.

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<sup>441</sup> However, it could be asked if an extended participation in EU battle groups and military crisis management operations can result in domestic perceptions of such an adaptational pressure, for instance through the mechanisms that are typical for Europeanization: interaction, learning and socialization. This issue might be a potential line for further research.

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